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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Eliminativism, Dialetheism And Moore's Paradox, John N. Williams
Eliminativism, Dialetheism And Moore's Paradox, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of Ellie is Di, a dialetheist who asserts or believes that: Since any adequate explanation of Moore's paradox must handle …
Moore’S Paradox And The Priority Of Belief Thesis, John N. Williams
Moore’S Paradox And The Priority Of Belief Thesis, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. …
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore's Paradox In Belief: A Reply To Chan, John N. Williams
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore's Paradox In Belief: A Reply To Chan, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy CHAN calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. CHAN, who also takes the absurdity to be a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must …
Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that …