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The Neuropsychology Of Justifications And Excuses: Some Problematic Cases Of Self-Defense, Duress And Provocation, Theodore Y. Blumoff

Theodore Y. Blumoff

In a famous address to the Aristotelian Society, Professor J. L. Austin provided dictum that has become a part of the conventional wisdom in the jurisprudence of our criminal law. His thesis simultaneously acknowledges the evident moral distinction between justifications and excuses, on the one hand, and the tendency, on the other, for the two doctrines to overlap and confound. From the perspectives of moral philosophy and jurisprudence, the distinction is clear. Justifications are socially approved (or, at least, not disapproved); excuses are not approved, but they obtain because the actor’s conduct reflects a substantial (and therefore judicially acknowledged) cognitive …

Neuroscientific Evidence In The Law: Fascinating Science, But To Laymen It's Still Phrenology, John M. Mccarthy

John M McCarthy

ABSTRACT

Neuroscientific Evidence in the Law: Fascinating Science, But to Laymen It's Still Phrenology by John M. McCarthy J.D. Yale, 1977

Cognitive neuroscience is one of biology's most exciting specialties, but outside of laboratories, "neuroscience" is not "science" but something else. The article examines what it is. This bears on today's burgeoning "neuro-" applications in the law, including "neuroethics". The article argues that neuroscientific findings should be excluded today from legal contexts, because valid scientific findings do not exist concerning the complex mental performances pertinent to adjudication.

Laymen and neuroscientists embrace a theoretical paradigm that is over two centuries old: …

Neuroscientific Evidence In The Law: Fascinating Science But To Layment It's Still Phrenology (Revised, 2009), John M. Mccarthy

John M McCarthy

ABSTRACT

Neuroscientific Evidence in the Law:

Fascinating Science, but to laymen it's still phrenology

by

John M. McCarthy

Cognitive neuroscience is one of biology's most exciting specialties, but outside of laboratories, "neuroscience" is not "science" but something else. The article examines what it is. This bears on today's burgeoning "neuro-" applications in the law, including "neuroethics". The article argues that neuroscientific findings should be excluded today from legal contexts, because valid scientific findings do not exist concerning the complex mental performances pertinent to adjudication.

Laymen and neuroscientists embrace a theoretical paradigm that is over two centuries old: that a biological …

Legal Storytelling: The Theory And The Practice - Reflective Writing Across The Curriculum, Nancy Levit

Nancy Levit

This article concentrates on the theory of narrative or storytelling and addresses the reasons it is vital to encourage in law schools in non-clinical or primarily doctrinal courses. Section I traces the advent of storytelling in legal theory and practice: while lawyers have long recognized that part of their job is to tell their clients' stories, the legal academy was, for many years, resistant to narrative methodologies. Section II examines the current applications of Writing Across the Curriculum in law schools. Most exploratory writing tasks in law school come in clinical courses, although a few adventurous professors are adding reflective …