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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo May 2013

Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.


Commentary On: Chris Campolo's "Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement", David M. Godden May 2013

Commentary On: Chris Campolo's "Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement", David M. Godden

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The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics, Begoῆa Carrascal May 2013

The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics, Begoῆa Carrascal

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In argumentation studies, almost all theoretical proposals are applied, in general, to the analysis and evaluation of written argumentative texts. I will consider mathematics to illustrate some differences between argumentative practice and the products of it, to emphasize the need to address the different types of argumentative discourse and argumentative situation. Argumentative practice should be encouraged when teaching technical subjects to convey a better understanding and to improve thought and creativity.


Commentary On: Begoῆa Carrascal's "The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics", Andrew Aberdein May 2013

Commentary On: Begoῆa Carrascal's "The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics", Andrew Aberdein

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Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink May 2013

Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink

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This paper presents the results of a quantitative study in which self-report scales were developed to measure four of the six dialogue types proposed by Walton (1998): persuasion, negotiation, information-seeking, and eristic dialogues. The paper details the research design, presents the measurement instruments developed, and describes the analyses conducted to assess the dimensionality and reliability of the proposed scales.


Commentary On: Ian Dove's "Visual Arguments And Meta-Arguments", Jens E. Kjeldsen May 2013

Commentary On: Ian Dove's "Visual Arguments And Meta-Arguments", Jens E. Kjeldsen

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Commentary On: Ionana Cionea, Dale Hample, And Edward Fink's "Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study", Douglas Walton May 2013

Commentary On: Ionana Cionea, Dale Hample, And Edward Fink's "Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study", Douglas Walton

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Visual Arguments And Meta-Arguments, Ian J. Dove May 2013

Visual Arguments And Meta-Arguments, Ian J. Dove

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Visual arguments—arguments that appeal to visual elements essentially—are legitimate arguments. To show this, I first consider what I call (perfect) fit arguments—arguments in which the recognition that items fit together suggests that they were once conjoined, perhaps originally. This form of argumentation is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation (IBE). I then consider mathematical visual meta-arguments—arguments in which the validity or soundness of a mathematical argument is confirmed or refuted by appeal to diagrams.


Argument And Explanation In Mathematics, Michel Dufour May 2013

Argument And Explanation In Mathematics, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

Are there arguments in mathematics? Are there explanations in mathematics? Are there any connections between argument, proof and explanation? Highly controversial answers and arguments are reviewed. The main point is that in the case of a mathematical proof, the pragmatic criterion used to make a distinction between argument and explanation is likely to be insufficient for you may grant the conclusion of a proof but keep on thinking that the proof is not explanatory.


Argumentative Patterns In Discourse, Frans H. Van Eemeren, Bart Garssen May 2013

Argumentative Patterns In Discourse, Frans H. Van Eemeren, Bart Garssen

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This paper discusses the ways in which argumentative discourse prototypically manifests itself. As a consequence of the institutional preconditions applying to the strategic manoeuvring taking place in specific communicative activity types, certain context-dependent argumentative patterns of standpoints, argument schemes and argumentation structures can be observed. Because of their interest in the extent to which argumentative discourse is context-dependent, pragma-dialecticians are out to discover such specific patterns. As a case in point, the authors discuss some institutionally motivated argumentative patterns in parliamentary debate in the European Parliament.


Commentary On: Michel Dufour's "Argument And Explanation In Mathematics", Andrew Aberdein May 2013

Commentary On: Michel Dufour's "Argument And Explanation In Mathematics", Andrew Aberdein

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Commentary On: Frans H. Van Eemeren And Bart Garssen's "Argumentative Patterns In Discourse", G. Thomas Goodnight May 2013

Commentary On: Frans H. Van Eemeren And Bart Garssen's "Argumentative Patterns In Discourse", G. Thomas Goodnight

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Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum (Ctac), Robert H. Ennis May 2013

Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum (Ctac), Robert H. Ennis

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Implementing critical thinking across the curriculum is challenging, involving securing substantial agreement on the nature of critical thinking, areas of prospective application (subject matter? everyday life?), degree of need for a separate course, and the nature of coordination, including leadership, a glossary, selection of courses for incorporation, avoidance of duplication and gaps, acquiring required subject matter, and assessment of the total effort, teaching methods used, and decrease or increase in retention of subject matter.


Commentary On: Robert H. Ennis' "Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum (Ctac)", Mark Battersby May 2013

Commentary On: Robert H. Ennis' "Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum (Ctac)", Mark Battersby

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The Virtues Of Dissoi Logoi, Victor Ferry May 2013

The Virtues Of Dissoi Logoi, Victor Ferry

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My claim is that rhetorical training is required to develop citizenship skills. I illustrate this claim by focussing on dissociation of notions, that is, a rhetorical technique that citizens might have to use in their civic life. After distinguishing a rhetorical and a normative approach to dissociation, I argue that dissoi logoi, as an exercise invented by the Sophists, offer a relevant training to master this technique.


Commentary On: Victor Ferry's "The Virtues Of Dissoi Logoi", James Crosswhite May 2013

Commentary On: Victor Ferry's "The Virtues Of Dissoi Logoi", James Crosswhite

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The Fallacy Of Composition And Meta-Argumentation, Maurice A. Finocchiaro May 2013

The Fallacy Of Composition And Meta-Argumentation, Maurice A. Finocchiaro

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Although the fallacy of composition is little studied and trivially illustrated, some view it as ubiquitous and paramount. Furthermore, although definitions regard the concept as unproblematic, it contains three distinct elements, often confused. And although some scholars apparently claim that fallacies are figments of a critic’s imagination, they are really proposing to study fallacies in the context of meta-argumentation. Guided by these ideas, I discuss the important historical example of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy.


Commentary On: Maurice Finocchiaro's "The Fallacy Of Composition And Meta-Argumentation", Michel Dufour May 2013

Commentary On: Maurice Finocchiaro's "The Fallacy Of Composition And Meta-Argumentation", Michel Dufour

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What Types Of Arguments Are There?, James B. Freeman May 2013

What Types Of Arguments Are There?, James B. Freeman

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Our typology is based on two ground adequacy factors, one logical and one epistemic. Logically, the step from premises to conclusion may be conclusive or only ceteris paribus. Epistemically, warrants may be backed a priori or a posteriori. Hence there are four types of arguments: conclusive a priori, defeasible a priori, defeasible a posteriori, and prima facie conclusive a posteriori. We shall give an example of each and compare our scheme with other typologies.


Emotion As Permeative: Attempting To Model The Unidentifiable, Michael A. Gilbert May 2013

Emotion As Permeative: Attempting To Model The Unidentifiable, Michael A. Gilbert

OSSA Conference Archive

The question of emotion in argumentation has received considerable attention in recent years. But there is a tension between the traditional normative role of informal logic, and the inclusion of emotion which is viewed as notoriously unstable. Here I argue that that, a] there is always emotion in an argument; b] that the presence of emotion is a good thing; and c] that we can and ought model and teach the use of emotion in Argumentation Theory.


Commentery On: David Godden's "On The Norms Of Visual Argument", Ian J. Dove May 2013

Commentery On: David Godden's "On The Norms Of Visual Argument", Ian J. Dove

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On The Norms Of Visual Argument, David M. Godden May 2013

On The Norms Of Visual Argument, David M. Godden

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While pictures can persuade, can they do so rationally – by offering reasons? Existing debate has focused on whether images are – or can be – arguments. Yet, from a normative perspective, a more pressing question concerns how the persuasive operation of images ought to be evaluated. By analyzing the concept of argument as necessarily involving reasons the paper argues that the possibility of visual arguments requires no revision to our existing normative theories of argument.


Why I Still Do Not Know What A "Real" Argument Is, G C. Goddu May 2013

Why I Still Do Not Know What A "Real" Argument Is, G C. Goddu

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In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is” Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of what a “real” argument is. I argue that if the definition picks out a stable class of arguments, such a class is either not theoretically relevant or is not capturing the class of arguments that Hamby intends.


Commentary On: Geoffrey C. Goddu's "Why I Still Do Not Know What A 'Real' Argument Is", David Botting May 2013

Commentary On: Geoffrey C. Goddu's "Why I Still Do Not Know What A 'Real' Argument Is", David Botting

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Measuring Critical Thinking About Deeply Held Beliefs, Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell May 2013

Measuring Critical Thinking About Deeply Held Beliefs, Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In this paper we report on preliminary results from our ongoing study designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this context.


Commentary On: Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury And Tracy Bowell's "Measuring Critical Thinking About Deeply Held Beliefs", Robert H. Ennis May 2013

Commentary On: Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury And Tracy Bowell's "Measuring Critical Thinking About Deeply Held Beliefs", Robert H. Ennis

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Response To Our Commentator, Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell May 2013

Response To Our Commentator, Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell

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Commentary On: Trudy Govier's "Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience", Maureen Linker May 2013

Commentary On: Trudy Govier's "Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience", Maureen Linker

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Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience, Trudy Govier May 2013

Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience, Trudy Govier

OSSA Conference Archive

The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed authority of victims.


Commentary On: Jean Goodwin's "Norms Of Advocacy", Camille Cameron May 2013

Commentary On: Jean Goodwin's "Norms Of Advocacy", Camille Cameron

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