Digital Commons Network^™

Privacy And The New Virtualism, Jonathon Penney

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

First generation cyberlaw scholars were deeply influenced by the uniqueness of cyberspace, and believed its technology and scope meant it could not be controlled by any government. Few still ascribe to this utopian vision. However, there is now a growing body of second generation cyberlaw scholarship that speaks not only to the differential character of cyberspace, but also analyzes legal norms within virtual spaces while drawing connections to our experience in real space. I call this the New Virtualism. Situated within this emerging scholarship, this article offers a new approach to privacy in virtual spaces by drawing on what Orin …

Understanding The New Virtualist Paradigm, Jonathon Penney

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

This article discusses the central ideas within an emerging body of cyberlaw scholarship I have elsewhere called the "New Virtualism". We now know that the original "virtualists"- those first generation cyberlaw scholars who believed virtual worlds and spaces were immune to corporate and state control - were wrong; these days, such state and corporate interests are ubiquitous in cyberspace and the Internet. But is this it? Is there not anything else we can learn about cyberlaw from the virtualists and their utopian dreams? I think so. In fact, the New Virtualist paradigm of cyberlaw scholarship draws on the insights of …

Of Inkblots And Omnisignificance: Conceptualizing Secondary And Symbolic Functions Of The Ninth Amendment, In A Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, Samuel J. Levine

Scholarly Works

In this Essay, Levine focuses on a particular hermeneutic approach common to the interpretation of the Torah and the United States Constitution: a presumption against superfluity. This presumption accords to the text a considerable degree of omnisignificance, requiring that interpreters pay careful attention to every textual phrase and nuance in an effort to find its legal meaning and implications. In light of this presumption, it might be expected that normative interpretation of both the Torah and the Constitution would preclude a methodology that allows sections of the text to remain bereft of concrete legal application. In fact, however, both the …

Constitution And The Laws Of War During The Civil War, The Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure, Andrew Kent

Faculty Scholarship

This Article uncovers the forgotten complex of relationships between the U.S. Constitution, citizenship and the laws of war. The Supreme Court today believes that both noncitizens and citizens who are military enemies in a congressionally-authorized war are entitled to judicially-enforceable rights under the Constitution. The older view was that the U.S. government’s military actions against noncitizen enemies were not limited by the Constitution, but only by the international laws of war. On the other hand, in the antebellum period, the prevailing view was U.S. citizenship should carry with it protection from ever being treated as a military enemy under the …

The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Both originalists and nonoriginalists alike often assume that background assumptions widely held when the Constitution or its amendments were enacted are part of the original meaning of the text. Originalists sometimes appeal to these background assumptions to render the meaning of more abstract words or phrases more determinate; nonoriginalist point to odious or outmoded assumptions as proof that original meaning is objectionable and should be rejected.

In this paper, the author examines the proper role of background assumptions in constitutional interpretation when ascertaining the meaning of the terms, and in constitutional construction when applying this meaning to particular cases and …

Limits Of Interpretivism, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Justice Stephen Markman sits on the Supreme Court of my home state of Michigan. In that capacity, he says, he is involved in a struggle between two kinds of judging. On one side are judges like him. They follow the rules. On the other side are unconstrained judges who decide cases on the basis of what they think the law ought to be. This picture is relatively simple, and Justice Markman apparently approves of its simplicity. But matters may in fact be a good deal more complex.

Does Free Exercise Of Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention?, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

The article discusses the inclusion of the free exercise of religion among a society's constitutional guarantees in the U.S. It cites Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, authors of the book "Religious Freedom and the Constitution," who hold that religion does not deserve constitutional mention on account of any special value. It disputes this view and states that religion does deserve constitutional mention and that the constitution should protect a citizen's right to practice his or her religion.

Is The Constitution Libertarian?, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ever since Justice Holmes famously asserted that “the Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” academics have denied that the Constitution is libertarian. In this essay, I explain that the Constitution is libertarian to the extent that its original meaning respects and protects the five fundamental rights that are at the core of both classical liberalism and modern libertarianism. These rights can be protected both directly by judicial decisions and indirectly by structural constraints. While the original Constitution and Bill of Rights provided both forms of constraints, primarily on federal power, it left states free to violate the …

Annan V: Rethinking The Viability Of The Constitutional Arrangement And Its Future Importance, Nicos Trimikliniotis

Nicos Trimikliniotis

This chapter argues that despite the post-colonial Zurich-London legacy and the flaws contained in the final version of the Annan Plan its central pillars provided the basis for a viable, workable and fair constitutional arrangement for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The plan’s philosophy is in line with human rights conventions, UN resolutions, the EU Acquis and the High Level agreements of 1977 and 1979. It defines ‘a bizonal bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship’. The alternative – the indefinite continuation of de facto partition, or a de jure partition, or a ‘return’ to a …