Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Should The Supreme Court Fear Congress?, Neal Devins
Should The Supreme Court Fear Congress?, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins
Foreword: Elected Branch Influences In Constitutional Decisionmaking, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
I Love You, Big Brother, Neal Devins
The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, Tara Leigh Grove
The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, Tara Leigh Grove
Tara L. Grove
No abstract provided.
A (Modest) Separation Of Powers Success Story, Tara Leigh Grove
A (Modest) Separation Of Powers Success Story, Tara Leigh Grove
Tara L. Grove
No abstract provided.
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Tara L. Grove
Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …
Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court And The Power To "Say What The Law Is", Timothy Zick
Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court And The Power To "Say What The Law Is", Timothy Zick
Timothy Zick
No abstract provided.
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …
Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins
Constitutional Avoidance And The Roberts Court, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …
Rationing The Constitution: Beyond And Below, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Rationing The Constitution: Beyond And Below, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
No abstract provided.