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Full-Text Articles in Business

Management Forecast Credibility And Underreaction To News, Jeffrey Ng, Irem Tuna, Rodrigo Verdi Dec 2013

Management Forecast Credibility And Underreaction To News, Jeffrey Ng, Irem Tuna, Rodrigo Verdi

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this paper, we first document evidence of underreaction to management forecast news. We then hypothesize that the credibility of the forecast influences the magnitude of this underreaction. Relying on evidence that more credible forecasts are associated with a larger reaction in the short window around the management forecasts and a smaller post-management forecast drift in returns, we show that the magnitude of the underreaction is smaller for firms that provide more credible forecasts. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing out-of-sample evidence of the drift in returns documented in the post-earnings-announcement drift literature, with the credibility of the …


Financial Reporting Quality Of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect Or The China Effect?, Kun-Chih Chen, Qiang Cheng, Ying Chou Lin, Yu-Chen Lin, Xing Xiao Dec 2013

Financial Reporting Quality Of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect Or The China Effect?, Kun-Chih Chen, Qiang Cheng, Ying Chou Lin, Yu-Chen Lin, Xing Xiao

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial reporting quality. We find that while U.S. RM firms have similar financial reporting quality as matched U.S. IPO firms, Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than Chinese ADR firms. We further find that Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. These results indicate that the use of RM process is associated with poor financial reporting quality only in firms from China, where the legal enforcement is weaker than U.S. In addition, we find that compared to Chinese ADR firms, …


What Are Analysts Really Good At?, Rong Wang, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, Tzachi Zach Dec 2013

What Are Analysts Really Good At?, Rong Wang, Leonardo Madureira, Rong Wang, Tzachi Zach

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their stock recommendations. For example, a ‘buy’ for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its peers in the same sector (“industry benchmarkers”), while for other brokers it means the stock is expected to outperform the market (“market benchmarkers”), or just some absolute return (“total benchmarkers”). We use these benchmarks to analyze the role of stock picking, industry picking and market timing in contributing to the performance of stock recommendations. We are able to do so given that different benchmarks suggest the use of different sets of abilities. Analysis of the …


A Taxing Problem, Singapore Management University Oct 2013

A Taxing Problem, Singapore Management University

Perspectives@SMU

MNCs move assets and products across borders. How does one know if they are doing so to avoid paying taxes?


Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang Oct 2013

Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.


Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai Sep 2013

Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family …


A Survey Of Executive Compensation Contracts In China’S Listed Companies, Yubo Li, Fang Lou, Jiwei Wang, Hongqi Yuan Sep 2013

A Survey Of Executive Compensation Contracts In China’S Listed Companies, Yubo Li, Fang Lou, Jiwei Wang, Hongqi Yuan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns …


Managerial Incentives And Management Forecast Precision, Qiang Cheng, Ting Luo, Heng Yue Sep 2013

Managerial Incentives And Management Forecast Precision, Qiang Cheng, Ting Luo, Heng Yue

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider …


Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong Aug 2013

Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with …


Internal Governance And Real Earnings Management, Qiang Cheng, Jimmy Lee, Terry J. Shevlin Aug 2013

Internal Governance And Real Earnings Management, Qiang Cheng, Jimmy Lee, Terry J. Shevlin

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon and influence. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the impact of internal governance is more important for firms with more complex operations where …


Work Out Optimum Tax Rates, Benefits For A New Business, Teng Aun Khoo, Clement Tan Kai Guan Aug 2013

Work Out Optimum Tax Rates, Benefits For A New Business, Teng Aun Khoo, Clement Tan Kai Guan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

No abstract provided.


Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence From An Exogenous Governance Change, Sterling Zhenrui Huang, Urs Peyer, Benjamin Segal Aug 2013

Do Firms Hedge Optimally? Evidence From An Exogenous Governance Change, Sterling Zhenrui Huang, Urs Peyer, Benjamin Segal

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We ask whether firms hedge optimally by analyzing the impact the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rule changes have had, which exogenously imposed board composition changes on a subset of firms, on financial risk management. Using new proxies for the extent of financial risk management in non-financial firms we find that treated firms reduce their financial hedging, in a difference-in-difference framework. The reduction is concentrated in firms with higher conflicts of interests, such as a high CEO equity ownership level, which exposes them to more idiosyncratic risk, and a higher occurrence of option backdating. We reject the hypothesis that newly majority-independent boards reduce …


Getting Your Accounting Right, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang Aug 2013

Getting Your Accounting Right, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

The book brings together authors from the industry and the academic world to contribute articles on the topic of high quality financial reporting. The objective is to help business directors and accounts preparers to understand the importance of high quality financial reporting to their business and get it right from the start.


The Effect Of Corporate Tax Avoidance On The Cost Of Equity, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin Aug 2013

The Effect Of Corporate Tax Avoidance On The Cost Of Equity, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

While prior studies have examined how investors perceive extreme forms of tax avoidance behavior such as tax sheltering and uncertain tax position (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009; Koester 2011; Hutchens and Rego 2012), there is little evidence on how investors perceive less extreme forms of tax avoidance. This study fills this void by examining the relation between firm’s cost of equity and corporate tax avoidance using three measures that capture less extreme forms of corporate tax avoidance: book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates. We find that less aggressive forms of corporate tax avoidance …


Political Connection And Firm Value, James S. Ang, David K. Ding, Tiong Yang Thong Aug 2013

Political Connection And Firm Value, James S. Ang, David K. Ding, Tiong Yang Thong

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We study the effect of political connection (PC) on company value in an environment where low PC is due to better institutions and not confounded by favorable social/cultural factors. We find that in Singapore, the only country that fits this description, PC in general adds little to the value of a company. However, in industries that are subject to more stringent government regulations, PC appears to be somewhat important. Robustness checks show that alternative PC variables give rise to similar results, and the addition of control variables do not drastically change the findings. Politically connected firms have higher managerial ownership …


Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer Jul 2013

Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.


How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios Jul 2013

How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are …


Accounting Restatements And External Financing Choices, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis Lo Jun 2013

Accounting Restatements And External Financing Choices, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis Lo

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO/CFO turnover and auditor dismissal. Our evidence …


Are Investors' Corporate Site Visits Informative?, Qiang Cheng, Fei Du, Xin Wang, Yutao Wang Jun 2013

Are Investors' Corporate Site Visits Informative?, Qiang Cheng, Fei Du, Xin Wang, Yutao Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Corporate site visit is an important type of investors’ information acquisition activities, but its usefulness is not well understood in the literature, partially due to the lack of data. Using a unique dataset of corporate site visits in China, we analyze the information content and the determinants of corporate site visits. Our main findings are as follows. First, we document a significant market reaction to corporate site visits and the market reaction is stronger for group visits, for visits conducted by mutual fund managers, for visits covering firm-specific topics, and for firms with poorer information environment. Second, we find that …


Which Board Interlocks Matter? The Impact Of Managerial Power, Legitimacy, And Family Power On The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, A. Tuschke Jun 2013

Which Board Interlocks Matter? The Impact Of Managerial Power, Legitimacy, And Family Power On The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, A. Tuschke

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Inter-organizational relationships and the networks they create are an important mechanism for the transfer of knowledge and learning. Network ties enable the transfer of experiential knowledge – for instance of vicarious information through board interlocks. While we know that organizational learning occurs and is influenced by factors like the strength of ties and a firm’s position in the network, it is still unclear what causes the firm to act on the information gained through network ties. We build on prior studies on the impact of interlocking board ties ion the adoption of new practices and analyze the effects of different …


Are Investors' Corporate Site Visits Informative?, Qiang Cheng, Fei Du, Xin Wang, Yutao Wang Jun 2013

Are Investors' Corporate Site Visits Informative?, Qiang Cheng, Fei Du, Xin Wang, Yutao Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Corporate site visit is an important type of investors’ information acquisition activities, but its usefulness is not well understood in the literature, partially due to the lack of data. Using a unique dataset of corporate site visits in China, we analyze the information content and the determinants of corporate site visits. Our main findings are as follows. First, we document a significant market reaction to corporate site visits and the market reaction is stronger for group visits, for visits conducted by mutual fund managers, for visits covering firm-specific topics, and for firms with poorer information environment. Second, we find that …


The Liability Of Foreignness In International Equity Investments: Evidence From The U.S. Stock Market, Bok Baik, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim, Joonho Lee May 2013

The Liability Of Foreignness In International Equity Investments: Evidence From The U.S. Stock Market, Bok Baik, Jun-Koo Kang, Jin-Mo Kim, Joonho Lee

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Using foreign institutional ownership data in the US from 1990 to 2007, we examine whether foreign institutional investors face liabilities of foreignness (LOF) in the US stock market. We find that foreign institutional investors prefer low information asymmetry stocks more than domestic institutional investors do, and this preference for low information asymmetry stocks is particularly strong among foreign institutional investors from countries with high LOF. More importantly, we find that a change in foreign institutional ownership is negatively related to future returns, whereas this relation does not exist for domestic institutional ownership. The negative relation between the change in foreign …


When The Pcaob Talks, Who Listens? Evidence From Stakeholder Reaction To Gaap-Deficient Pcaob Inspection Reports Of Small Auditors, Lawrence J. Abbott, Katherine A. Gunny, Tracey Chunqi Zhang May 2013

When The Pcaob Talks, Who Listens? Evidence From Stakeholder Reaction To Gaap-Deficient Pcaob Inspection Reports Of Small Auditors, Lawrence J. Abbott, Katherine A. Gunny, Tracey Chunqi Zhang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts inspections of registered public accounting firms that provide audits for publicly traded companies. The results of the inspection process are summarized in publicly available reports at the PCAOB website. Using these reports, we categorize the inspection reports into three levels of increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and GAAP-deficient. We examine the potential use of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports as perceived audit quality signals for the clients of GAAP-deficient auditors that are inspected on a triennial basis by the PCAOB. Our investigation is predicated …


How Important Are Earnings Announcements As An Information Source?, Sudipta Basu, Truong Duong, Stanimir Markov, Eng Joo Tan May 2013

How Important Are Earnings Announcements As An Information Source?, Sudipta Basu, Truong Duong, Stanimir Markov, Eng Joo Tan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In a competitive information market, no single information source is likely to dominate all other sources collectively, but a single source can dominate all or most other sources individually. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar’s R2 metric: the proportion of the variation in annual returns explained by earnings announcement returns. We find that earnings announcement R2 is 11% -- higher than the corresponding R2 of returns on days with dividend announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, 10-K and 10-Q filings and amendments. Only the four largest realized absolute daily returns in a year match …


Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang Apr 2013

Social Capital, Informal Governance, And Post-Ipo Firm Performance: A Study Of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Jerry X. Cao, Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper explores the links between entrepreneurs' social capital and post-IPO firm performance in China's unique capital market and regulatory setting. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs' political connections and firm financial information, we construct original measures for various types of social capital and examine their roles in determining the accounting and financial performance of entrepreneurial firms after an IPO. On one hand, firm accounting performance is enhanced by entrepreneurs' bridging social capital, such as political connections or a willingness to share power with external investors. On the other hand, bonding social capital such as intra-group related party transactions causes performance …


Pcaob Inspection Reports And Audit Quality, Katherine A. Gunny, Tracey Chunqi Zhang Mar 2013

Pcaob Inspection Reports And Audit Quality, Katherine A. Gunny, Tracey Chunqi Zhang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously …


Corporate Governance: The Role Of Independent Directors, Singapore Management University Jan 2013

Corporate Governance: The Role Of Independent Directors, Singapore Management University

Perspectives@SMU

Companies in Singapore may now have to spend more time and resources to look for independent directors for their firms after the recent revised Corporate Governance Code, but the efforts will be worth it, said Jeremy Goh, associate professor of finance at SMU at a panel discussion during the 3rd Singapore Corporate Governance Week.


The Impact Of Sfas133 On Income Smoothing By Banks Through Loan Loss Provisions, Emre Kilic, Gerald J. Lobo, Tharindra Ranasinghe, K. Sivaramakrishnan Jan 2013

The Impact Of Sfas133 On Income Smoothing By Banks Through Loan Loss Provisions, Emre Kilic, Gerald J. Lobo, Tharindra Ranasinghe, K. Sivaramakrishnan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine the impact of SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their financial statements. We argue that because the stricter recognition and classification requirements of SFAS 133 reduced banks' ability to smooth income through derivatives, banks more affected by SFAS 133 will rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. We find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the increased reliance on loan loss provisions for smoothing income has impaired the informativeness of loan loss provisions.


Managerial Incentives And Management Forecast Precision, Qiang Cheng, Ting Luo, Heng Yue Jan 2013

Managerial Incentives And Management Forecast Precision, Qiang Cheng, Ting Luo, Heng Yue

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision of their earnings forecasts for self-serving purposes. Building on prior research demonstrating that the market reaction to vague management forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing …


The Opportunistic Reporting Of Material Events And The Apparent Misconception Of Investors' Reaction, Dan Segal, Benjamin Segal Jan 2013

The Opportunistic Reporting Of Material Events And The Apparent Misconception Of Investors' Reaction, Dan Segal, Benjamin Segal

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 1996 to 2011, we examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting of mandatory and voluntary news. We find strong evidence of opportunistic reporting of negative news, especially among public firms. Public firms are more likely to delay disclosure of negative news, report negative news after trading hours, and report on the last day of the week. We also find evidence of opportunistic bundling of news. Our findings support the notion that managers engage in strategic disclosure by delaying or obfuscating negative news in order to mitigate the potential market reaction. Factors …