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A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores
Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores
CMC Faculty Publications and Research
Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk …