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Statistcal Mechanics And The Past Hypothesis, Angela Lee Feb 2019

Statistcal Mechanics And The Past Hypothesis, Angela Lee

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Statistical mechanics is a time invariant explanation of thermodynamic phenomena at a microphysical level. However, given that the laws of thermodynamics are not time-reversal symmetric, it is unclear whether to introduce the asymmetry through boundary conditions (through the past hypothesis) or through the dynamic laws themselves. In this paper, I defend the need of a boundary condition for statistical mechanics against two main objections: that there is no independent knowledge of the past hypothesis, and that the dynamic laws in statistical mechanics should be time-reversal asymmetric. I first introduce core notions of statistical mechanics, explain the past hypothesis and its …


Comments On Jongmin Jerome Baek Paper “How To Solve Moral Conundrums With Computability Theory”, Liam Grantham Feb 2019

Comments On Jongmin Jerome Baek Paper “How To Solve Moral Conundrums With Computability Theory”, Liam Grantham

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

“How to Solve Moral Conundrums with Computability Theory”

By Jongmin Jerome Baek (University of California, Berkeley)

Comments by Liam Grantham

Chair: Erland Cain


Comments On Angela Lee’S “Statistical Mechanics And The Past Hypothesis”, Emory Brigden Feb 2019

Comments On Angela Lee’S “Statistical Mechanics And The Past Hypothesis”, Emory Brigden

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

“Statstcal Mechanics and the Past Hypothesis”

By Angela Lee (University of California, Berkeley)

Comments by Emory Brigden

Chair: James Conley


Ubi As Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard Or Dose Of Paternalism?, Sun Woo Lee Feb 2019

Ubi As Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard Or Dose Of Paternalism?, Sun Woo Lee

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Universal Basic Income is a welfare scheme that deliberately stays agnostic about how it is spent and the type of people it benefits. In this paper, I argue that contrary to its façade of agnosticism, UBI is not as carefree as its proponents say it is or wish it to be. I point out a definitional feature of UBI that is at odds with its commitment to anti-paternalism--its insistence on continuous payment. Drawing on the contest between Basic Income and Basic Capital, the latter of which endorses lump-sum payments as opposed to Basic Income’s periodic ones, I suggest that UBI …


Comments On Sun Woo Lee’S “Ubi As Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard Or Dose Of Paternalism?, Brian Kim Feb 2019

Comments On Sun Woo Lee’S “Ubi As Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard Or Dose Of Paternalism?, Brian Kim

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

“UBI as Regular Payment: Egalitarian Safeguard or Dose of Paternalism?”

By Sun Woo Lee (Stanford University)

Comments by Brian Kim

Chair: Guillermo Ruiz


Response To “Truth In The Falsification Of Ai”, August Malueg Feb 2019

Response To “Truth In The Falsification Of Ai”, August Malueg

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

12:00-12:50: “The Truth in the Falsifcaton of Artfcial Intelligence”

By Mariah Jacobs (Pacifc University)

Comments by August Malueg

Chair: Thalia Barr-Malec


The Truth In The Falsification Of Artificial Intelligence, Mariah Jacobs Feb 2019

The Truth In The Falsification Of Artificial Intelligence, Mariah Jacobs

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

The influence Karl Popper’s falsificationist model has had on the scientific method and the demarcation problem is troublesome for the field of artificial intelligence (AI). According to Popper, the falsifiability of a hypothesis is a necessary condition for its scientific validity. Because the falsificationist model has been formative in the development of modern philosophy of science, it has become the primary way in which we demarcate the scientific from the non-scientific. However, as a consequence of our current, limited understanding of mental properties—such as intelligence, thought, and personal identity—I argue that it is unclear whether hypotheses concerning the design of …


Mt. Olympus, Gotham City, And Metropolis: The Power Of Heroism In Shaping Cultures And Futures, Julia French Feb 2019

Mt. Olympus, Gotham City, And Metropolis: The Power Of Heroism In Shaping Cultures And Futures, Julia French

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Stories reflect the cultures they arise from and their heroes help direct the mindset of future generations. From ancient Greece to modern America, the human creativity behind these worlds has allowed us to promote new beliefs and virtues through the adventures of our heroes. “Mt. Olympus, Gotham City, and Metropolis” explores how mythological heroism has changed over time and now conflicts with itself as religious and secular story-tellers alike wrestle with the teleological foundation within heroism.

In America for instance, Batman and Superman are the pillars of our modern pantheon, and their recent movie Batman v. Superman: Dawn of Justice …


A Response To Julia French’S “Mt. Olympus, Gotham City And The Metropolis: The Power Of Heroism, In Shaping Cultures And Futures”, Sam Place Feb 2019

A Response To Julia French’S “Mt. Olympus, Gotham City And The Metropolis: The Power Of Heroism, In Shaping Cultures And Futures”, Sam Place

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

11:00-11:50: “Mt. Olympus, Gotham City, and Metropolis: The Power of Heroism in Shaping Cultures and Futures”

By Julia French (University of Notre Dame)

Comments by Sam Place

Chair: Madilyn Ivey


Comments On William Perrin’S “The Failure Of Hope As An Epistemic Standard”, Colleen Hanson Feb 2019

Comments On William Perrin’S “The Failure Of Hope As An Epistemic Standard”, Colleen Hanson

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

10:00-10:50: “The Failure of Hope as an Epistemic Standard”

By William Perrin (Pepperdine University)

Comments by Colleen Hanson

Chair: Samantha Lilly


The Failure Of Hope As An Epistemic Standard, William Perrin Feb 2019

The Failure Of Hope As An Epistemic Standard, William Perrin

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Jonathan Weinberg (2007) attempted to show how to challenge intuitions empirically, without risking skepticism. In this paper, I raise several objections to his project. In the first section I will clarify and explain several terms. Specifically, what I mean when I use intuition in this paper and what Weinberg means by hopefulness. Clarification of these terms is essential to this paper, as both intuition and hopefulness have become somewhat muddled terms in recent literature. In the second section I will reconstruct Weinberg’s argument against philosophers’ appeals to intuition. Weinberg aims to show that philosophers’ appeals to intuitions are epistemically hopeless …


Comments “Listening To Music: A Philosophical Account”, Sammy Jones Jan 2019

Comments “Listening To Music: A Philosophical Account”, Sammy Jones

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

3:30-4:20: “Listening to Music: A Philosophical Account”

By Paskalina Bourbon (Pomona College)

Comments by Sammy Jones

Chair: Colleen Hanson


A Response To Cassie Finley’S ‘Aristotle’S Functionalism’, Holden Chen Jan 2019

A Response To Cassie Finley’S ‘Aristotle’S Functionalism’, Holden Chen

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

A Response to Cassie Finley’s ‘Aristotle’s Functionalism’

2:30-3:20: “Aristotle’s Functonalism: Psyche’s Relevance to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind ” By Cassie Finley (Pacifc University)

Comments by Holden Chen

Chair: Sienna Murphy


Aristotle’S Functonalism: Psyche’S Relevance To Contemporary Philosophy Of Mind, Cassie Finley Jan 2019

Aristotle’S Functonalism: Psyche’S Relevance To Contemporary Philosophy Of Mind, Cassie Finley

Puget Sound Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

While functionalism often attributes its roots to Aristotle’s On the Soul, contemporary philosophers of mind have left behind crucial features of Aristotle’s philosophy by losing his distinction between mind and soul. I propose a revision to our present concept of mind, instead situating it as an aspect of the Aristotelian concept of soul, which allows for a more robust account of functionalism that encompasses the entirety of the human being as a system of demonstrative, functional capacities. I argue that Aristotle’s applied theory of the nature of souls offers greater fecundity to discourse in philosophy of mind, specifically in …