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Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand
Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand
Michael A Helfand
No abstract provided.
Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand
Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand
Michael A Helfand
No abstract provided.
A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand
A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand
Michael A Helfand
This article considers the extent to which the liberal nation-state ought to accommodate religious practices that contravene state law and to incorporate religious discourse into public debate. To address these questions, the article develops a liberalism of sincerity based on John Locke’s theory of toleration. On such an account, liberalism imposes a duty of sincerity to prevent individuals from consenting to a regime that exercises control over matters of core concern such as faith, religion, and conscience. Liberal theory grounds the legitimacy of the state in the consent of the governed, but consenting to an intolerant regime is illegitimate because …
Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand
Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand
Michael A Helfand
This article considers how parties should resolve disputes that turn on religious doctrine and practice – that is, how people should litigate religion. Under current constitutional doctrine, litigating religion is generally the task of two types of religious institutions: first, religious arbitration tribunals, whose decisions are protected by arbitration doctrine, and religious courts, whose decision are protected by the religion clauses. Such institutions have been thrust into playing this role largely because the religion clauses are currently understood to prohibit courts from resolving religious questions – that is, the “religious question” doctrine is currently understood to prohibit courts from litigating …