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Articles 31 - 51 of 51
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert
Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
A general definition of exclusionary conduct has become a sort of Holy Grail for antitrust scholars. At present, four proposed definitions appear most promising: (1) conduct that could exclude an equally efficient rival; (2) conduct that raises rivals' costs unjustifiably; (3) conduct that, on balance, impairs consumer welfare by creating market power without providing countervailing consumer benefits; and (4) conduct that makes no economic sense but for its exclusionary effect on rivals.
Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, C. Scott Hemphill
Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, C. Scott Hemphill
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
Over the past decade, drug makers have settled patent litigation by making large payments to potential rivals who, in turn, abandon suits that (if successful) would increase competition. Because such "pay-for-delay" settlements postpone the possibility of competitive entry, they have attracted the attention of antitrust enforcement authorities, courts, and commentators. Pay-for-delay settlements not only constitute a problem of immense practical importance in antitrust enforcement, but also pose a general dilemma about the proper balance between innovation and consumer access.
This Article examines the pay-for-delay dilemma as a problem in regulatory design. A full analysis of the relevant industry-specific regulatory statute, …
The Demise Of Regulation In Ocean Shipping: A Study In The Evolution Of Competition Policy And The Predictive Power Of Microeconomics, Christopher L. Sagers
The Demise Of Regulation In Ocean Shipping: A Study In The Evolution Of Competition Policy And The Predictive Power Of Microeconomics, Christopher L. Sagers
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
Over its 140 year history, ocean liner shipping has almost always enjoyed an antitrust exemption permitting price-fixing cartels of ocean carriers. The exemption was premised on the belief that problems of cost and capacity inherent in the trade can be resolved only by horizontal collusion. Now that that exemption has been whittled away by deregulatory efforts, the pre- and post-deregulation evidence presents one of the world's rare opportunities for natural experiment on the behavior and effectiveness of collusive cartel pricing. Moreover, because normal and effective competition never really existed prior to 1998, the normative foundation of the antitrust exemption was …
Antitrust And The Supremacy Clause , Richard Squire
Antitrust And The Supremacy Clause , Richard Squire
Faculty Scholarship
In the course of damning the market giant Standard Oil, the Supreme Court declared that the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act is to prevent "monopoly and the acts which produce the same result as monopoly." The Constitution's Supremacy Clause, in turn, requires preemption-that is, non-enforcement--of state laws that conflict with a federal statute. Put together, these propositions suggest that state laws which create monopolies should be prime candidates for preemption via the Sherman Act. But despite the syllogistic logic bearing down on them, monopoly-creating state laws have easily weathered most federal antitrust challenges, even when the state does not …
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating The Foreseeability Doctrine, Elizabeth Trujillo
Faculty Scholarship
The state action antitrust exemption, also known as the state action immunity doctrine, is used by antitrust defendants to shield themselves against antitrust liability in instances where their anticompetitive conduct, if not under the aegis of state policy, would have been deemed a violation of federal antitrust law. Under the Midcal test, a court may grant state action immunity to a defendant if it is proven that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is pursuant to a clearly-articulated state policy and has been actively supervised by the state.
This paper evaluates the role, function, and definition of the state action exemption in …
Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards, Stephen Calkins
Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards, Stephen Calkins
Law Faculty Research Publications
Once again a national commission is attempting to address problems in antitrust law and enforcement. At this writing, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) is well underway. The AMC has identified 25 issues for study, and is receiving comments and holding hearings. This brief Article looks backward at previous efforts to use commissions to improve antitrust. It reviews those efforts, evaluates the results, and provides some lessons (and cautions) for other modernizers.
Civil Monetary Remedies Available To Federal Antitrust Enforcers, Stephen Calkins
Civil Monetary Remedies Available To Federal Antitrust Enforcers, Stephen Calkins
Law Faculty Research Publications
No abstract provided.
Atomism And The Private Merger Challenge, Paul Stancil
Atomism And The Private Merger Challenge, Paul Stancil
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the implications of allowing private parties to challenge mergers and acquisitions under the antitrust laws. It highlights a number of relatively recent developments in antitrust law that suggest an increase in private merger challenges in the future, and it identifies antiquated time of suit doctrines that may lead to inefficient and/or frivolous antimerger filings. It concludes by proposing several significant changes to the existing legal regime: (1) limited fee-shifting; (2) rigid time-of-suit deadlines; (3) single damages; and (4) limits on the use of postacquisition evidence to establish liability. Taken together, these reforms will allow private parties to …
Network Neutrality And The Economics Of Congestion, Christopher S. Yoo
Network Neutrality And The Economics Of Congestion, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Regulating Access To Databases Through Antitrust Law, Daryl Lim
Regulating Access To Databases Through Antitrust Law, Daryl Lim
Faculty Scholarly Works
It is largely uncontroversial that the “creative” effort in a database will be protected by copyright. However, any effort to extend protection to purely factual databases creates difficulties in determining the proper method and scope of protection. This Paper argues that antitrust law can be used to supplement intellectual property law in maintaining the “access-incentive” balance with respect to databases. It starts from the premise that a trend toward “TRIPs-plus” rights in databases, whatever its form, is inevitable. The reason is a simple, but compelling one: business needs shape the law. Various means of database access regulation are explored and …
In Defense Of Regulatory Peer Review, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
In Defense Of Regulatory Peer Review, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The debate over application of peer review to the regulatory decisions of administrative agencies has heated up in the last year. Part of the larger and controversial sound science movement, mandating peer review for certain types of agency decisions has recently been championed by the White House and proponents in Congress. Indeed, this past January the Office of Management and Budget finalized guidelines requiring peer review for large classes of agency activities. These initiatives have not gone unchallenged, and a fierce debate has resulted between those who claim peer review will strengthen the scientific basis of agency decisions and those …
Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney
Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
Following a string of government losses in cases challenging hospital mergers in federal court, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice issued their report on competition in health care seeking to set the record straight on a number of issues that underlie the judiciary's resolution of these cases. One such issue is the import of nonprofit status for applying antitrust law. This essay describes antitrust's role in addressing the consolidation in the hospital sector and the subtle influence that the social function of the nonprofit hospital has had in merger litigation. Noting that the political and social context …
Regulatory Responses To Investor Irrationality: The Case Of The Research Analyst, Jill E. Fisch
Regulatory Responses To Investor Irrationality: The Case Of The Research Analyst, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
An extensive body of behavioral economics literature suggests that investors do not behave with perfect rationality. Instead, investors are subject to a variety of biases that may cause them to react inappropriately to information. The policy challenge posed by this observation is to identify the appropriate response to investor irrationality. In particular, should regulators attempt to protect investors from bad investment decisions that may be the result of irrational behavior?
This Article considers the appropriate regulatory response to investor irrationality within the concrete context of the research analyst. Many commentators have argued that analyst conflicts of interest led to biased …
Vertical Restraints On Competition, Franklin A. Gevurtz
Vertical Restraints On Competition, Franklin A. Gevurtz
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles
This report addresses the application of United States "antitrust" - or what other nations commonly refer to as "competition" - law to agreements between sellers and purchasers of goods and services, when those agreements impact competition. In other words, this report is concerned with "vertical," as opposed to "horizontal," restraints (horizontal referring to agreements between competitors). This report will proceed in two parts. Part I will provide a broad overview of the relevant statutes, enforcement mechanisms, and approach ofUnited States law to vertical restraints. Part II will discuss how United States law currently applies to specific vertical restraints.
Horizontal Agreements: Concept And Proof, George A. Hay
Horizontal Agreements: Concept And Proof, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
It is well established that, absent some very special circumstances, agreements on price or certain other terms of trade by otherwise competing entities (i.e., "horizontal agreements") are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. In practical effect, once the fact of the horizontal agreement has been established, an adverse impact on competition is presumed, and therefore that the plaintiff is spared the burden of proving such an impact. The principal task for plaintiffs in such cases, therefore, is establishing the existence of an agreement.
In the ideal world (from plaintiffs' perspective), there would be "hard" evidence of a "formal" agreement. …
Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese
Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
In Search Of A Unifying Principle For Article V Of The Uniform Trust Code: A Response To Professor Danforth, Jeffrey Schoenblum
In Search Of A Unifying Principle For Article V Of The Uniform Trust Code: A Response To Professor Danforth, Jeffrey Schoenblum
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Professor Robert Danforth's exploration of spendthrift trusts in Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors 'Rights in Trusts is a superb piece of work. Professor Danforth analyzes with considerable acuity the ins and outs of the specific rights creditors and beneficiaries of trusts have under the Uniform Trust Code (UTC). His article clearly represents the most detailed analysis of the new Code's approach to spendthrift trusts. Professor Danforth is determined to establish that Article V is not as creditor-friendly as its critics claim.2 His article is essentially an apologia, coupled with some proposed modifications so as to …
Competition Policy As A Political Bartain, Jonathan Baker
Competition Policy As A Political Bartain, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Competition policy in the U.S. may be understood as a self-enforcing political bargain emerging from a repeated political interaction between two large and diffuse interest groups, consumers and producers. Absent such a bargain, regulatory policy would fluctuate between pro-producer policies that tolerate the exercise of market power and pro-consumer policies that systematically redistribute surplus from producers to consumers. This perspective is consistent with the broad contours of the historical U.S. experience with antitrust, particularly with the continuity in antitrust enforcement and decline in the political salience of competition policy since the 1940s. The adoption of Chicago school views during the …
Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru
Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Professional sports organizations' relationships with their players are, like other employer-employee relationships, subject to scrutiny under the antidiscrimination mandates embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Professional sports organizations are, however, unique among employers in many respects. Most notably, unlike other employers, professional sports organizations attract avid supporters who identify deeply with the teams and their players. To the extent an organization racially discriminates, therefore, such discrimination creates the risk that fans will identify with the homogenous or racially disproportionate roster that results. The consequences of such race-based team identification are wide-reaching and potentially tragic. Through …
Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws, Christopher M. Holman
Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws, Christopher M. Holman
Faculty Works
The term "reverse payment" has been used as shorthand to characterize a variety of diverse agreements between patent owners and alleged infringers that involve a transfer of consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer. Reverse payment settlements are particularly associated with drug patent challenges mounted by generic drug companies under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Many, including the Federal Trade Commission, would characterize these agreements as antitrust violations. However, courts have generally declined to find these agreements in violation of the antitrust laws based solely on the presence of a reverse payment.
This article begins in Section II with an …
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required prong of a multi-pronged liability standard is fundamentally flawed. The profit-sacrifice test may be useful, for example, as one type of evidence of anticompetitive purpose. In unilateral refusal to deal cases, it can be useful in determining the non-exclusionary benchmark. However, the test is not generally a reliable indicator of the impact of allegedly exclusionary conduct on consumer welfare - the primary focus of the antitrust laws. The profit-sacrifice test also is prone to …