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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
The Fragmented Mind: Working Memory Cannot Implement Consciousness, Javier Gomez-Lavin
The Fragmented Mind: Working Memory Cannot Implement Consciousness, Javier Gomez-Lavin
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
In both philosophy and the sciences of the mind there is a shared commitment to the idea that there is a center—the seat of consciousness, the source of deliberation and reflection, and the core of personal identity—in the mind. My dissertation challenges this deeply entrenched view. I review the empirical literature on working memory, psychology’s best candidate for the workspace of the mind, and argue that it is not a natural kind and cannot inform these central cognitive processes. This deflationary view directly imperils many naturalistic theories of consciousness that rely on working memory, which are reviewed in this project. …
Complexities And Challenges Of Nonduality, Elizabeth Stephens
Complexities And Challenges Of Nonduality, Elizabeth Stephens
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
States of consciousness referred to as nonduality, awakening, enlightenment, moksha, peak experience, unitive states, or void states, among other terms, have garnered increasing secular attention and have become a topic of psychological and neuroscientific research. A review of the literature revealed many challenges to studying this set of states, such as inconsistent conceptualizations, a variety of models and theories, and conflicting descriptions indicating that the actual experience may not live up to the superlative descriptions found in historical texts or the expectations put forth by nondual teachers. A great deal more empirical research on this topic is needed, and researchers …
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Jennifer Mather, PhD
Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
Animal Sentience
Whereas we have denied the experience of pain to animals, including human babies, the evidence is becoming clearer that animals across a variety of species have the capacity to feel pain (Bellieni, 2012). As converging findings are collected from pain studies and the study of cognition, it is becoming harder to deny that fish are among the species that do feel pain.
Pain In Fish: Evidence From Peripheral Nociceptors To Pallial Processing, Michael L. Woodruff
Pain In Fish: Evidence From Peripheral Nociceptors To Pallial Processing, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
The target article by Sneddon et al. (2018) presents convincing behavioral and pharmacological evidence that ray-finned fish consciously perceive noxious stimuli as painful. One objection to this interpretation of the evidence is that the fish nervous system is not complex enough to support the conscious experience of pain. Data that contradict this objection are presented in this commentary. The neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of the fish nervous system from the peripheral nerves to the pallium is able to support the sentient appreciation of pain.
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai, Ila France Porcher
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
The systematic criticism of articles providing evidence that fish and invertebrates can feel pain is discussed. Beliefs are known to be stronger than evidence in the human mind, and could generate this outcry, while from another perspective, the criticisms appear as a territorial move by fishermen against a perceived threat to their domain. The scientific inconsistency in which consciousness is granted to machines but not to fish and invertebrates, purely due to political bias, is pointed out. No basis exists for denying sentience to any life form as long as science is ignorant of the nature and source of consciousness.