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Improving Human Rights Compliance In Supply Chains, Kishanthi Parella
Improving Human Rights Compliance In Supply Chains, Kishanthi Parella
Scholarly Articles
Corporations try to convince us that they are good global citizens: “brands take stands” by engaging in cause philanthropy; CEOs of prominent corporations tackle a variety of issues; and social values drive marketing strategies for goods and services. But despite this rhetoric, corporations regularly fall short in their conduct. This is especially true in supply chains where a number of human rights abuses frequently occur. One solution is for corporations to engage in meaningful human rights due diligence that involves monitoring human rights, reporting on social and environmental performance, undertaking impact assessments, and consulting with groups whose human rights they …
Governing Medical Knowledge Commons - Introduction And Chapter 1, Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison
Governing Medical Knowledge Commons - Introduction And Chapter 1, Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison
Book Chapters
Governing Medical Knowledge Commons makes three claims: first, evidence matters to innovation policymaking; second, evidence shows that self-governing knowledge commons support effective innovation without prioritizing traditional intellectual property rights; and third, knowledge commons can succeed in the critical fields of medicine and health. The editors' knowledge commons framework adapts Elinor Ostrom's groundbreaking research on natural resource commons to the distinctive attributes of knowledge and information, providing a systematic means for accumulating evidence about how knowledge commons succeed. The editors' previous volume, Governing Knowledge Commons, demonstrated the framework's power through case studies in a diverse range of areas. Governing Medical Knowledge …
Three Essays On Remittances, Institutions, And Economic Development, Durga Gautam
Three Essays On Remittances, Institutions, And Economic Development, Durga Gautam
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
Does the inflow of remittances affect the quality of institutions in the recipient countries? This question is important because economists have stressed that good economic institutions, particularly those in the public sector, are instrumental for economic development and growth. The literature on remittances, however, does not document a thorough analysis and compelling evidence of the relationship between these private financial transfers and institutional quality. Unlike other kinds of international capital flows, remittances inflows are not mediated by the government of recipient countries. Remittances are not taxed directly and so are not a source of revenue for the government. Then a …
Solving Charity Failures, Brian L. Frye
Solving Charity Failures, Brian L. Frye
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
“Crowdfunding” is a way of using the Internet to raise money by asking the public to contribute to a project. In the past, asking a large number of people to contribute small amounts of money to a project was expensive and inefficient for most organizations and individuals. By greatly reducing transaction costs, crowdfunding enables anyone to inexpensively and efficiently seek small contributions to a project. While crowdfunding is a new model of fundraising, it has already transformed funding for the arts. For example, the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter distributed more than forty million dollars to the creators of almost seventy-five hundred …
Governing Knowledge Commons -- Introduction & Chapter 1, Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, Katherine J. Strandburg
Governing Knowledge Commons -- Introduction & Chapter 1, Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, Katherine J. Strandburg
Book Chapters
“Knowledge commons” describes the institutionalized community governance of the sharing and, in some cases, creation, of information, science, knowledge, data, and other types of intellectual and cultural resources. It is the subject of enormous recent interest and enthusiasm with respect to policymaking about innovation, creative production, and intellectual property. Taking that enthusiasm as its starting point, Governing Knowledge Commons argues that policymaking should be based on evidence and a deeper understanding of what makes commons institutions work. It offers a systematic way to study knowledge commons, borrowing and building on Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize-winning research on natural resource commons. It …
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, Todd L. Cherry, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Nonrivalry And Price Discrimination In Copyright Economics, John P. Conley, Christopher S. Yoo
Nonrivalry And Price Discrimination In Copyright Economics, John P. Conley, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
The literature on the economics of copyright proceeds from the premise that copyrightable works constitute pure public goods, which is generally modeled by assuming that such works are nonexcludable and that the marginal cost of making additional copies is essentially zero. A close examination of the foundational literature on public goods theory reveals that the defining characteristic of public goods is instead the optimality criterion known as the “Samuelson condition,” which implies that the systematic bias toward underproduction is the result of the inability to induce consumers to reveal their preferences rather than the inability to exclude or price at …
Interoperability Provision In Ngc: The Case Of Italian Dtv, Nicola Matteucci
Interoperability Provision In Ngc: The Case Of Italian Dtv, Nicola Matteucci
Nicola Matteucci
The deployment of next generation communications (NGC) progresses unevenly, frequently suffering from insufficient interoperability. Interoperability remains a fundamental driver for NGC diffusion, but existing theories remain vague on how to ensure its provision. Since interoperability features increasing returns and public good regimes, its market provision may be hampered. At the same time, public efforts might be ineffective when colliding with private operators' incentives. Sometimes, the policy instruments used might even distort technological diffusion and competition in a way incompatible with a market-neutral approach. This paper aims to investigate these issues.
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy∗, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy∗, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John M. Spraggon
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal …
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
The Problem Of Maintaining Compliance Within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence, David M. Mcevoy, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal …
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John M. Spraggon
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both …
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts To Support Cooperation? Evidence From Field Experiments In Colombia, Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon, John K. Stranlund
John K. Stranlund
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Colombia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both …