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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Can You Escape Agency By Falling Asleep? Killing Two Constitutivists’ Problems With One Stone, Henrique Cassol Leal
Can You Escape Agency By Falling Asleep? Killing Two Constitutivists’ Problems With One Stone, Henrique Cassol Leal
Theses
In this paper, I present a new problem to constitutivism (the idea that agency grounds our practical norms) and argue that the solution to this problem also solves Enoch’s shmagency question. The problem I bring forth involves the fact that agency seems to be metaphysically escapable, such as when we fall asleep, or get hit by a truck. If this is correct, then we allow for perplexing cases in which a wrongdoing is done, but no agent is responsible, nor is any norm broken—for, what grounds responsibility and norms, our agency, has disappeared. I thus argue for a notion of …
Intentional Passing And Closeted Agency, Logan Bohlinger
Intentional Passing And Closeted Agency, Logan Bohlinger
Theses
It is characteristic of closeted queer agents that they behave so as to pass as heterosexual, cisgender, or otherwise as non-queer. Thus, I take it that an action-theoretic account of the phenomenon of straight-passing is essential to developing an action-theoretic account of the practical disposition of being “in the closet.” To progress towards a broader account of closeted queer agency, I endeavor in this thesis to clarify the patterns of practical reasoning involved in straight-passing with an aim to demonstrate that straight-passing, in all its forms, is something that a queer agent can intentionally do. However, a queer agent often …
How To Distinguish Qualities And Dispositions, Seth Reed
How To Distinguish Qualities And Dispositions, Seth Reed
Theses
There is an intuitive difference between a qualitative and a dispositional predicate. Qualitative predicates seemingly refer to inherent features of an object, while dispositional predicates point outward to possible interactions. Attempts to further spell this distinction have proven difficult, however. Past approaches have either started from metaphysical assumptions or compared paradigmatic cases of each side-by-side. In this paper I offer a new approach to solving this puzzle. Starting with a qualitative or dispositional predicate of a property, we can examine how that differs from a predicate of the other kind that applies, in virtue of that property, to the same …
A Conferralist Account Of Individuality, Zachary Auwerda
A Conferralist Account Of Individuality, Zachary Auwerda
Theses
The individual is at the center of liberal political theory. Despite this, oppressed groups that are members of liberal societies are not respected as individuals. This paper attempts to explain one way in which this happens. I argue that some people are not treated as individuals, because they are in fact not individuals. In some cases, to be an individual requires recognition as an individual. I attempt to show that certain uses of the term “individual” refer to conferred properties. A conferred property is a property that is given to an object by a subject. Thus, conferred properties are not …
Public Artifacts, Empirical Vulnerability And Descriptive Metaphysics, Blake Davenport
Public Artifacts, Empirical Vulnerability And Descriptive Metaphysics, Blake Davenport
Theses
Herein I argue that Amie Thomasson’s account of public artifacts is empirically vulnerable. I first identify the descriptive claims that feature in Thomasson’s argument and then outline an experimental framework in which the accuracy of those claims can be evaluated. I conclude with some brief remarks on the possible implications of my approach for Thomasson’s account, and some thoughts on whether an experimental approach to evaluating projects in descriptive metaphysics might be valuable more broadly.