Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy Faculty Research

Series

Justified beliefs

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

The Knower, Inside And Out, Steven Luper Mar 1988

The Knower, Inside And Out, Steven Luper

Philosophy Faculty Research

Adherents of the epistemological position called internalism typically believe that the view they oppose, called externalism, is such a new and radical departure from the established way of seeing knowledge that its implications are uninteresting. Perhaps it is relatively novel, but the approach to knowledge with the greatest antiquity is the one that equates it with certainty, and while this conception is amenable to the demands of the internalist, it is also a non-starter in the opinion of almost all contemporary epistemologists since obviously it directly implies that we know nothing about the world. Perhaps skepticism is correct, but …


The Causal Indicator Analysis Of Knowledge, Steven Luper Jun 1987

The Causal Indicator Analysis Of Knowledge, Steven Luper

Philosophy Faculty Research

In this paper I want to describe and motivate an approach to knowledge that I call the Causal Indicator Analysis. My strategy will be to sketch (in Part I) the main features of an adequate account of knowledge, then use my sketch (in Part II) to reveal some of the faults of some of the main analyses defended today. I will be particularly interested in discussing the work of Fred Dretske, whose views have significantly influenced my own. With these tasks behind me, I will offer my own account in Part III, and argue that it has the features an …


The Reliabilist Theory Of Rational Belief, Steven Luper Apr 1985

The Reliabilist Theory Of Rational Belief, Steven Luper

Philosophy Faculty Research

Proponents of Reliabilism must give an account of the conditions under which a belief has been arrived at through a reliable means. In this paper I will sketch just such an account, one which will improve on that of Alvin Goldman1 and others (see Section I). Then, bearing that analysis in mind, I will argue against Reliabilism by refuting the Reliabilist's Thesis (in Section II). Having given Reliabilists the best analysis of reliable belief sources I can develop, I believe that my refutation of Reliabilism should still be of interest, though, since it is resistant to a wide range …