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Full-Text Articles in Business
Analysts' Site Visits And Corporate Innovation, Qiang Cheng, Yutao Wang, Holly I. Yang, Zheyuan Zhang
Analysts' Site Visits And Corporate Innovation, Qiang Cheng, Yutao Wang, Holly I. Yang, Zheyuan Zhang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
While prior studies examine whether analyst coverage affects corporate innovation, there is little research on the mechanism through which financial analysts affect corporate innovation. In this paper, we examine whether and how analysts’ questions about innovation affect corporate innovation activities and outcomes. Using a sample of corporate site visits in China, we find that when analysts ask questions about innovation during site visits, the firms invest more in research and development and file more patent applications in the future. This association is stronger when analysts have a greater information and monitoring role. In addition, consistent with knowledge diffusion between firms, …
Essays On Innovation, Analyst Coverage, And Corporate Finance, Yang Liu
Essays On Innovation, Analyst Coverage, And Corporate Finance, Yang Liu
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
This dissertation consists of three chapters that encompass corporate innovation, analyst coverage, public firm disclosure, and institutional investors.
Analyst Coverage And The Cost Of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence From Underpricing Of Seasoned Equity Offerings, Robert M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng
Analyst Coverage And The Cost Of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence From Underpricing Of Seasoned Equity Offerings, Robert M. Bowen, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Theorists have long recognized that information asymmetry among investors adversely affects the cost of raising equity capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). When there is information asymmetry, relatively uninformed investors are reluctant to trade because of higher potential loss from transacting with informed investors (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). To trade, uninformed investors demand compensation for the risks of trading with informed investors (O’Hara 2003). In the case of issuing new equity, firms must issue shares at a discount to overcome the reluctance of uninformed investors. Such discounting leads to smaller proceeds to the firm and a higher …