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An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine Mims Crocker May 2019

An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants. Lawsuits challenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama administration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.

Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion? This Essay argues that state plaintiffs are far more like at least one …


Qualified Immunity And Constitutional Structure, Katherine Mims Crocker May 2019

Qualified Immunity And Constitutional Structure, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

A range of scholars has subjected qualified immunity to a wave of criticism— and for good reasons. But the Supreme Court continues to apply the doctrine in ever more aggressive ways. By advancing two claims, this Article seeks to make some sense of this conflict and to suggest some thoughts toward a resolution.

First, while the Court has offered and scholars have rejected several rationales for the doctrine, layering in an account grounded in structural constitutional concerns provides a historically richer and analytically thicker understanding of the current qualified-immunity regime. For suits against federal officials, qualified immunity acts as a …


No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory Of The Due Process Of Law, Randy E. Barnett, Evan D. Bernick Apr 2019

No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory Of The Due Process Of Law, Randy E. Barnett, Evan D. Bernick

William & Mary Law Review

“Due process of law” is arguably the most controversial and frequently litigated phrase in the Constitution of the United States. Although the dominant originalist view has long been that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clauses are solely “process” guarantees that do not constrain the content or “substance” of legislation at all, originalist scholars have in recent years made fresh inquiries into the historical evidence and concluded that there is a weighty case for some form of substantive due process. In this Article, we review and critique those findings, employing our theory of good-faith originalist interpretation and …


Trusting The Federalism Process Under Unique Circumstances: United States Election Administration And Cybersecurity, Eric S. Lynch Apr 2019

Trusting The Federalism Process Under Unique Circumstances: United States Election Administration And Cybersecurity, Eric S. Lynch

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


There's Nothing Rational About It: Heightened Scrutiny For Sexual Orientation Is Long Overdue, Daniel J. Galvin Jr. Apr 2019

There's Nothing Rational About It: Heightened Scrutiny For Sexual Orientation Is Long Overdue, Daniel J. Galvin Jr.

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

In this Article, I argue that sexual orientation meets the burden established by Supreme Court jurisprudence for suspect classification and, therefore, should receive heightened scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis. After decades of using the fundamental rights analysis to aid lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals in their pursuit of equality, addressing the fundamental right to marry and the fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme Court must address the elephant in the courtroom: that sexual orientation meets all of the factors set by the Court in equal protection cases for suspect classification.

Gays, lesbians, and bisexual individuals (LGBs) meet the …


The Second Amendment As A Fundamental Right, Timothy Zick Apr 2019

The Second Amendment As A Fundamental Right, Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

The Second Amendment has been suffering from an inferiority complex. Litigants, scholars, and judges have complained that the right to keep and bear arms is not being afforded the respect and dignity befitting a “fundamental” constitutional right. They have asserted that, both on its own terms and relative to rights in the same general class, the Second Amendment has been disrespected, under-enforced, and orphaned. They have argued that courts have treated the Second Amendment as “peripheral,” “fringe,” “anachronistic,” “second rate,” and “second-class.” The Second Amendment has been described as “the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights” and even compared …


Antitrust As Speech Control, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao Mar 2019

Antitrust As Speech Control, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust law, at times, dictates who, when, and about what people can and cannot speak. It would seem then that the First Amendment might have something to say about those constraints. And it does, though perhaps less directly and to a lesser degree than one might expect. This Article examines the interface between those regimes while recasting antitrust thinking in terms of speech control.

Our review of the antitrust-First Amendment legal landscape focuses on the role of speech control. It reveals that while First Amendment issues are explicitly addressed relatively infrequently within antitrust decisions that is, in part, because certain …


Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Constitutional And Antitrust Commitments, Jonathan B. Baker Mar 2019

Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Constitutional And Antitrust Commitments, Jonathan B. Baker

William & Mary Law Review

This Article shows how the norm supporting governmental action to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century, and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national commitment to assuring competitive markets.


Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane Mar 2019

Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane

William & Mary Law Review

State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …


Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka Mar 2019

Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka

William & Mary Law Review

The Parker v. Brown (or “state action”) doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution impose different limits on antitrust suits challenging anticompetitive state regulation. The Supreme Court has developed these two versions of state sovereign immunity separately, and lower courts usually apply the immunities independently of each other (even in the same cases) without explaining their relationship. Nevertheless, the Court has derived the two immunities from the same principle of sovereign immunity, so it is worth considering why and how they differ, and what the consequences of the differences are for antitrust policy. The state action immunity is based …


Religious Freedom Through Market Freedom: The Sherman Act And The Marketplace For Religion, Barak D. Richman Mar 2019

Religious Freedom Through Market Freedom: The Sherman Act And The Marketplace For Religion, Barak D. Richman

William & Mary Law Review

In prior work, I examined certain restraints by private religious organizations and concluded that the First Amendment did not immunize these organizations from antitrust liability. In short, the First Amendment did not preempt enforcing the Sherman Act against certain religious monopolies or cartels.

This Article offers a stronger argument: First Amendment values demand antitrust enforcement. Because American religious freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in American history, are quintessentially exercised when decentralized communities create their own religious expression, the First Amendment’s religion clauses are best exemplified by a proverbial marketplace for religions. Any effort to stifle a market organization …


“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic Mar 2019

“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic

William & Mary Law Review

In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook an ambitious program of reforms. Among other measures, the agency expanded the focus of antitrust enforcement to address economic concentration, including the use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to restructure dominant firms and oligopolies. In many ways Michael Pertschuk, who chaired the agency from 1977 to 1981, became the symbol of the FTC’s efforts to stretch the boundaries of antitrust policy—to pursue a conception of “competition policy in its broadest sense.” Despite a number of valuable accomplishments, the FTC achieved relatively few litigation successes, …


Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar Mar 2019

Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar

William & Mary Law Review

In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of political harms inherent in the structure of the North …


Epilogue: From Too Tall To Trim And Small, Mark A. Drumbl Mar 2019

Epilogue: From Too Tall To Trim And Small, Mark A. Drumbl

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


State Empowerment And The Compact Clause, James F. Blumstein, Thomas J. Cheeseman Mar 2019

State Empowerment And The Compact Clause, James F. Blumstein, Thomas J. Cheeseman

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


Merging Offensive-Speech Cases With Viewpoint-Discrimination Principles: The Immediate Impact Of Matal V. Tam On Two Strands Of First Amendment Jurisprudence, Clay Calvert Mar 2019

Merging Offensive-Speech Cases With Viewpoint-Discrimination Principles: The Immediate Impact Of Matal V. Tam On Two Strands Of First Amendment Jurisprudence, Clay Calvert

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article examines flaws with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Matal v. Tam that equated giving offense with viewpoint discrimination. Already, the Court’s language in Tam that “giving offense is a viewpoint” is being cited by multiple lower courts. This Article argues, however, that giving offense is not synonymous with viewpoint discrimination. This Article contends that the Court in Tam conflated two distinct strands of First Amendment jurisprudence—namely, its offensive-speech cases with principles against viewpoint discrimination. The Article proposes two possible paths forward to help courts better clarify when a case such as Tam should be analyzed as …


The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth Mar 2019

The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

William & Mary Law Review

Is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation? The “right to earn a living” movement, gaining steam in policy circles and winning some battles in the lower courts, says so. Advocates for this right say that the right to compete in an occupation stands on equal footing with our most sacred constitutional rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination. This Article takes a different view, arguing that while there is a limited constitutional right to compete in an occupation, it is—and should be—weaker than these advocates claim. Some state licensing laws run afoul of …


Taking Shelter Under The Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality Of Policing Methods At State-Sponsored Natural Disaster Shelters, Kyle M. Wood Feb 2019

Taking Shelter Under The Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality Of Policing Methods At State-Sponsored Natural Disaster Shelters, Kyle M. Wood

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Enforcing Principled Constitutional Limits On Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement Of Justice Cardozo's Jurisprudence, Robert J. Pushaw Jr. Feb 2019

Enforcing Principled Constitutional Limits On Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement Of Justice Cardozo's Jurisprudence, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

Since the New Deal of the mid-1930s, Congress has asserted virtually absolute power to (1) “regulate Commerce ... among the States,” (2) tax and spend for the “general Welfare,” and (3) delegate “legislative Power[ ]” to the executive branch. From 1937 until 1994, the Supreme Court rejected every claim that such statutes had exceeded Congress’s Article I authority and usurped the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. Over the past quarter century, conservative Justices have tried, and failed, to develop principled constitutional limits on the federal government while keeping the modern administrative and social welfare state largely intact.

The …


Government Standing And The Fallacy Of Institutional Injury, Tara Leigh Grove Feb 2019

Government Standing And The Fallacy Of Institutional Injury, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

A new brand of plaintiff has come to federal court. In cases involving the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and partisan gerrymandering, government institutions have brought suit to redress “institutional injuries”—that is, claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties. Jurists and scholars are increasingly enthusiastic about these lawsuits, arguing (for example) that the Senate should have standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House of Representatives may sue to preserve its role in the appropriations process; and that the President may go to court to vindicate his Article II prerogatives. This Article …


Two Models For Amending The 'Fleeing Felon' Rule, Cynthia V. Ward Jan 2019

Two Models For Amending The 'Fleeing Felon' Rule, Cynthia V. Ward

Faculty Publications

The so-called “fleeing felon” rule instructs courts and law-enforcement personnel about whether, and when, police may use deadly force to stop a suspect who is attempting to escape arrest. At common law, police were allowed to use deadly force when necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon, even if the escapee did not present an imminent threat of violence to the officers or others. By contrast, the right of private citizens to use deadly force against another person is generally restricted to situations involving self-defense—where an innocent person reasonably believes she is facing an imminent threat of death …