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Act 301 (14-1891) Amicus Brief, Curtis J. Neeley Jr Jan 2014

Act 301 (14-1891) Amicus Brief, Curtis J. Neeley Jr

Curtis J Neeley Jr

Apparently no law school or media read the Roe v Wade ruling since 1973 and use the contentious issue to raise money.


Why Do Cities Innovate In Public Health? Implications Of Scale And Structure, Paul Diller Jan 2014

Why Do Cities Innovate In Public Health? Implications Of Scale And Structure, Paul Diller

Paul Diller

Big cities have frequently enacted public health regulations—especially with respect to tobacco use and obesity—that go beyond the state and federal regulatory floors. That cities innovate in public health at all is remarkable. They have less to gain financially from more stringent regulation than higher levels of government, which shoulder more of the burden of Medicare and Medicaid. Cities are supposed to fear mobile capital flight; if they regulate, businesses will leave. Moreover, because innovation is costly and likely to be copied by others when successful, a free-rider problem might inhibit local policy innovation generally.

Cities’ prolific regulation in the …


New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal Jan 2014

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …


Compelling Product Sellers To Transmit Government Public Health Messages, Stephen D. Sugarman Dec 2013

Compelling Product Sellers To Transmit Government Public Health Messages, Stephen D. Sugarman

Stephen D Sugarman

No abstract provided.


Act 301 (14-1891) Amicus Reply Brief, Curtis J. Neeley Jr Dec 2013

Act 301 (14-1891) Amicus Reply Brief, Curtis J. Neeley Jr

Curtis J Neeley Jr

Reply covering every brief filed.


Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall Dec 2013

Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

Many politicians and commentators agree that credit default swaps (CDS) played a significant role in the financial crisis of 2008. Yet, few who observe this role are aware that CDS were set loose on the economy by the federal pre-emption of thousands of years of public policy. Since the time of Aristotle law, philosophy and public policy have been hostile to gambling. Viewed as a socially unproductive zero sum wealth transfer, the law has generally refused to permit parties to use the courts to enforce wagers. Courts and legislatures worked in harmony to control and in some cases punish financial …


Restraining The Hand Of Law: A Conceptual Framework To Shrink The Size Of Law, Bryan H. Druzin Dec 2013

Restraining The Hand Of Law: A Conceptual Framework To Shrink The Size Of Law, Bryan H. Druzin

Bryan H. Druzin

There is a fierce ideological struggle between two warring camps: those who rally against expansive government and those who support it. Clearly, the correct balance must be struck between the extremes of legislative over-invasiveness and the frightening total absence of legal structure. This paper articulates a framework that allows for legislative parsimony—a way to scale back state law in a way that avoids lurching to unnecessary extremes. I assume the libertarian premise that law should strive to encroach as minimally as possible upon social order, yet I argue that we must do this in a highly selective fashion, employing a …