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Constitutional Law

Selected Works

2019

Judicial Power

Neal E. Devins

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network

Should The Supreme Court Fear Congress?, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Should The Supreme Court Fear Congress?, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


I Love You, Big Brother, Neal Devins Sep 2019

I Love You, Big Brother, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …


Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins Sep 2019

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …