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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Faculty Publications
We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, …
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Edward J. Lopez
We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, …
Through A Glass Darkly’: Assessing The ‘New’ War Against Corruption In Nigeria, Shola J. Omotola
Through A Glass Darkly’: Assessing The ‘New’ War Against Corruption In Nigeria, Shola J. Omotola
Shola J. Omotola Mr
It is no longer news that corruption is endemic in Nigeria. Neither is it news that the ‘democratic’ government of President Obasanjo is waging an unprecedented war against corruption. What is, however, controversial is the extent to which the ‘new’ war has succeeded in addressing this scourge. This article engages this crucial question and submits that while the legal and institutional anchorages of the war offer a good point of departure, they remain grossly inadequate. This largely explains why the war has been underproductive and caught in a deepening crisis of legitimacy. What is required is the nourishing and re-envisioning …
Impact Of European Union Funding On Tourism In The Grampian Region, R Nash, D Koyabe, Paul Matthew Stansbie
Impact Of European Union Funding On Tourism In The Grampian Region, R Nash, D Koyabe, Paul Matthew Stansbie
Paul Matthew Stansbie
No abstract provided.