Digital Commons Network^™

Deterring Holdout Creditors In A Restructuring Of Pdvsa Bonds And Promissory Notes (¿Cómo Disuadir A Acreedores 'Holdout' En Una Restructuración De Bonos Y Pagarés De Pdvsa?), Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The prospect of the potential mischief that may be caused by holdout creditors in a Venezuelan sovereign debt restructuring is probably the main reason why the Maduro administration has not attempted such an exercise. The next administration in Venezuela — whenever and however it may arrive — will not want for suggestions about how to minimize or neutralize this holdout creditor threat. This short article is another contribution to that growing literature. Were the Republic of Venezuela to acknowledge that there really is only one public sector credit risk in the country, and that the distinction between Republic bonds and …

Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The existing contractual framework for sovereign debt restructuring is sorely inadequate. Whether or not their fault, nations sometimes take on debt burdens that become unsustainable. Until resolved, the resulting sovereign debt problem hurts not only those nations (such as Greece) but also their citizens, their creditors, and—by posing serious systemic risks to the international financial system—the wider economic community. The existing contractual framework functions poorly to resolve the problem because it often leaves little alternative between a sovereign debt bailout, which is costly and creates moral hazard, and a default, which raises the specter of systemic financial contagion.

Most observers …

Talking One's Way Out Of A Debt Crisis, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member of the monetary union. This policy was motivated principally, but not exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to European sovereigns. In short, they feared contagion.

The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was an official sector bailout. The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus …

The Sovereign-Debt Listing Puzzle, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Josefin Meyer, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The claim that stock exchanges perform certification and monitoring roles in securities offerings is pervasive in the legal and financial literatures. This article tests the validity of this “bonding hypothesis” in the sovereign-bond market—one of the oldest and largest securities markets in the world. Using data on sovereign-bond listings for the entire post-World War II period, we provide the first comprehensive report on sovereigns’ historical listing patterns. We then test whether a sovereign bond issue’s listing jurisdiction affects its yield at issuance, as the bonding hypothesis would predict. We find little evidence of bonding in today’s sovereign-debt market. Instead, we …

Shadow Banking And Regulation In China And Other Developing Countries, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The rapid but largely unregulated growth in shadow banking in developing countries such as China can jeopardize financial stability. This article discusses that growth and argues that a regulatory balance is needed to help protect financial stability while preserving shadow banking as an important channel of alternative funding. The article also analyzes how that regulation could be designed.

Quieting The Sharholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence Of Pervasive Bundling In Proxy Solicitations, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

The integrity of shareholder voting is critical to the legitimacy of corporate law. One threat to this process is proxy “bundling,” or the joinder of more than one separate item into a single proxy proposal. Bundling deprives shareholders of the right to convey their views on each separate matter being put to a vote and forces them to either reject the entire proposal or approve items they might not otherwise want implemented.

In this Paper, we provide the first comprehensive evaluation of the anti-bundling rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 1992. While we find that the …

Targeted Subordination Of Official Sector Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

If Greece’s debt is unsustainable, and most observers (including the IMF) seem to think it is, the country’s only source of funding will continue to be official sector bailout loans. Languishing for a decade or more as a ward of the official sector is undesirable from all perspectives. The Greeks bridle under what they see as foreign imposed austerity; the taxpayers who fund the official sector loans to Greece balk at the prospect of shoveling good money after bad. The question then is how to facilitate Greece’s ability to tap the private capital markets at tolerable interest rates. The IMF’s …

Securitization And Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

There are few types of securities as internationally traded as those issued in securitization (also spelled securitisation) transactions. The post-financial crisis regulatory responses to securitization in the United States and Europe are, at least in part, political and ad hoc. To achieve a more systematic regulatory framework, this article examines how existing regulation should be supplemented by identifying the market failures that apply distinctively to securitization and analyzing how those market failures could be corrected. Among other things, the article argues that Europe’s regulatory framework for simple, transparent, and standardised (“STS”) securitizations goes a long way towards addressing complexity as …

Macroprudential Regulation Of Mortgage Lending, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Much regulatory effort has been devoted to improving mortgage lending, the principal source of housing finance. To date, that effort has primarily been microprudential—intended to correct market failures in order to increase economic efficiency. In contrast, and while there is some overlap, this article focuses on a more “macroprudential” regulation of mortgage lending—intended to reduce systemic risk. Although largely underdeveloped in the literature, the macroprudential regulation of mortgage lending would have two goals: an ex ante goal of preventing systemic shocks in housing finance and the housing sector, and an ex post goal of ensuring that housing finance, the housing …

Perspectives On Regulating Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This book chapter, which synthesizes several of the author’s articles, attempts to provide useful perspectives on regulating systemic risk. First, it argues that systemic shocks are inevitable. Accordingly, regulation should be designed not only to try to reduce those shocks but also to protect the financial system against their unavoidable impact. This could be done, the chapter explains, by applying chaos theory to help stabilize the financial system. The chapter then focuses on trying to prevent excessive corporate risk-taking, which is one of the leading triggers of systemic shocks and widely regarded to have been a principal cause of the …

Pricing Sovereign Debt: Discretion V. Expropriation, Michael Bradley, Irving De Lira Salvatierra, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The Greek restructuring of March 2012 illustrates how non-price contract terms can have a significant effect on the pricing of sovereign debt. In the Greek restructuring, bonds governed by local law suffered NPV haircuts in the range of 60-75%, whereas those bonds governed by foreign law were paid in full and on time. Other contract parameters such as the currency in which the debt is denominated and the exchange on which it is listed can also affect the leeway a sovereign debtor has in dealing with its creditors. In general, we find that sovereigns with strong institutions and investor protections …

Fiduciary Contours: Perspectives On Mutual Funds And Private Funds, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

The thesis of this essay, written as a chapter in a forthcoming book, is that in the mutual fund context, the specifics of fiduciary duty reflect the distinctive qualities of this form of investment in securities. The particular contours that shape fiduciary duty reflect many factors, including the highly prescriptive regulatory context distinctively applicable to mutual funds. To sharpen its depiction of the fiduciary distinctiveness of mutual funds, I draw contrasts with two other avenues through which an investor may delegate investment choice: (1) "private" funds, that is, vehicles for pooled investments that are not subject to the full regulatory …

A Sovereign’S Cost Of Capital: Go Foreign Or Stay Local, Michael Bradley, Irving Arturo De Lira Salvatierra, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

A critical question faced by any sovereign seeking to raise funds in the bond market is whether to issue the debt under foreign or local parameters. This choice determines other key characteristics of any bond issue such as which banks, lawyers, and investors will be involved. Most important though, this decision involves a tradeoff between the sovereign retaining discretion in managing the issue and relinquishing control of the issue to third parties to prevent the sovereign from expropriating wealth from bondholders in the future. Based on a sample of 17,349 issuances by 117 sovereigns between 1990 and 2015, we investigate …

The Pricing Of Non-Price Terms In Sovereign Bonds: The Case Of The Greek Guarantees, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

In March 2012, Greece conducted one of the biggest and most brutal sovereign debt restructurings ever, asking holders of Greek government bonds to take net present value haircuts of near 80 percent. Greece forced acquiescence to its terms from a large number of its bonds by using a variety of legal strong-arm tactics. With the vast majority of Greek bonds, the tactics worked. There were, however, thirty-six bonds guaranteed by the Greek state, which, because of the weakness of the underlying companies, were effectively obligations of the Greek state. Yet, on these thirty six bonds, even though Greece desperately needed …

Pricing Contract Terms In A Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds In 2016, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena

Faculty Scholarship

As of this writing in June 2016, the markets are predicting Venezuela to be on the brink of default. On June 1, 2016, the 6 month CDS contract traded at about 7000bps which translates into a likelihood of default of over 90%. Our interest in the Venezuelan crisis is that its outstanding sovereign bonds have a unique set of contractual features that, in combination with its near-default status, have created a natural experiment. This experiment has the potential to shed light on one of the long standing questions that sits at the intersection of the fields of law and finance, …

Brief Of Prof. Steven L. Schwarcz As Amicus Curiae, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Evaluating The 2013 Euro Cac Experiment, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

On January 1, 2013, it became mandatory that every new sovereign bond issued by a member of the European Monetary Union include a new contract clause called a Collective Action Clause or CAC. This, we believe, constituted the biggest one-time change to the terms of sovereign debt contracts in history, impacting a market of many trillions of euros. And it was not just that the change was big in terms of the size of the market it impacted; it was big in terms of its impact on the documentation of each individual Euro area sovereign bond contract. To illustrate, prior …

The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The literature on sovereign debt treats law as of marginal significance, largely because the doctrine of sovereign immunity leaves creditors few potent legal remedies against sovereign borrowers. Although sovereign debts can indeed by hard to enforce, the goal of this Essay is to demonstrate that law plays a central, and constantly evolving, role in structuring sovereign debt markets. To list just a few examples, legal rules and institutions (i) decide when a borrower is sovereign, (ii) define the consequences of sovereignty by drawing (or refusing to draw) artificial boundaries between the sovereign and other legal entities, (iii) play some role …

Reprofiling Sovereign Debt, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado

Faculty Scholarship

• The IMF staff’s 2013 proposal to reprofile (i.e., stretch out for a short period without haircutting principal or interest) the maturing debt of a country that has lost market access is a sensible policy in cases where the IMF is uncertain whether the country’s debt stock is sustainable.

• The motivation for the policy is to avoid situations, such as occurred during the Eurozone debt crisis, in which Fund resources are used to bail-out commercial creditors in full.

• But a debt reprofiling is a species of debt restructuring and as such is susceptible to holdout creditor behaviour.

• …

Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder suits that were not successfully concluded. The legislature acted after the Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund. v. Chevron Corp ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, broadly empowered the board vis-à-vis the shareholders through the board’s power to amend the bylaws. Repeatedly the analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the shareholders had through the articles of …

When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern

Faculty Scholarship

At least three times in the past two decades, national governments and institutions at the regional and international levels have tried to reform sovereign bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring. Increasingly, these efforts have focused on promoting majority modifications clauses, a species of collective action clause (CAC) that facilitates a binding debt restructuring. Rather than legislate or regulate, governments have convened expert commissions, produced model CACs, and aggressively marketed these clauses to debtors and creditors. When events prove the existing CAC template inadequate or irrelevant, the process begins anew. This paper considers this mode of government intervention, which has a …

"We're Cool" Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits For Failures To Comply With The Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

As part of a symposium celebrating the multiple contributions of the late Alan Bromberg, this article examines implications flowing from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund. Because Omnicare lands so squarely on the Court’s earlier opaque opinion in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg addressing the treatment of the materiality of opinion statements, Omnicare is the new currency in the realm that will have far-reaching implications. In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court quickly concluded shareholders would attach significance to the board of directors’ statement that the cash-out merger …

Human Equity? Regulating The New Income Share Agreements, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring

Faculty Scholarship

A controversial new financing phenomenon has recently emerged. New "income share agreements" (''ISAs'') enable an individual to raise funds by pledging a percentage of her future earnings to investors for a certain number of years. These contracts, which have been offered by entities such as Fantex, Upstart, Pave, and Lumni, raise important questions for the legal system: Are they a form of modern-day indentured servitude or an innovative breakthrough in human financing? How should they be treated under the law?

This Article comprehensively addresses the public policy and legal issues raised by ISAs and articulates an analytical approach to evaluating …

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …

Banking And Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter provides a basic overview of banking and financial regulation for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Paris, ed.). Among other things, the chapter compares traditional and shadow banking and their regulation, differentiating “micro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting individual components of the financial system, such as banks) and “macro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting against systemic risk). The chapter also examines how regulation can help to correct market failures that undermine financial efficiency. In that context, it discusses, among other things, capital requirements, ring-fencing, and stress testing. Finally, the chapter examines how regulation …

A Model-Law Approach To Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both …

Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the …

A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It …

From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …

Putting The Securities Laws To The Test: The Long-Standing Approach To Federal Securities Regulation Is Not Working, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.