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The Long-Term Effects Of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, And Ownership Structure On Valuation, Michael R. King, Dan Segal
The Long-Term Effects Of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, And Ownership Structure On Valuation, Michael R. King, Dan Segal
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We show that investor recognition and bonding associated with a U.S. cross-listing are distinct effects using a sample of Canadian firms. In contrast to the post-listing decline documented in the literature, we find that cross-listed firms with a single class of shares enjoy a permanent increase in valuation if they attract and maintain investor recognition over time. Valuations of firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base return to pre-listing levels within two years. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings, consistent with firm-level bonding.
Corporate Ownership Structure And Innovation: Evidence From Taiwan's Electronics Industry, Chen Lung Chin, Yu Ju Chen, Gary Kleinman, Picheng Lee
Corporate Ownership Structure And Innovation: Evidence From Taiwan's Electronics Industry, Chen Lung Chin, Yu Ju Chen, Gary Kleinman, Picheng Lee
Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners' self-interested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of directors or externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership and control structure and innovation. The ownership and control structure is measured first as the divergence between the ultimate owner's voting rights and the ultimate owner's cash flow rights, and second by the presence of ultimately controlling shareholder's family member as …