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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Business
Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding And Online Auction Ipos, A. Christine Hurt
Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding And Online Auction Ipos, A. Christine Hurt
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Time To Lift The Veil Of Inequality In Health Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law To Defend The Affordable Care Act, Seema Mohapatra
Time To Lift The Veil Of Inequality In Health Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law To Defend The Affordable Care Act, Seema Mohapatra
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
Following the contraction in demand for law firms’ services during the Great Recession, “Big Law” was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for “relationship firms.” While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we should expect certain firms to continue …
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …