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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Reid’S Foundation For The Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction, Jennifer Mckitrick
Reid’S Foundation For The Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction, Jennifer Mckitrick
Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications
Thomas Reid (1710-1796) offers an under-appreciated account of the primary/secondary quality distinction. He gives sound reasons for rejecting the views of Locke, Boyle, Galileo and others, and presents a better alternative, according to which the distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Primary qualities, for Reid, are qualities whose intrinsic natures can be known through sensation. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are unknown causes of sensations. Some may object that Reid’s view is internally inconsistent, or unacceptably relativistic. However, a deeper understanding shows that it is consistent, and relative only to normal humans. To acquire this deeper understanding, one must …
Kant And Capital Punishment Today, Nelson T. Potter
Kant And Capital Punishment Today, Nelson T. Potter
Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications
We will consider alternative ways that Kant’s philosophical views on ethics generally and on punishment more particularly could be brought into harmony with the present near consensus of opposition to the death penalty. We will make use of the notion of the contemporary consensus about certain issues, particularly equality of the sexes and the death penalty, found in widespread agreement, though not unanimity. Of course, it is always possible that some consensuses are wrong, or misguided, or mistaken. We should not put too much philosophical weight on the notion of a consensus here. If there is a consensus for the …
Ultra-Strong Internalism And The Reliabilist Insight, Dan D. Crawford
Ultra-Strong Internalism And The Reliabilist Insight, Dan D. Crawford
Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications
When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model for justification, I show how ordinary perceivers would appeal to external factors to support their perceptual beliefs, and normally …