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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Public History
Media Discourses That Normalize Colonial Relations: A Critical Discourse Analysis Of (Im)Migrants And Refugees, Meng Zhao, Jorge Rodriguez, Lilia D. Monzó
Media Discourses That Normalize Colonial Relations: A Critical Discourse Analysis Of (Im)Migrants And Refugees, Meng Zhao, Jorge Rodriguez, Lilia D. Monzó
Education Faculty Articles and Research
The im(migration) and refugee crisis that are being exacerbated under the Trump administration, is a manifestation of empire-building and the long history of colonization of the Global South. A Marxist-humanist perspective recognizes these as consistent aspects of a clearly racist global capitalism that functions in the interest of multibillion dollar U.S.–based corporations and increasingly transnational corporations. Trade agreements, international economic policy, political intervention, invasion or the threat of these, often secure corporate interests in specific countries and regions. The authors use critical discourse analysis to examine the discourses around Mexican, Central American, and Syrian im(migrants) and refugees as examples of …
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' …
“A Disconnected Dialogue: American Military Strategy, 1964-1968,” Oklahoma Humanities, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall-Winter 2017., Gregory A. Daddis
“A Disconnected Dialogue: American Military Strategy, 1964-1968,” Oklahoma Humanities, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall-Winter 2017., Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
"The admission, supported by a careful reading of the historical record, begs larger questions: How do we remember American strategy in Vietnam? What language do we use to describe a war that proved so tragic, not only for the United States but, perhaps more importantly, for the millions of Vietnamese who lost their lives in a decades-long civil war? In coming to grips with a complex war, Americans, then and now, have relied on a series of tropes to streamline their conversations about a distasteful war."
Faith In War: The American Roots Of Global Conflict, Gregory A. Daddis
Faith In War: The American Roots Of Global Conflict, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
War has become a form of secular religion for many Americans in the modern era. Much of our deployment of military power during the last 50 years has rested on a set of absolute beliefs about the overall utility of war. In the process, policymakers and citizens alike maintain an enduring faith that the United States, via its military forces, has the power to transform societies abroad.
Choosing Progress: Evaluating The "Salesmanship" Of The Vietnam War In 1967, Gregory A. Daddis
Choosing Progress: Evaluating The "Salesmanship" Of The Vietnam War In 1967, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
"As the president and his war managers increasingly saw Vietnam as a 'race between accomplishment and patience,' publicizing progress became an integral part of the war. Yet far from a unique case of bureaucratic dishonesty, the 1967 salesmanship campaign demonstrates the reality, even necessity, of conversation gaps when one is assessing progress in wars where the military struggle abroad matters less than the political one at home."
Westmoreland’S War: Reassessing American Strategy In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Westmoreland’S War: Reassessing American Strategy In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
An original and major reinterpretation of American strategy during the Vietnam War which totally reconsiders the generalship of William Westmoreland and offers a more balanced picture of the US Army in Vietnam. The book's thesis that US strategy was more than just 'attrition' confronts decades' worth of historical narratives which argue we lost in Vietnam due to bad leadership and an incorrect strategy
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally …
Review Of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of Nick Turse's Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam.
On Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
On Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley.
No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness And Progress In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness And Progress In The Vietnam War, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Review Of A Question Of Command: Counterinsurgency From The Civil War To Iraq, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of A Question Of Command: Counterinsurgency From The Civil War To Iraq, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, by Mark Moyar.
Review Of The Battle Of An Loc, Gregory A. Daddis
Review Of The Battle Of An Loc, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
A review of The Battle of An Loc, by James H. Willbanks.
Armageddon’S Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations In Allenby’S Palestine Campaign, Gregory A. Daddis
Armageddon’S Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations In Allenby’S Palestine Campaign, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Articles and Research
In September 1918, the EEF concluded its campaign in Palestine by routing the Turkish forces at the battle of Megiddo. Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. In terms of surprise, concentration, and operational balance of forces, the culmination of the Palestine campaign was a foreshadowing of the German blitzkrieg used in World War II.
Unfortunately, the …