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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
A Critique Of Scanlon On The Scope Of Morality, Benjamin A. Elmore
A Critique Of Scanlon On The Scope Of Morality, Benjamin A. Elmore
Between the Species
In this essay, I argue that contractualism, even when it is actually used to construe our moral duties towards non-human animals, does not do so naturally. We can infer from our experiences with companion animals that we owe moral duties to them because of special relationships we are in with them. We can further abstract that we owe general moral duties to non-human animals because they are the kinds of beings that we can have relationships with, and because of the capacities that make possible this relational capacity. This type of approach better explains our duties to non-human animals and …
Fishy Reasoning And The Ethics Of Eating, Mylan Engel Jr.
Fishy Reasoning And The Ethics Of Eating, Mylan Engel Jr.
Between the Species
Ethical vegetarians believe that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Yet, many self-ascribed “ethical vegetarians” continue to eat fish. The question I explore here is this: Can one coherently maintain that it is morally wrong to eat meat, but morally permissible to eat fish? I argue that it is morally inconsistent for ethical vegetarians to eat fish, not on the obvious yet superficial ground that fish flesh is meat, but on the morally substantive ground that fish are sentient intelligent beings capable of experiencing morally significant pain and thus deserve moral consideration equal to that owed birds and mammals.
Why We Should Stop Creating Pets With Lives Worth Living, Chelsea Haramia
Why We Should Stop Creating Pets With Lives Worth Living, Chelsea Haramia
Between the Species
Pedigreed breeding often leads to severe health problems for, say, those dogs who exist as a result of the practice. It is also the case that virtually all of those unhealthy animals would not exist at all if it were not for the practice of pedigreed breeding. If those animals have lives worth living, then it follows that they are not harmed by the practice—assuming that a life worth living is better than no life at all. It would seem, then, that the standard account of harm cannot account for the wrongness of our intentionally creating pets with lower welfare. …