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Executive Compensation And Regulation Imposed Governance: Evidence From The California Non-Profit Integrity Act (2004), Sandip Dhole, Saleha B. Khumawala, Sagarika Mishra, Tharindra Ranasinghe
Executive Compensation And Regulation Imposed Governance: Evidence From The California Non-Profit Integrity Act (2004), Sandip Dhole, Saleha B. Khumawala, Sagarika Mishra, Tharindra Ranasinghe
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance …
Transnational Governance Interactions: A Critical Review Of The Legal Literature, Stepan Wood
Transnational Governance Interactions: A Critical Review Of The Legal Literature, Stepan Wood
Transnational Business Governance Interactions Working Papers
Overlaps and interactions among diverse legal rules, actors and orders have long preoccupied legal scholars. This preoccupation has intensified in recent years as transnational efforts to regulate business have proliferated. This proliferation has led to increasingly frequent and intense interactions among transnational regulatory actors and programs. These transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) are the subject of an emerging interdisciplinary research agenda. This paper situates the TBGI research agenda in the broader field of transnational legal theory by presenting a critical review of the ways in which legal scholars have addressed the phenomenon of governance interactions. Legal scholars frequently recognize the …
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.
This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …