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Articles 1 - 13 of 13

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

No Solace In Quantum: Indeterminacy And Collapse Of The Wave Function Do Not Explain Consciousness, Glenn Hartelius, Courtenay Richards Crouch Sep 2020

No Solace In Quantum: Indeterminacy And Collapse Of The Wave Function Do Not Explain Consciousness, Glenn Hartelius, Courtenay Richards Crouch

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

N/A


A Fractal Topology Of Transcendent Experience, Sally Wilcox, Allan Combs Sep 2020

A Fractal Topology Of Transcendent Experience, Sally Wilcox, Allan Combs

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

N/A


Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci Jul 2020

Izutsu’S Zen Metaphysics Of I-Consciousness Vis-À-Vis Cartesian Cogito, Takaharu Oda, Alessio Bucci

Comparative Philosophy

Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation). This is examined step by step from the perspective of …


Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill Jul 2020

Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill

Animal Sentience

We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for …


Topics Of The Sky: Ashbery's Involving Search For The Poem, Tom M. Carlson Jun 2020

Topics Of The Sky: Ashbery's Involving Search For The Poem, Tom M. Carlson

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

An essay lived by John Ashbery's Three Poems with special attention to the possibility of cosmic relevance. This paper attempts to imagine priorities and needs proper to celestial bodies. Three Poems is the consciousness that gives possibility to the text, while Blanchot, Nietzsche, and other thinkers ground its exploration in philosophical analysis.


"Do You Have A Conscience?", Jeremy Bendik-Keymer Feb 2020

"Do You Have A Conscience?", Jeremy Bendik-Keymer

The International Journal of Ethical Leadership

No abstract provided.


In Support Of Abstraction: Physical Interiority Beyond Postmodern Dance, Irene Hultman Monti Feb 2020

In Support Of Abstraction: Physical Interiority Beyond Postmodern Dance, Irene Hultman Monti

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

I investigate how speculative philosophy informs critical thinking about dance and its performance, encompassing both the act of creating and the action of executing. Speculative thinking augments and draws out new experiences and realities in the artistic body. I will argue that speculative theories widen the understanding and implementation of dance and its performance through a combination of human and nonhuman forces. This broadened understanding encourages progress, transformation, and evolution within the field of dance. I discuss the human (that which is experienced through sensibilities, therefore tangible and understandable on a cognitive and practical level) and the nonhuman (forces beyond …


Moral Treatment For All, Eric Dietrich, Tara Fox Hall Jan 2020

Moral Treatment For All, Eric Dietrich, Tara Fox Hall

Animal Sentience

There is no way to include invertebrates within the moral sphere without being “extreme” — to use Mikhalevich & Powell’s term. This is because of the profound difficulties in correctly attributing sentience. This commentary argues that we have a moral duty to be extreme.


Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak Jan 2020

Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak

Animal Sentience

In certain situations, insects appear to lack a response to noxious stimuli that would cause pain in humans. For example, from the fact that male mantids continue to mate while being eaten by their partner it does not follow that insects do not feel pain; it could be the result of modulation of nociceptive inputs or behavioural outputs. When we try to infer the underlying mental state of an insect from its behaviour, it is important to consider the behavioural effects of the associated physiological and neurobiological mechanisms.


Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino Jan 2020

Sentience In All Organisms With Centralized Nervous Systems, Lori Marino

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates, especially insects, by asking whether invertebrates have the cognitive and neural characteristics necessary for sentience. This approach assumes that human neural and cognitive complexity is the basis of sentience. But insight might also be gained by turning this approach on its head and examining the notion that sentience may be a fundamental biological property, appearing very early in the evolution of life in all organisms with centralized nervous systems.


Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe Jan 2020

Intuition And The Invertebrate Dogma, Jonathan Balcombe

Animal Sentience

Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuition can lead to the opposite conclusion. Observed insect behavior, combined with scientific support for insect consciousness summarized in Mikhalevich & Powell’s target article, and bolstered by the Precautionary Principle, all militate against completely denying moral status to insects.


Reconsidering Moral Perception: The Dialectical Emergence Of Moral Perceptual Contents During Experience Via Cognitive Penetration And Oppressive Socialization’S Suppression Of Our Ability To ‘See’ Moral Reasons For Humanization And Liberation, James William Lincoln Jan 2020

Reconsidering Moral Perception: The Dialectical Emergence Of Moral Perceptual Contents During Experience Via Cognitive Penetration And Oppressive Socialization’S Suppression Of Our Ability To ‘See’ Moral Reasons For Humanization And Liberation, James William Lincoln

Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy

Moral perceptions occur when a subject makes an immediate discernment about the moral features of an occurrent experience. This project taxonomizes theories of moral perception into the following two camps: experientialism and judgementalism. I defend a version of experientialism, Moral Perceptual Orientation, by arguing that we, in addition to making moral judgments, have genuine perceptions with moral content during occurrent experience. I then go on to advance a framework for understanding how these perceptions are curated by our background beliefs by developing a view of dialectical consciousness. I do this by synthesizing Herbert Marcuse’s perspective on the epistemic subject with …


The Ontological Significance Of Consciousness, Corydon Diamond Jan 2020

The Ontological Significance Of Consciousness, Corydon Diamond

CMC Senior Theses

Providing a wholly physical description of consciousness in nature is an elusive process. Unlike all other physical systems, consciousness seems to be explainable only if it is considered as non-physical. However, the arguments for a materialist view of consciousness, with consciousness prioritized as a process which creates imperfect dependence relations in reality, eliminates the need for a dualist understanding of reality. Through an explanation of imperfect dependence, materialist consciousness overcomes all relevant dualist arguments, while simultaneously retaining an epistemic gap, denying the conceivability of zombies, and providing convincing explanations of seemingly dualist positions in a materialist fashion.