Philosophy Commons^™

Theistic Open Futurism: A Critical Philosophical Investigation, Elijah Hess

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

In this dissertation I critically evaluate and develop a model of God I dub “theistic open futurism”—the view that an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being exists but fails to know future contingent statements because such statements are not true. Contrary to what their free will critics have supposed, I argue that theistic open futurists do not subscribe to a metaphysical vision of the future that is logically or religiously incoherent. With respect to the latter, I suggest that while some open theists have overstated their case concerning the amount of providential control God could have given the reality of an …

Between Choice And Compulsion: An Examination And Critique Of The Evolution Of 'Original Sin', Matthew James Wynn

MSU Graduate Theses

“Why are we the way that we are?” is one of the hardest questions to answer because it requires grasping the origin of human beings. This has left philosophers and theologians in century-long debates on forming a “cosmogony of ontology” (i.e., how the origin of the universe informs the human condition). The concept, “original sin” was developed by a North African theologian named Augustine (354 – 430 CE). Augustine’s reading of Genesis 3, and inaccurate translation of Romans 5:12, taught that a person is born morally culpable for a fault antecedent to their existence. This way of thinking about the …

The Denial Of Transcendental Freedom Is Self-Refuting, Theodore Kahn

CMC Senior Theses

The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically morallives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and …

The Problem Of Luck And Free Will : How Counterfactuals Can Help., Zach Smith

College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses

For free will theorists, the problem of luck has been a constant source of consternation. Peter van Inwagen presents a version immune to even agent-causal conceptions of free will. However, van Inwagen’s version of the problem can be avoided if there are true propositions taking the form of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. There are good reasons to think that there are, and no comparably good reasons to think that there are not. This defense is also resistant to common attacks based on foreknowledge and the grounding of the truth of these counterfactuals.

In Defense Of The Direct Argument For Incompatibilism, Paul Roger Turner

Doctoral Dissertations

Is moral responsibility compatible with the truth of causal determinism? One of the most influential arguments that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism is the so-called ‘Direct Argument,’ developed by Peter van Inwagen in his An Essay on Free Will. Informally put, the Direct Argument goes as follows:

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But we are not responsible for what went on before we were born, and neither are we responsible for what the laws of nature are. Therefore, we are not …