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Ancient Philosophy

Orexis

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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Appetites And Actions In Aristotle's Moral Psychology, Tom Olshewsky Jan 2008

Appetites And Actions In Aristotle's Moral Psychology, Tom Olshewsky

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The so-called practical syllogism is best understood in dispositional terms. Animate movement originates with orexis (appetite), but appetite is the result of the coming together of dual dispositions, the orektikon and the orekton. For calculative appetite, multiple objectives can be imagined, and deliberation determines which objective is best for this person in this circumstance. Deliberation is an antecedent of the actualized appetite, not its consequence. This psychology makes clear that satisfaction of appetites is a two-stage process for calculative beings: first the determination of the appetite, then movement to fulfillment in its objective. In deliberation, the determination is which …


Aristotle On The Αρχή Of Practical Reasoning: Countering The Influence Of Sub-Humeanism, Lynn Holt Mar 1995

Aristotle On The Αρχή Of Practical Reasoning: Countering The Influence Of Sub-Humeanism, Lynn Holt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My central aim is to show that Aristotle convincingly avoids what has been the linchpin of the dominant contemporary view of the starting point of practical reasoning: that practical reasoning must begin, both normatively and motivationally, with some desire or want (call this sub-Humeanism). My task is made more difficult by the presence of a now common interpretation of Aristotle himself in which desire is both normatively and motivationally super-ordinate. On this view, Aristotle cannot be a genuine alternative to the contemporary view, since he just is a contemporary: Aristotle is the first sub-Humean about practical reasoning.

In order to …


On The Antecedents Of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology, William W. Fortenbaugh Dec 1969

On The Antecedents Of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology, William W. Fortenbaugh

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

This paper will be concerned with the antecedents of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology. It will consider two common theses: 1) Aristotle's bipartite psychology is in origin a popular psychology already present (if not clearly formulated) in Euripides' Medea; 2) Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition by collapsing together the two lower elements of tripartition. Roughly, I shall be affirming the first and rejecting the second thesis. In both cases I hope to develop and make more precise the origins of Aristotle's bipartite psychology.