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Restoring Nobility To The Constitution: A Modern Approach To A Founding Principle, Marc A. Greendorfer

ConLawNOW

It is common lore in the United States that our federal government was structured with a number of checks and balances that ensure, at a minimum, the equal application of law among all citizens. While there are indeed such structural mechanisms embedded in the Constitution, they don’t always work as intended and, in fact, at times they fail utterly to prevent blatant abuses of the rule of law by the vast and growing political class in America. Our political office holders (and their favored constituents) can, and do, pick and choose which laws apply to them and, more importantly, which …

Interpretation: Article I, Section 5, Ronald Weich, Martin B. Gold

All Faculty Scholarship

In Article I of the Constitution, the Framers vest the legislative authority of the United States government in a bicameral Congress, and over the ten sections of the Article they systematically flesh out the structure, duties, and powers of that Congress. In the early sections of Article I they describe the membership of each House, giving life to the “Great Compromise” of the Constitutional Convention under which each state has equal representation in the Senate but population-based representation in the House of Representatives. In Section 5, they grant Congress the power to govern itself.

Section 5 consists of four separate …

The Death Knell For The Death Penalty: Judge Carney's Order To Kill Capital Punishment Rings Loud Enough To Reach The Supreme Court, Alyssa Hughes

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Taking Constitutional Identities Away From The Courts, Pietro Faraguna

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

In federal states, constitutional identity is the glue that holds together the Union. On the contrary, in the European Union—not a fully-fledged federation yet—each Member state has its own constitutional identity. On the one hand, the Union may benefit from the particular knowledge, innovation, history, diversity, and culture of its individual states. On the other hand, identity-related claims may have a disintegrating effect. Constitutional diversity needs to come to terms with risks of disintegration. The Treaty on the European Union seeks a balance, providing the obligation to respect the constitutional identities of its Member states. Drawing from the European experience, …

When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

"To The Devil We Sprang And To The Devil We Shall Go": Memory And History In The Narrative Of British Medieval Constitutionality, Helen W. Tschurr

Summer Research

The British Bill of Rights is arguably one of the most important documents in history; it symbolizes modernity, legal protection for popular sovereignty, and has inspired several political and intellectual revolutions. The Bill of Rights is a physical manifestation of the British constitution and represents a triumph of constitutionality over despotism, the struggle which has defined British history since the Norman Invasion in 1066, and which has been deemed the de facto constitution itself. Because of its unique composition, the British constitution has been a hotly debated historical subject since the Glorious Revolution. Most scholarship on this topic has been …

Holmes And Brennan, Howard Wasserman

Faculty Publications

This article jointly examines two legal biographies of two landmark First Amendment decisions and the justices who produced them. In The Great Dissent (Henry Holt and Co. 2013), Thomas Healy explores Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919), which arguably laid the cornerstone for modern American free speech jurisprudence. In The Progeny (ABA 2014), Stephen Wermiel and Lee Levine explore William J. Brennan’s majority opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) and the development and evolution of its progeny over Brennan’s remaining twenty-five years on the Court. The article then explores three ideas: 1) the connections …

The Founding Fathers Said I Am Not Subject To Term Limits, Elias Arroyo

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Political Dysfunction And The Election Of Donald Trump: Problems Of The U.S. Constitution's Presidency, David Orentlicher

Scholarly Works

In this article, Professor Orentlicher examines the Constitution's design for the executive branch. He argues that by opting for a single executive rather than a multi-person executive, the Constitution causes two serious problems-it fuels the high levels of partisan polarization that we see today, and it increases the likelihood of misguided presidential decision making. Drawing on the experience in other countries with executive power shared by multiple officials, he proposes a bipartisan executive.

Scalia On Abortion: Originalism... But, Why?, Robert Cassidy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can Prosecutors Be Both Coach And Referee?, Rebecca Roiphe

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

The Original Understanding Of "Property" In The Constitution, Paul J. Larkin Jr.

Marquette Law Review

Contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence treats “property” as far less deserving of judicial protection than “life” or “liberty.” The Supreme Court, however, has misread American legal history. Anglo-American traditions, customs, and law held that property was an essential ingredient of the liberty that the Colonists had come to enjoy and must be protected against arbitrary governmental interference. The Framers’ generation believed that “property” and “liberty” were equally important institutions and that neither one could exist without the other. The Framers venerated property as a means of guaranteeing personal independence because (among other things) the concept of “property” embraced the legal rights …

Applying The U.S. Constitution To Foreign Asylum Seekers: Exposing A Curious, Inconsistent Practice In The Federal Courts, Shalini Bhargava Ray

Marquette Law Review

Asylum law is based on an international treaty, but federal courts routinely invoke U.S. constitutional norms in adjudicating asylum claims. Specifically, they rely on constitutional norms when gauging whether an asylum applicant has suffered harm amounting to “persecution” and whether the harm was inflicted “on account of” a protected characteristic, such as political opinion or religion. In a close analysis of this unusual practice, this Article argues that federal courts have come to inconsistent, and often incompatible, conclusions regarding the use of constitutional norms in the analysis of asylum claims: principally, on whether constitutional norms establish sufficient, insufficient, necessary, or …

Australians' "Right" To Be Bigoted: Protecting Minorities' Rights From The Tyranny Of The Majority, Jillian Rudge

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act (RDA) is a federal statute prohibiting behavior that offends, insults, humiliates, or intimidates people based on their race, nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. It appropriately limits the right to freedom of expression where the exercise of that right encroaches on other, equally fundamental rights to equality and freedom from discrimination. The RDA is one of Australia’s few human rights laws focused on fighting racism. It is especially important for protecting the rights of minorities since Australia lacks a constitutional or federal bill of rights. Unfortunately, in 2014 and 2015, conservative politicians called for a repulsion of …

November Madness: A Proposal For Representative Democracy Brackets To Eliminate The Undue Influence Of Money On Elections, Daniel P. Valentine

Texas A&M Law Review

This Comment proposes Representative Democracy Brackets, a multi-level manner of choosing candidates in which all voters have an equal voice, but which by its structure reduces the effect of mass marketing in favor of a focus on forming and evaluating interpersonal relationships. By implementing Representative Democracy Brackets, a state or the United States can achieve the twin benefits of decreasing the undue effects of political spending and increasing the quality of the resulting decisions. The proposed brackets winnow the pool of voters until it is small enough to make an informed decision.

This Comment defines the problem by reviewing the …

Binding Authority: Unamendability In The United States Constitution–A Textual And Historical Analysis, George Mader

Faculty Scholarship

We think of constitutional provisions as having contingent permanence—they are effective today and, barring amendment, tomorrow and the day after and so on until superseded by amendment. Once superseded, a provision is void. But are there exceptions to this default state of contingent permanence? Are there any provisions in the current United States Constitution that cannot be superseded by amendment—that are unamendable? And could a future amendment make itself or some portion of the existing Constitution unamendable?

Commentators investigating limits on constitutional amendment frequently focus on limits imposed by natural law, the democratic underpinnings of our nation, or some other …

A Tradition At War With Itself: A Reply To Professor Rana's Review Of America's Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions Of Power And Community, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

his essay responds to Professor Aziz Rana's review essay, "The Many American Constitutions," 93 Texas Law Review 1193 (2015).

He contends: (1) my portrayal of American constitutionalism might contain a “hidden” teleological understanding of the development of constitutional law; (2) my notion of "conventional sovereignty" sometimes seems content-free and at other times "interlinked with liberal egalitarianism"; and (3) a focus on failed constitutions "inadvertently tends to compartmentalize the overall tradition."

I answer in the following ways: (1) I reject any sense that constitutional law has moved in an arc of steady progress toward Enlightenment and instead embrace a tradition of …

The Emergence Of Classical American Patent Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

One enduring historical debate concerns whether the American Constitution was intended to be "classical" -- referring to a theory of statecraft that maximizes the role of private markets and minimizes the role of government in economic affairs. The most central and powerful proposition of classical constitutionalism is that the government's role in economic development should be minimal. First, private rights in property and contract exist prior to any community needs for development. Second, if a particular project is worthwhile the market itself will make it occur. Third, when the government attempts to induce development politics inevitably distorts the decision making. …

Politics At Work After Citizens United, Ruben J. Garcia

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

There are seismic changes going on in the political system. The United States Supreme Court has constitutionalized the concentration of political power in the “one percent” in several recent decisions, including Citizens United v. FEC. At the same time, unions are representing a shrinking share of the workforce, and their political power is also being diminished. In order for unions to recalibrate the balance of political power at all, they must collaborate with grassroots community groups, as they have done in several recent campaigns. There are, however, various legal structures that make coordination between unions and nonunion groups difficult, …

When The Police Get The Law Wrong: How Heien V. North Carolina Further Erodes The Fourth Amendment, Vivan M. Rivera

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus

Michigan Law Review

The maxim that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers can be understood as a “continuity tender”: not a principle with practical consequences for governance, but a ritual statement with which practitioners identify themselves with a history from which they descend. This interpretation makes sense of the longstanding paradox whereby courts recite the enumeration principle but give it virtually no practical effect. On this understanding, the enumerated-powers maxim is analogous to the clause that Parliament still uses to open enacted statutes: “Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty.” That text might imply that the Queen is …

Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Michigan Law Review

Though the Constitution conspicuously bars some state involvement in foreign affairs, the states clearly retain some authority in foreign affairs. Correctly supposing that state participation may unnecessarily complicate or embarrass our nation’s foreign relations, the Supreme Court has embraced aggressive preemption doctrines that sporadically oust the states from discrete areas in foreign affairs. These doctrines are unprincipled, supply little guidance, and generate capricious results. Fortunately, there is a better way. While the Constitution permits the states a limited and continuing role, it never goes so far as guaranteeing them any foreign affairs authority. Furthermore, the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact …

Rluipa And The Limits Of Religious Institutionalism, Zachary A. Bray

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

What special protections, if any, should religious organizations receive from local land use controls? The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)—a deeply flawed statute—has been a magnet for controversy since its passage in 2000. Yet until recently, RLUIPA has played little role in debates about “religious institutionalism,” a set of ideas that suggest religious institutions play a distinctive role in developing the framework for religious liberty and that they deserve comparably distinctive deference and protection. This is starting to change: RLUIPA’s magnetic affinity for controversy has begun to connect conflicts over religious land use with larger debates about …

The Executive, Shubhankar Dam

Shubhankar Dam

India has a parliamentary system. The President is the head of the Union of India; the Prime Minister is the head of government.1 Along with his or her cabinet, the Prime Minister is responsible to the Lower House of Parliament.2 States have similar arrangements. They are formally headed by Governors. But chief ministers and their cabinets lead the governments. Executive power, ordinarily, is exercised by the Prime Minister, chief ministers and their respective councils of ministers. However, in keeping with India’s Westminster inheritance, such power often vests in the formal heads, and is exercised in their names. This chapter offers …

Holmes And Brennan, Howard M. Wasserman

Howard M Wasserman