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The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy∗, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy∗, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John M. Spraggon
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal …
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal …
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John M. Spraggon
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both …
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Colombia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both …