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Philosophy

Attila Tanyi

Selected Works

Desires

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi Dec 2010

Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the …

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Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi Dec 2008

Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case they can …

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Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi Dec 2005

Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non- descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, does not answer the pressing concern behind Parfit’s charge. I conclude that we had better turn to the third …

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