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Sacred Cows, Holy Wars: Exploring The Limits Of Law In The Regulation Of Raw Milk And Kosher Meat, Kenneth Lasson Dec 2013

Sacred Cows, Holy Wars: Exploring The Limits Of Law In The Regulation Of Raw Milk And Kosher Meat, Kenneth Lasson

Kenneth Lasson

SACRED COWS, HOLY WARS Exploring the Limits of Law in the Regulation of Raw Milk and Kosher Meat By Kenneth Lasson Abstract In a free society law and religion seldom coincide comfortably, tending instead to reflect the inherent tension that often resides between the two. This is nowhere more apparent than in America, where the underlying principle upon which the first freedom enunciated by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights is based ‒ the separation of church and state – is conceptually at odds with the pragmatic compromises that may be reached. But our adherence to the primacy of individual rights …


The Political (And Other) Safeguards Of Religious Freedom, Richard W. Garnett Nov 2013

The Political (And Other) Safeguards Of Religious Freedom, Richard W. Garnett

Richard W Garnett

This essay is a contribution to a symposium marking the 20th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s still-controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith. That decision, it is suggested, should not be read as reflecting or requiring hostility or indifference towards claims for legislatively enacted accommodations of religion. Smith is not an endorsement of religion-blind neutrality in constitutional law; instead, it assigns to politically accountable actors the difficult, but crucially important, task of accommodating those whose religious exercise would otherwise be burdened by generally applicable laws. The essay goes on to suggest several things that must be true of our law …


Assimilation, Toleration, And The State's Interest In The Development Of Religious Doctrine, Richard Garnett Nov 2013

Assimilation, Toleration, And The State's Interest In The Development Of Religious Doctrine, Richard Garnett

Richard W Garnett

Thirty-five years ago, in the context of a church-property dispute, Justice William Brennan observed that government interpretation of religious doctrine and judicial intervention in religious disputes are undesirable, because when civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies..., the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. This statement, at first, seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and obvious. On examination, though, it turns out to be intriguing, elusive, and misleading. Indeed, Justice Brennan's warning presents hazards of its own, and its premises - if …


Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, And Constitutionalism, Richard W. Garnett Nov 2013

Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, And Constitutionalism, Richard W. Garnett

Richard W Garnett

No abstract provided.


Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy In The Constitutional Order - The End Of Church And State?, Gerard V. Bradley Oct 2013

Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy In The Constitutional Order - The End Of Church And State?, Gerard V. Bradley

Gerard V. Bradley

No abstract provided.


Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions And The Siren Song Of Liberalism, Gerard V. Bradley Oct 2013

Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions And The Siren Song Of Liberalism, Gerard V. Bradley

Gerard V. Bradley

No abstract provided.


Religious Pretenders In The Courts: Unmasking The Imposters, John O. Hayward Sep 2013

Religious Pretenders In The Courts: Unmasking The Imposters, John O. Hayward

John O. Hayward

When courts decide First Amendment “Free Exercise” cases, they often are confronted with the daunting task of defining what exactly is a “religion.” This article examines how judicial definitions and interpretations of religious faith have evolved over many decades, including legal recognition of Wicca (modern day witchcraft) and Hare Krishna as “religions,” as well as courts steering clear of the issue whenever possible, for example, when faced with an adherent of the “Church of Body Modification” who claims her employer’s dress code violates her religion. It also explores how courts have sought to uncover deception and fraud hiding behind disingenuous …


Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth A. Clark Feb 2013

Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth A. Clark

Elizabeth A. Clark

Commentators increasingly challenge religion’s privileged legal status, arguing that it is not “special” or distinct from other associations or philosophical or conscientious claims. I propose that religion is “special” because it functions metaphorically as a legal sovereign, asserting supreme authority over a realm of human life. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious freedom can be understood as at least partial deference to a religious sovereign in a system of shared or overlapping sovereignty. This Article suggests that federalism, which also involves shared sovereignty, can provide a useful heuristic device for examining religious freedom. Specifically, the Article examines a range of federalism …


Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand Feb 2013

Symposium Introduction: The Competing Claims Of Law And Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? , Robert F. Cochran Jr., Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand Feb 2013

Religion's Wise Embrace Of Commerce, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

No abstract provided.


Getting The Framers Wrong: A Response To Professor Geoffrey Stone, Samuel W. Calhoun Jan 2013

Getting The Framers Wrong: A Response To Professor Geoffrey Stone, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

Professor Geoffrey Stone’s Essay, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, seeks to state “the truth about . . . what [the Framers] believed, and about what they aspired to when they created this nation.” Doing so will accomplish Professor Stone’s main objective, helping us to understand what “the Constitution allows” on a host of controversial public policy issues.3 Regrettably, Professor Stone’s effort is unsuccessful. Although he clearly tried to be fair in his historical account,4 the Essay ultimately presents a misleading view of the Framers’ perspective on the proper relationship between religion and the state.


When Religion And Law Conflict, Alan Garfield Jan 2013

When Religion And Law Conflict, Alan Garfield

Alan E Garfield

Religion and law.


A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand Dec 2012

A Liberalism Of Sincerity: The Role Of Religion In The Public Square, Michael Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This article considers the extent to which the liberal nation-state ought to accommodate religious practices that contravene state law and to incorporate religious discourse into public debate. To address these questions, the article develops a liberalism of sincerity based on John Locke’s theory of toleration. On such an account, liberalism imposes a duty of sincerity to prevent individuals from consenting to a regime that exercises control over matters of core concern such as faith, religion, and conscience. Liberal theory grounds the legitimacy of the state in the consent of the governed, but consenting to an intolerant regime is illegitimate because …


Beyond Interpretation: The "Cultural Approach" To Understanding Extra-Formal Change In Religious And Constitutional Law (Invited Symposium Contribution), Mark Rosen Dec 2012

Beyond Interpretation: The "Cultural Approach" To Understanding Extra-Formal Change In Religious And Constitutional Law (Invited Symposium Contribution), Mark Rosen

Mark D. Rosen

No abstract provided.


Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand Dec 2012

Litigating Religion, Michael A. Helfand

Michael A Helfand

This article considers how parties should resolve disputes that turn on religious doctrine and practice – that is, how people should litigate religion. Under current constitutional doctrine, litigating religion is generally the task of two types of religious institutions: first, religious arbitration tribunals, whose decisions are protected by arbitration doctrine, and religious courts, whose decision are protected by the religion clauses. Such institutions have been thrust into playing this role largely because the religion clauses are currently understood to prohibit courts from resolving religious questions – that is, the “religious question” doctrine is currently understood to prohibit courts from litigating …