Tax Avoidance And The Design Of The Tax Structure,
2011
Toulouse School of Economics
Tax Avoidance And The Design Of The Tax Structure, Georges Casamatta
Georges Casamatta
We study the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxes in the presence of tax avoidance. It is shown that a linear consumption tax is part of the optimal tax scheme, and so even when the assumptions of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem are not satisfied. The reason is that taxing consumption is a way to tax true income, whereas income taxation only falls on reported income. We also show that, with a weakly separable utility function and linear Engel curves, tax rates should be uniform across goods. With nonlinear Engel curves, which good should be taxed more depends on the comparison …
Choosing The Legal Retirement Age In Presence Of Unemployment,
2011
Toulouse School of Economics
Choosing The Legal Retirement Age In Presence Of Unemployment, Georges Casamatta, Caroline De Paoli
Georges Casamatta
A general conclusion of the theoretical literature on pensions is, confronted to an increased longevity, to encourage continued activity. This literature however assumes a perfect labour market. The central question addressed in this article is whether it is still desirable to increase the retirement age when individuals face the risk of being unemployed. In this purpose, we study the design of the Pay-As-You-Go pension system, focusing on the determination of the retirement age, in a model where people differ according to age only and face in every period a given probability of becoming unemployed. We first determine the optimal pension …
Optimal Income Taxation With Tax Avoidance,
2011
Toulouse School of Economics
Optimal Income Taxation With Tax Avoidance, Georges Casamatta
Georges Casamatta
We follow the approach of Grochulski (2007), who determines the optimal income tax schedule when individuals have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes. We however modify his setup by considering a convex concealment cost function. This assumption violates the subadditivity property used in Grochulski (2007) and this has strong implications for the design of the tax schedule. This latter indeed shows that, with subadditivity, all individuals should declare their true income. Tax avoidance is thus not optimal. With a convex cost function, we find that a subset of individuals, located in the interior of the income distribution, should be allowed …
Employment Relations In Belgium And The Netherlands,
2011
University of Amsterdam
Employment Relations In Belgium And The Netherlands, Hester Houwing, Maarten Keune, Philippe Pochet, Kurt Vandaele
Kurt Vandaele
No abstract provided.
De Belgische Stakingsdata: Beperkingen En Mogelijkheden Voor De Studie Naar Het Stakingsverschijnsel,
2011
ETUI
De Belgische Stakingsdata: Beperkingen En Mogelijkheden Voor De Studie Naar Het Stakingsverschijnsel, Kurt Vandaele
Kurt Vandaele
No abstract provided.
Sustaining Or Abandoning ‘Social Peace’? Strike Development And Trends In Europe Since The 1990s,
2011
ETUI
Sustaining Or Abandoning ‘Social Peace’? Strike Development And Trends In Europe Since The 1990s, Kurt Vandaele
Kurt Vandaele
No abstract provided.
A World Without Intellectual Property?: Boldrin And Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly,
2011
Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley
A World Without Intellectual Property?: Boldrin And Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Revising The Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons From The U.S. And The E.U. (With Daniel Rubinfeld),
2011
Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley
Revising The Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons From The U.S. And The E.U. (With Daniel Rubinfeld), Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Efficient Division Of Profits From Complementary Innovations,
2011
Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley
Efficient Division Of Profits From Complementary Innovations, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
No abstract provided.
Deal Or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations,
2011
Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley
Deal Or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations, Richard J. Gilbert
Richard J Gilbert
Owners of patents with claims that are essential to a standard may charge high royalties for the use of products that comply with the standard. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have addressed this concern by seeking to obtain commitments from participating patent owners to license their essential patents at terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). More recently, SSOs have considered joint negotiations by their members with patent owners to more clearly establish licensing terms before the standard issues. However joint negotiation may allow potential licensees to suppress royalty terms below a technology’s economic value. This paper advances an alternative proposal …
Clash Of Classical And Keynesian Schools Of Thought,
2011
Office of the General Counsel
Clash Of Classical And Keynesian Schools Of Thought, Woody R. Clermont
Woody R Clermont
No abstract provided.
Growth And Multifactor Productivity, China, And The Four Tigers Of The East: An Investigation,
2011
Office of the General Counsel
Growth And Multifactor Productivity, China, And The Four Tigers Of The East: An Investigation, Woody R. Clermont
Woody R Clermont
No abstract provided.
Cuiusvis Hominis Est Errare, Nullius Nisi Insipientis In Errore Perseverare,
2011
Office of the General Counsel
Cuiusvis Hominis Est Errare, Nullius Nisi Insipientis In Errore Perseverare, Woody R. Clermont
Woody R Clermont
No abstract provided.
A Global Currency For A Global Economy: Getting From Here To There,
2011
Ph.D. University of Chicago
A Global Currency For A Global Economy: Getting From Here To There, Warren Coats
Warren Coats
In this paper Dr. Warren Coats proposes stabilizing the value of money by linking it to an independently defined unit of account with a relatively constant real value. A common unit of account would lower the cost of trading by reducing transaction and information costs and would increase world trade and improve the efficiency of international resource allocation. The unit he suggests, a commodity basket, would not have the shortcomings that afflict the gold standard-gold's fluctuating relative value. The link between money and this unit that he suggests, fixing the value of a unit of money in terms of the …
What Is The Evidence Of The Impact Of Tariff Reductions On Employment And Fiscal Revenue In Developing Countries?,
2011
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
What Is The Evidence Of The Impact Of Tariff Reductions On Employment And Fiscal Revenue In Developing Countries?, Xavier Cirera, Dirk Willenbockel, Rajith Lakshman
Dr Xavier Cirera
No abstract provided.
Regional Deregulation And Entrepreneurial Growth In China’S Transition Economy,,
2011
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Regional Deregulation And Entrepreneurial Growth In China’S Transition Economy,, Wubiao Zhou
Wubiao Zhou
No abstract provided.
Estimates Of Patient Costs Related With Population Morbidity: Can Indirect Costs Affect The Results?,
2011
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Estimates Of Patient Costs Related With Population Morbidity: Can Indirect Costs Affect The Results?, Pere Ibern
Pere Ibern
No abstract provided.
1. Costly Screening, Self Selection, And The Existence Of A Pooling Equilibrium In Credit Markets (Job Market Paper),
2011
The George Washington University
1. Costly Screening, Self Selection, And The Existence Of A Pooling Equilibrium In Credit Markets (Job Market Paper), Pingkang Yu
Pingkang Yu
This paper presents a credit market model that embeds a costly, universal and imperfect screening technology in an otherwise simple model with borrower self-selection and costly lender screening. Contrary to the result in previous models, such as Wang and Williamson (1998) with random screening, the combination of universal screening and type I screening error produces pooling equilibrium as a non-trivial outcome. This result suggests that generalized lenders engaged in price rationing can sometimes compete with specialized lenders serving a single borrower type in credit markets that relies on costly lender screening as a sorting device.
2. Screening Cost, Credit Risk, And The Optimal Structure Of Mortgage Lending—Origin Of The Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2011
The George Washington University
2. Screening Cost, Credit Risk, And The Optimal Structure Of Mortgage Lending—Origin Of The Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Pingkang Yu
Pingkang Yu
This paper attempts to answer a direct question—who should get mortgage credit and how should that credit be supplied? This question is at the heart of the recent subprime crisis and the efforts to reform mortgage lending through new regulations. This paper develops a credit market model with borrower’s self-selection and lender’s costly screening. Borrowers in the model differ in both screening cost and credit risk. In particular, the model includes fraudulent borrowers and low-risk-high-documentation-cost borrowers. The paper finds that separating equilibrium, where specialized lender serves the targeted type of borrower, is the only feasible market structure in the long …
Miscounts, Duverger's Law And Duverger's Hypothesis,
2011
Bocconi University
Miscounts, Duverger's Law And Duverger's Hypothesis, Mattias K. Polborn, Matthias Messner
Mattias K Polborn
We analyze plurality rule and runoff rule voting games when the vote counting technology is imperfect and each ballot is miscounted with probability $\varepsilon>0$. A strategy profile $s$ is a {\it robust} equilibrium if there is a $\overline \varepsilon >0$ such that $s$ is an equilibrium whenever $\varepsilon <\overline \varepsilon$. We show that all robust equilibria of plurality voting games satisfy {\it Duverger's Law}: In any robust equilibrium, exactly two candidates receive a positive number of votes. Moreover, robustness (only) rules out a victory of the Condorcet loser. All robust equilibria under runoff rule satisfy {\it Duverger's Hypothesis}: First round votes are (almost always) dispersed over more than two alternatives. With three candidates, robustness has strong implications for equilibrium outcomes under runoff rule: For large parts of the parameter space, the robust equilibrium outcome is unique.
