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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Business
Protecting Reasonable Expectations: Mapping The Trajectory Of The Law, Edward J. Waitzer, Douglas Sarro
Protecting Reasonable Expectations: Mapping The Trajectory Of The Law, Edward J. Waitzer, Douglas Sarro
Articles & Book Chapters
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved into a powerful tool for judicial and regulatory activism and, as a result, a bellwether for the trajectory of the law. The concept has broadened — both in scope and in the range of potential claimants. Yet it has been used to achieve goals that are remarkably consistent across different areas of law: first, to require powerful actors to treat stakeholders fairly, which entails treating them with honesty and avoiding actions that would impose unnecessary or disproportionate costs on them; second, to uphold the integrity of legal or regulatory regimes by remedying actions …
Understanding The Global In Global Finance And Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter
Understanding The Global In Global Finance And Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr.
Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper articulates a framework both for assessing the various government bailouts that took place at the onset of Great Recession and for guiding future rescue efforts when they become necessary. The goals for those engineering a bailout should be to be as transparent as possible, to articulate clearly the reason for the intervention, to respect existing priorities among investors, to exercise control only at the top level where such efforts can be seen by the public, and to exit as soon as possible. By these metrics, some of the recent bailouts should be applauded, while others fell short. We …
Key Flaws In The European Commission’S Proposals For Foreign Investor Protection In Ttip, Gus Van Harten
Key Flaws In The European Commission’S Proposals For Foreign Investor Protection In Ttip, Gus Van Harten
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series
In November 2015, the European Commission released a proposed text on foreign investor protection in the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In this paper, I outline key flaws in this proposal, including language buried in the text that significantly undermines the EC's proposed provisions on the investment court system (ICS) and on the right to regulate.
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking And Public Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking And Public Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This article argues for a “public governance duty” to help manage excessive risk-taking by systemically important firms. Although governments worldwide, including the United States, have issued an array of regulations to attempt to curb that risk-taking by aligning managerial and investor interests, those regulations implicitly assume that investors would oppose excessively risky business ventures. That leaves a critical misalignment: because much of the harm from a systemically important firm’s failure would be externalized onto the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, such a firm can engage in risk-taking ventures with positive expected value to its investors but …
Perspectives On Regulating Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Perspectives On Regulating Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This book chapter, which synthesizes several of the author’s articles, attempts to provide useful perspectives on regulating systemic risk. First, it argues that systemic shocks are inevitable. Accordingly, regulation should be designed not only to try to reduce those shocks but also to protect the financial system against their unavoidable impact. This could be done, the chapter explains, by applying chaos theory to help stabilize the financial system. The chapter then focuses on trying to prevent excessive corporate risk-taking, which is one of the leading triggers of systemic shocks and widely regarded to have been a principal cause of the …
Keynote Address, Regulating Corporate Governance In The Public Interest: The Case Of Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Address, Regulating Corporate Governance In The Public Interest: The Case Of Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
There’s long been a debate whether corporate governance law should require some duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is not to require such a duty—that corporate profit maximization provides jobs and other public benefits that exceed any harm. This is especially true, the argument goes, because imposing specific regulatory requirements and making certain actions illegal or tortious can mitigate the harm without unduly impairing corporate wealth production. Whether that is true in other contexts, this paper—delivered as the keynote address at the June 2016 National Business Law Scholars Conference at The University of Chicago Law School—questions if it’s true …
Shadow Banking And Regulation In China And Other Developing Countries, Steven L. Schwarcz
Shadow Banking And Regulation In China And Other Developing Countries, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
The rapid but largely unregulated growth in shadow banking in developing countries such as China can jeopardize financial stability. This article discusses that growth and argues that a regulatory balance is needed to help protect financial stability while preserving shadow banking as an important channel of alternative funding. The article also analyzes how that regulation could be designed.