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The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
As the housing crisis escalated during the second half of 2007, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), occupied an increasingly central role in the secondary mortgage market, purchasing a greater percentage of new mortgages as private securitization rapidly contracted. As their importance in this market grew, the two GSEs also began to suffer billion-dollar losses, inciting concerns that they might not be able to stay solvent throughout the remainder of the crisis. On September 6, 2008, fearing the systemic consequences of the two firms’ failures, the …
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module C: Gse Credit Facility, Emily Vergara
The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module C: Gse Credit Facility, Emily Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2007 and 2008, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and the deterioration of the housing market more generally precipitated a crisis at the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which together held or guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets. Over the course of two years, both entities suffered high losses and saw their liquidity positions deteriorate as the market perceived their rapid decline. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), pursuant to the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, took Fannie …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
Starting in mid-2007, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing collateral calls from counterparties looking to protect their positions in credit default swap (CDS) contracts that AIG had written on residential and commercial collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (US COP 2010, 28-30). Per these agreements, the AIG parent company was responsible for insuring the value of the CDOs against the risk of a negative credit event, such as default (GAO 2011, 5; US COP 2010, 29-30). AIG’s immediate need for liquidity on September 16, largely driven by a securities lending program and those collateral calls, prompted the Federal Reserve to lend the …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan …
Stress Tests And Policy, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Stress Tests And Policy, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Ten years after the Federal Reserve’s crisis-era bank stress test, it is time to recalibrate the stress tests for “peacetime.” Outside of a crisis, supervisors should tailor stress tests to focus on their comparative advantages by taking a macroprudential focus, with severe scenarios that enable them to learn about emerging risks in both traditional and shadow banking sectors. In peacetime, also, supervisors should emphasize risk- management practices and be wary of forcing rapid changes in capital levels for individual banks, while linking stress-test results with countercyclical capital buffers across the system.
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced by the commission and why its report is important. This "Lessons Learned" is based on an interview with Mr. Feldberg.
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Gary Cohen joined the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in December 2009 to serve as its general counsel at the request of commission chairman Phil Angelides. The FCIC was a 10-member bipartisan group convened by Congress to investigate the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Cohen had a wide-ranging and ad hoc position that included advising commissioners and staffers on administrative matters and protocols. In addition, he assisted in document requests and compelling witnesses to testify and, on occasion, in conducting interviews and public hearings. He played an instrumental role in editing the commission’s final report. This “Lessons …
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.
Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Phil Angelides chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) established by Congress in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with the purpose of understanding what precipitated the crisis so that any future crises might be averted. The 10-member bipartisan commission, known as the “Angelides Commission” after its chair, convened in September 2010. Meeting in a span of 15 months and holding 19 public hearings and interviewing more than 700 people, the commission submitted its findings in January 2011. The commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the “result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments.” The report included …
Monetization Of Fiscal Deficits And Covid-19: A Primer, Aidan Lawson, Greg Feldberg
Monetization Of Fiscal Deficits And Covid-19: A Primer, Aidan Lawson, Greg Feldberg
Journal of Financial Crises
Monetization—also known as “money-financed fiscal programs” or “money-printing”—occurs when a government finances itself by issuing currency or other non-interest-bearing liabilities, such as bank reserves. It poses real risks—potentially excessive inflation and encroachment on central-bank independence—and some paint it as a relic of a bygone era. The onset of the COVID-19 crisis, however, forced governments to spend heavily to combat the considerable economic and public health impacts. As government deficits climbed, monetization re-entered the conversation as a way to avoid the massive debt burdens that some nations may face. This paper describes how monetization works, provides key historical examples, and examines …