Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
-
- University of Michigan Law School (65)
- Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (25)
- Pepperdine University (2)
- Roger Williams University (2)
- The University of Akron (2)
-
- University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (2)
- Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law (2)
- Chicago-Kent College of Law (1)
- Georgetown University Law Center (1)
- Mitchell Hamline School of Law (1)
- Seattle University School of Law (1)
- Selected Works (1)
- University of Georgia School of Law (1)
- University of Kentucky (1)
- University of Maine School of Law (1)
- University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (1)
- University of Massachusetts School of Law (1)
- University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (1)
- University of Richmond (1)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Articles (35)
- Touro Law Review (24)
- Michigan Law Review (14)
- University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (7)
- Michigan Law Review First Impressions (6)
-
- Faculty Scholarship (2)
- Faculty Testimony (2)
- Life of the Law School (1993- ) (2)
- Pepperdine Law Review (2)
- Scholarly Works (2)
- Akron Law Review (1)
- All Faculty Scholarship (1)
- Book Chapters (1)
- Chicago-Kent Law Review (1)
- ConLawNOW (1)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (1)
- Kentucky Law Journal (1)
- Maine Law Review (1)
- Martin A. Schwartz (1)
- Maryland Law Review (1)
- Michigan Journal of Gender & Law (1)
- Other Publications (1)
- Seattle University Law Review (1)
- University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review (1)
- University of Massachusetts Law Review (1)
- University of Richmond Law Review (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 31 - 60 of 112
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Appellate Division, First Department: People V. Montes, Lauren L. Morales
Appellate Division, First Department: People V. Montes, Lauren L. Morales
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael: The Supreme Court Follows Up On The Daubert Test, Martin A. Schwartz
Kumho Tire Co. V. Carmichael: The Supreme Court Follows Up On The Daubert Test, Martin A. Schwartz
Martin A. Schwartz
No abstract provided.
Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon
Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …
Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley
Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley
Chicago-Kent Law Review
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and adopted new law concerning the use of hearsay testimony at criminal trials. This was based on the Sixth Amendment's command that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. " On its face this provision seems to say that the accused has the right to cross-examine anybody who testifies for the prosecution at trial, whether as a live witness or through hearsay. The Supreme Court acknowledged much of this in Crawford, but …
"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair
"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not unconditional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on the confrontation right of a pro …
Giles V. California: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Giles V. California: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In this Essay, Professor Friedman places Giles v. California in the context of the recent transformation of the law governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He contends that a robust doctrine of forfeiture is an integral part of a sound conception of the confrontation right. One reason this is so is that cases fitting within the traditional hearsay exception for dying declarations can be explained as instances of forfeiture. This explanation leads to a simple structure of confrontation law, qualified by the principle that the confrontation right may be waived or forfeited but not subject to genuine exceptions. …
Is A Forensic Laboratory Report Identifying A Substance As A Narcotic 'Testimonial'?, Richard D. Friedman
Is A Forensic Laboratory Report Identifying A Substance As A Narcotic 'Testimonial'?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Is a state forensic analyst's laboratory report, prepared for use in a criminal proceeding and identifying a substance as cocaine, "testimonial" evidence and so subject to the demands of the Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)?
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If an accused murdered a witness, should he be deemed to have forfeited the right under the Sixth Amendment "to be confronted with" the witness, absent proof that the accused committed the murder for the purpose of rendering her unavailable as a witness?
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
So my topic this morning is on forfeiture of the confrontation right, which I think plays a central role in confrontation doctrine. And to try to present that, let me state the entirety of confrontation doctrine as briefly as I can. This is, at least, what I think the doctrine is and what it can be: A testimonial statement should not be admissible against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused either has had or will have an opportunity to confront the witness-which should occur at trial unless the witness is then unavailable-or has …
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. It was not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement, it made little practical difference whether the court termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not comply with the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have to say that when I stood up to argue Hammon I felt the wind at my back. I was basically a lawyer with an easy case, and there wasn't anything particularly unpredictable at the argument of Hammon. Now it got a little bit interesting, as I will explain later, because to a certain extent I was trying to argue the other case as well. But Hammon itself was sort of ordinary, normal law.
Holmes V. South Carolina Upholds Trial By Jury, Samuel R. Gross
Holmes V. South Carolina Upholds Trial By Jury, Samuel R. Gross
Articles
Bobby Lee Holmes was convicted of a brutal rape-murder and sentenced to death. The only evidence that connected him to the crime was forensic: a palm print, and blood and fiber evidence. (Biological samples taken from the victim for two rape kits were compromised and yielded no identifiable evidence.) Holmes claimed that the state's forensic evidence was planted and mishandled, and that the rape and murder were committed by another man, Jimmy McCaw White. At a pretrial hearing three witnesses testified that they saw White near the victim's house at about the time of the crime, and four others testified …
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …
Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman
Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Crawford v. Washington, has adopted a testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement and that person is unavailable to testify at trial. If a statement is not deemed to be testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any obstacle to its admission.2 A great deal therefore now rides on the meaning of the word "testimonial."
Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The following edit excerpt, drawn from "The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed," 2003-04 Cato Supreme Court Review 439 (2004), by Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, discusses the impact, effects, and questions generated by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington last year that a defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement presented against him. In Crawford, the defendant, charged with attacking another man with a knife, contested the trial court's admission of a tape-recorded statement his wife made to police without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine. The tiral court admitted the statement, and …
Crawford V. Washington: Encouraging And Ensuring The Confrontation Of Witness, Robert P. Mosteller
Crawford V. Washington: Encouraging And Ensuring The Confrontation Of Witness, Robert P. Mosteller
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman
Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of an accused 'to confront the witnesses against him'. The United States Supreme Court has treated this Confrontation Clause as a broad but rather easily rebuttable rule against using hearsay on behalf of a criminal prosecution; with respect to most hearsay, the exclusionary rule is overcome if the court is persuaded that the statement is sufficiently reliable, and the court can reach that conclusion if the statement fits within a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception. This article argues that this framework should be abandoned. The clause should not be regarded …
The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman
The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
For several centuries, prosecution witnesses in criminal cases have given their testimony under oath, face to face with the accused, and subject to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the procedure, providing that ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.’’ In recent decades, however, judicial protection of the right has been lax, because the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of outof- court statements against the accused, without cross-examination, if the statements are deemed ‘‘reliable’’ or ‘‘trustworthy.’’ …
Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman
Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Craitiord is a very positive development, restoring to its central position one of the basic protections of the common law system of criminal justice. But the decision leaves many open questions, and all lawyers involved in the criminal justice process will have to adjust to the new regime that it creates. This article outlines and summarizes the problems with the law as it stood before Crait/brd. It then explains the theoretical …
The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman
The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), is one of the most dramatic Evidence cases in recent history, radically transforming the doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Crawford is a very positive development, but leaves many open questions - and forces Evidence teachers to rethink how they teach hearsay and confrontation.
Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Other Publications
This article is an edited excerpt from the amicus curiae brief filed in Crawford v. Washington, heard before the United States Supreme Court on November 10, 2003. Prof. Friedman wrote the brief for the Court.
Confrontation As A Hot Topic: The Virtues Of Going Back To Square One, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation As A Hot Topic: The Virtues Of Going Back To Square One, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have been working so obsessively on the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him 1 that I am gratified that the organizers of this conference have designated confrontation as one of the "hot topics" of Evidence law. I am not so egotistical as to think that my work has made confrontation into a hot topic; I am just glad to know that I am working where a good deal of action is, and that other scholars recognize that confrontation is an important area in which dramatic changes may be occurring.
Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
On June 9, by granting certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter once again into the realm of the Confrontation Clause, in which it has found itself deeply perplexed. This time there was a difference, however, because the grant indicated that the Court might be willing to rethink its jurisprudence in this area. Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), presents a classic case of what might be called station-house testimony. Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing another man. His wife, Sylvia, was …
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …