Business Commons^™

The Effect Of Auditors’ Assessment Of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting On Audit Fees, Cost Of Debt And Net Compliance Benefit, Hongmei Jia

Theses and Dissertations--Accountancy

In this study, I use Section 404(b) of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock to examine the effect of auditors’ assessment of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) on audit fees, cost of debt, and net value of compliance between 2002 and 2010. Using firms themselves as their own control, this study conducts firm-fixed effects analyses to explore the close causal effect of SOX 404(b) on compliance costs (proxied by audit fees), compliance benefit (proxied by cost of debt) and net compliance benefit (proxied by Tobin’s q). Through analyzing how SOX 404(b) affects firms’ compliance cost, compliance …

To What Extent Does The European Debt Crisis Affect Both The European And The Global Economies, Amy Yi Huang

Lewis Honors College Capstone Collection

The goal of my research is to analyze the relationship between the 2007-2009 United States financial crisis and the ongoing European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Debt Crisis’ possible effects on the global economy and to examine the different approaches to reduce the devastating effects of the European Debt Crisis.

First, I am going to analyze the relationship between the bursting of the US Housing Bubble and the European Debt Crisis. According to Robert Kolb (2011), a Finance professor at the University of Chicago, the bursting of the US Housing Bubble in 2007 that resulted in the 2007-2009 economic recession …

The Effect Of Increased Audit Disclosure On Investors' Perceptions Of Management, Auditors, And Financial Reporting: An Experimental Investigation, Marcus M. Doxey

Theses and Dissertations--Accountancy

Standard setters recently proposed increasing audit disclosures and reporting. Two experiments examine the effects of auditor-provided disclosures on financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor independence, management credibility, reporting quality, materiality, and investment decisions. In the first experiment, I manipulate auditor agreement with management’s estimates and whether the estimates are incentive-consistent for management. I find that users view auditors as more (less) independent when they agree (disagree) with management, given an unqualified opinion. I also find that users are able to identify management bias using audit disclosures, and that the disclosures are value-relevant. In the second experiment, I provide users with …