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Commentary On Jarmila Bubikova-Moan’S “Unpacking The Narrative-Argumentative Conundrum: Story Credibility Revisited”, Paula Olmos

OSSA Conference Archive

Commentary on Jarmila Bubikova-Moan’s “Unpacking the narrative-argumentative conundrum: story credibility revisited”

Commentary: Wu’S “Indigenous Cosmovision And Rights Of Nature: A Legal Inquiry”, Andrea G. Sullivan-Clarke

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Commentary On Michel Dufour’S “What Makes A Fallacy Serious?”, Hans Vilhelm Hansen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Rights Of Nature And Indigenous Cosmovision: A Fundamental Inquiry, Jingjing Wu

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, I ask whether we can weigh and balance indigenous cosmovision—the reasoning used as the main source of legitimacy in some rights of nature legislation—within a secular legal system. I examine three barriers that rights of nature and their corollary spiritual reasoning are likely to encounter if they are invoked in secular courts: (a) spiritual reasoning is non-defeasible (Part 3) and (b) irrational (Part 4), and (3) the current concept of human rights as a universal legal norm is based on a circular logic (Part 5). In order to overcome these barriers, I draw inspiration from Dworkin’s ‘rights …

Unpacking The Narrative-Argumentative Conundrum: Story Credibility Revisited, Jarmila Bubikova-Moan

OSSA Conference Archive

Building on a view of both narration and argumentation as dynamic concepts, the aim of this paper is to argue that story credibility remains a core issue in the debate on the argumentative quality of narratives, yet one that the dynamic perspective has not interrogated in sufficient detail. To illustrate, I will draw on empirical examples from research interviews with adult migrants to Norway on their learning and using Norwegian as a second language.

What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

Among the defining criteria of a fallacy, Douglas Walton requires that its flaw must be serious. This allows his distinction between “serious” fallacies, minor ones, or mere blunders. But what makes a fallacy serious? Isn’t being fallacious serious enough? Walton leaves these questions unanswered but often calls to his distinction between sophism and paralogism. Several ways to apply the adjective “serious” to fallacies are discussed. Some depend on the type, others on structural aspects, and others on a dialectical background.

Cancelled - The Ontological Status Of Cartesian Possibilia, Daniel Stermer, Marc Bobro, Liz Goodnick

Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events

In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who …

Day 1 Schedule, Benjamin Hill

Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events

No abstract provided.

Commentary On Anne-Marie Mccallion's "Adversity And Attrition: Disassociated Disagreement And Extracted Speech In Undergraduate Philosophers, Philip Rose

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Commentary Hoppmann On Kišiček Listen Carefully, Michael J. Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Commentary On Léa Farine, “Public Deliberation And Epistemic Parity In Direct Democracies”, Dale Hample

OSSA Conference Archive

Farine's paper connects to some other accounts of argument norms.

Public Deliberation And Epistemic Parity In Direct Democracies, Léa Farine

OSSA Conference Archive

In a context of public-policy making, I propose to consider a fundamental norm of epistemic parity as contributing to the justification, the acceptability and the legitimacy of decisions taken through deliberative processes. I also suggest that models of semi-direct democracy, whose constitutional foundations include the possibility of deliberations among all citizens sanctioned by popular votes, promote epistemic parity.

Listen Carefully! Fallacious Auditory Arguments, Gabrijela Kišiček

OSSA Conference Archive

In some cases, prosodic features (or other forms of sound) which accompany verbal message might be an essential part of an argument. The same as verbal, auditory arguments can also be fallacious. Prosodic features (e.g., word emphasis, pause) may contribute to making an auditory straw man fallacy or by manipulating voice quality, pitch or intonation one can make an auditory ad hominem. Also there are many potentially fallacious appeals to emotion.

Comments On Developing Critical Thinking With Rhetorical Pedagogy By Elizabeth Ismail, Sharon Bailin

OSSA Conference Archive

In her paper, Ismail argues that common approaches to teaching critical thinking based on informal logic are inadequate and that equating the ability to think critically with the ability to analyze and evaluate arguments is problematic. To remedy these inadequacies, she proposes a pedagogy based in rhetoric. I first examine her critiques of informal logic, seconding many of her concerns regarding the limitations of equating critical thinking with argument analysis and evaluation. I concur with her judgment that there is a case to be made for broadening the scope of critical thinking instruction and argue that the need for a …

Commentary On Vollbrecht's "Epistemic Success And Skeptical Norms In Argumentation", Daniel H. Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Commentary On Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Developing Critical Thinking With Rhetorical Pedagogy, Elizabeth Ismail

OSSA Conference Archive

The development of critical thinking skills is emphasized as a fundamental attribute of successful graduates (Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005; Willingham, 2008). Some critical thinking textbooks inform students to “see beyond the rhetoric to the core idea being stated” (Moore and Parker, 2009, p. 21); however, other scholars have begun to suggest that rhetoric is intrinsically interrelated to critical thinking and plays a pivotal role in everyday interactions (Saki, 2016). This paper explores the later.

Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Kathryn Phillips

OSSA Conference Archive

A popular approach to analyzing the concept of evidence is to identify a unique set of normative criteria that delineate the concept. However, disagreements about evidence seem deep, and using this approach raises concerns about the imposition of dominant norms. Such an imposition excludes important sources of knowledge and leads to argumentative vices such as unwillingness to engage.

Virtue argumentation, like its predecessors from ethics and epistemology, focuses on practical applicability through the cultivation of habits and character rather than the articulation of universal principles or consistent theories. While Andrew Aberdein and others have been working to develop taxonomies of …

Epistemic Success And Skeptical Norms In Argument, Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht

OSSA Conference Archive

The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney’s going case, the Penaluna – Leiter exchange, is not attributable to argument’s skeptical norms.

Commentary: Notes On Katharina Stevens Essay "Charity For Moral Reasons", Maureen Linker

OSSA Conference Archive

There are a variety of important and insightful points in Stevens’ essay for argument theorists and teachers of logic and critical thinking. The interplay between morality, epistemology, and metaphysics for instance that underlie reason and argumentation. The important point that arguers and their interlocuters, when representing reasons, are doing something fundamentally human and their identity as knowers should be respected as part of a reasoning community. The equally important point that epistemic imperialism is a risk of toxic charity when an arguer with more social power and privilege, presumes to interpret an interlocuter on the social margins (who may have …

Institutionalized Argumentative Reasonableness - Commentary On Reijven, Jean H.M. Wagemans

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Comment On Beth Innocenti’S “Paying A Cost Of Metadialogue: Reasonable Observations And Another Example On Handling Unwarranted Retreats To Metadialogue”, Susan L. Kline

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Halting Retreats To Metadialogues, Beth Innocenti

OSSA Conference Archive

How can social actors halt retreats to metadialogues that involve nit-picking or unwarranted charges, and why can they expect the strategies to work? Krabbe (2003) has proposed a dialectical regulation designed to forestall or halt retreats from ground-level discussions to metadialogues: paying the costs of the metadialogue. I argue that this dialectical regulation deserves to be taken seriously because it is realistic and encompasses a range of strategies that ordinary social actors take as reasonable.

Principle Of Charity As A Moral Requirement In Non-Institutionalized Argumentation, Katharina Stevens

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of the principle of charity as a moral requirement on arguers. I present two moral reasons for charity, one based on respect for dignity, the other based on the need to avoid harm. I argue, however, that the amount of effort an arguer needs to invest in charity varies with context.

Institutional And Institutionalized Fallacies: Diversifying Pragma-Dialectical Fallacy Judgments, Menno H. Reijven

OSSA Conference Archive

To improve argumentative discourse, it is necessary to make fallacy judgments which take into consideration the social practice in which argumentation occurs. In this paper, I propose four meta-categories for fallacies to study the connection of fallacies to their institutionalized discourse. Using the first 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate as a case study, I show how this framework can be used to propose improvements to argumentative contexts.

Commentary On Lumer, "A Theory Of Philosophical Arguments", Patrick Bondy

OSSA Conference Archive

Commentary on Christoph Lumer, "A Theory of Philosophical Argument," for OSSA 12. Lumer offers a general theory of philosophical argument. This commentary discusses four related topics: Pascal arguments; the problem of the criterion; the status of intuitions in philosophy; and the status of arguments that do not fit into the four ideal argument types that Lumer sets out.

Commentary On Serafis Et Al.’S “Finding The Multi- In The Mode”, Justin Eckstein

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Commentary On “The Persuasive Force Of The Ad Baculum” By John Patrick Casey, Thierry Herman

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

A Theory Of Philosophical Arguments, Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

In the main part of the article, a new, idealizing-hermeneutic methodological approach to developing a theory of philosophical arguments is presented and carried out. The basis for this is a theory of ideal philosophical theory types developed from the analysis of historical examples (Lumer 2011b; 2020). According to this theory, the following ideal types of theory exist in philosophy: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. idealizing-hermeneutic, 3. technical-constructive, 4. ontic-practical. These types of theories are characterized in particular by what their basic types of theses are. The main task of this article is then to determine the types of arguments that are suitable …

The Persuasive Force Of The Ad Baculum, John P. Casey

OSSA Conference Archive

Standard accounts of the ad baculum locate its fallaciousness either in irrelevance or dialogue shift. Such accounts, however, fail to explain its persuasiveness. This paper offers a new account where the real target of an ad baculum is an audience downstream from the initial ad baculum exchange. This means that the ad baculum consists in misrepresenting the quality of evidence by means of the forced adoption of a particular standpoint.