Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Keyword
-
- Identification (13)
- Asymptotic size (10)
- Test (9)
- Confidence set (6)
- Correlated equilibrium (6)
-
- Incomplete information (6)
- Weak identification (6)
- Generalized method of moments (5)
- Voting (5)
- Empirical likelihood (4)
- Moments restrictions (4)
- Nonlinear models (4)
- Partial identification (4)
- Robustness to private information (4)
- Asset pricing (3)
- Asymptotically similar (3)
- Autoregressive model (3)
- Collateral equilibrium (3)
- Confidence interval (3)
- Endogenous leverage (3)
- Evolution of institutions (3)
- Inference (3)
- Kernel (3)
- Likelihood (3)
- Local power (3)
- Moment inequalities (3)
- Nonparametric identification (3)
- Nonparametric inference (3)
- Nonseparable models (3)
- Public goods (3)
Articles 1 - 30 of 89
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Integrated Economic And Climate Modeling, William D. Nordhaus
Integrated Economic And Climate Modeling, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This survey examines the history and current practice in integrated assessment models (IAMs) of the economics of climate change. It begins with a review of the emerging problem of climate change. The next section provides a brief sketch of the rise of IAMs in the 1970s and beyond. The subsequent section is an extended exposition of one IAM, the DICE/RICE family of models. The purpose of this description is to provide readers an example of how such a model is developed and what the major components are. The final section discusses major important open questions that continue to occupy IAM …
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper develops methods of inference for nonparametric and semiparametric parameters defined by conditional moment inequalities and/or equalities. The parameters need not be identified. Confidence sets and tests are introduced. The correct uniform asymptotic size of these procedures is established. The false coverage probabilities and power of the CS’s and tests are established for fixed alternatives and some local alternatives. Finite-sample simulation results are given for a nonparametric conditional quantile model with censoring and a nonparametric conditional treatment effect model. The recommended CS/test uses a Cramér-von-Mises-type test statistic and employs a generalized moment selection critical value.
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper develops methods of inference for nonparametric and semiparametric parameters defined by conditional moment inequalities and/or equalities. The parameters need not be identified. Confidence sets and tests are introduced. The correct uniform asymptotic size of these procedures is established. The false coverage probabilities and power of the CS’s and tests are established for fixed alternatives and some local alternatives. Finite-sample simulation results are given for a nonparametric conditional quantile model with censoring and a nonparametric conditional treatment effect model. The recommended CS/test uses a Cramér-von-Mises-type test statistic and employs a generalized moment selection critical value.
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Nonparametric Inference Based On Conditional Moment Inequalities, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xiaoxia Shi
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper develops methods of inference for nonparametric and semiparametric parameters defined by conditional moment inequalities and/or equalities. The parameters need not be identified. Confidence sets and tests are introduced. The correct uniform asymptotic size of these procedures is established. The false coverage probabilities and power of the CS’s and tests are established for fixed alternatives and some local alternatives. Finite-sample simulation results are given for a nonparametric conditional quantile model with censoring and a nonparametric conditional treatment effect model. The recommended CS/test uses a Cramér-von-Mises-type test statistic and employs a generalized moment selection critical value.
Prizes Versus Wages With Envy And Pride, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko
Prizes Versus Wages With Envy And Pride, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).
Greek Debt And American Debt: Graduation Speech At The University Of Athens Economics And Business School, John Geanakoplos
Greek Debt And American Debt: Graduation Speech At The University Of Athens Economics And Business School, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This is the graduation speech I gave on receiving an honorary doctorate at the University of Athens Economics and Business School. I talk about my Greek family, about how I got interested in economics, and then how in the 1990s I came to think about default, collateral, and leverage as the central features of the financial/macro economy, despite their complete absence (even now) from any textbooks. Finally I suggest that the Greek debt problem, and on a bigger scale, the American debt problem, can only be cured when lenders are prodded to forgive. That would be better for the borrowers …
Pricing Under The Threat Of Piracy: Flexibility And Platforms For Digital Goods, Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker
Pricing Under The Threat Of Piracy: Flexibility And Platforms For Digital Goods, Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management policy for a digital good subject to piracy. Consumers can acquire the digital good either as a licensed product or as an unlicensed copy. The ease of access to unlicensed copies is increasing in the flexibility accorded to licensed copies. The content provider has to trade off consumers’ valuation of a licensed copy against the sales lost to piracy. We enrich the basic model by introducing a “secure platform” that is required to use the digital good. We show that the platform allows for the socially optimal provision of …
Sensitivity Analysis In Semiparametric Likelihood Models, Xiaohong Chen, Elie Tamer, Alexander Torgovitsky
Sensitivity Analysis In Semiparametric Likelihood Models, Xiaohong Chen, Elie Tamer, Alexander Torgovitsky
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We provide methods for inference on a finite dimensional parameter of interest, θ in Re ^{ d _θ}, in a semiparametric probability model when an infinite dimensional nuisance parameter, g , is present. We depart from the semiparametric literature in that we do not require that the pair (θ, g ) is point identified and so we construct confidence regions for θ that are robust to non-point identification. This allows practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their estimates of θ to specification of g in a likelihood setup. To construct these confidence regions for θ, we invert a profiled sieve …
Monitoring Leverage, John Geanakoplos, Lasse H. Pedersen
Monitoring Leverage, John Geanakoplos, Lasse H. Pedersen
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We discuss how leverage can be monitored for institutions, individuals, and assets. While traditionally the interest rate has been regarded as the important feature of a loan, we argue that leverage is sometimes even more important. Monitoring leverage provides information about how risk builds up during booms as leverage rises and how crises start when leverage on new loans sharply declines. Leverage data is also a crucial input for crisis management and lending facilities. Leverage at the asset level can be monitored by down payments or margin requirement or and haircuts, giving a model-free measure that can be observed directly, …
Nota Bene; Volume Xxvi, Number Ii, Yale University Library
Nota Bene; Volume Xxvi, Number Ii, Yale University Library
Nota Bene
Nota Bene is published during the academic year to acquaint the Yale community and others with the resources of the Yale Library.
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium And The Comparison Of Information Structures, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium And The Comparison Of Information Structures, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. We describe a partial order on many player information structures — which we call individual sufficiency — under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of …
Gmm Estimation And Uniform Subvector Inference With Possible Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Gmm Estimation And Uniform Subvector Inference With Possible Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper determines the properties of standard generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) in moment condition models in which some parameters are unidentified or weakly identified in part of the parameter space. The asymptotic distributions of GMM estimators are established under a full range of drifting sequences of true parameters and distributions. The asymptotic sizes (in a uniform sense) of standard GMM tests and CS’s are established. The paper also establishes the correct asymptotic sizes of “robust” GMM-based Wald, t , and quasi-likelihood ratio tests and CS’s whose critical values are designed to yield robustness …
On Bartlett Correctability Of Empirical Likelihood In Generalized Power Divergence Family, Lorenzo Camponovo, Taisuke Otsu
On Bartlett Correctability Of Empirical Likelihood In Generalized Power Divergence Family, Lorenzo Camponovo, Taisuke Otsu
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Baggerly (1998) showed that empirical likelihood is the only member in the Cressie-Read power divergence family to be Bartlett correctable. This paper strengthens Baggerly’s result by showing that in a generalized class of the power divergence family, which includes the Cressie-Read family and other nonparametric likelihood such as Schennach’s (2005, 2007) exponentially tilted empirical likelihood, empirical likelihood is still the only member to be Bartlett correctable.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation And Uniform Inference With Sporadic Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Maximum Likelihood Estimation And Uniform Inference With Sporadic Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper analyzes the properties of a class of estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) when the parameters are not identified in parts of the parameter space. Specifically, we consider estimator criterion functions that are sample averages and are smooth functions of a parameter theta. This includes log likelihood, quasi-log likelihood, and least squares criterion functions. We determine the asymptotic distributions of estimators under lack of identification and under weak, semi-strong, and strong identification. We determine the asymptotic size (in a uniform sense) of standard t and quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) tests and CS’s. We provide methods of constructing QLR tests …
A Theory Of Asset Prices Based On Heterogeneous Information, Elias Albagli, Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski
A Theory Of Asset Prices Based On Heterogeneous Information, Elias Albagli, Christian Hellwig, Aleh Tsyvinski
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main element determining prices of different securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formulating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and tractable, yet flexible in the specification of cash flow risks. We show that the noisy aggregation of heterogeneous investor beliefs drives a systematic wedge between the impact of fundamentals on an asset price, and the corresponding impact on cash flow expectations. The key intuition behind the wedge is that the identity of the marginal trader has to shift for different …
Meritocracy Voting: Measuring The Unmeasurable, Peter C.B. Phillips
Meritocracy Voting: Measuring The Unmeasurable, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Learned societies commonly carry out selection processes to add new fellows to an existing fellowship. Criteria vary across societies but are typically based on subjective judgments concerning the merit of individuals who are nominated for fellowships. These subjective assessments may be made by existing fellows as they vote in elections to determine the new fellows or they may be decided by a selection committee of fellows and officers of the society who determine merit after reviewing nominations and written assessments. Human judgment inevitably plays a central role in these determinations and, notwithstanding its limitations, is usually regarded as being a …
Optimally Empty Promises And Endogenous Supervision, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen
Optimally Empty Promises And Endogenous Supervision, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts, incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with “empty promises” and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally make more promises than they intend to keep, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation And Uniform Inference With Sporadic Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Maximum Likelihood Estimation And Uniform Inference With Sporadic Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper analyzes the properties of a class of estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) when the parameters are not identified in parts of the parameter space. Specifically, we consider estimator criterion functions that are sample averages and are smooth functions of a parameter theta. This includes log likelihood, quasi-log likelihood, and least squares criterion functions. We determine the asymptotic distributions of estimators under lack of identification and under weak, semi-strong, and strong identification. We determine the asymptotic size (in a uniform sense) of standard t and quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) tests and CS’s. We provide methods of constructing QLR tests …
Gmm Estimation And Uniform Subvector Inference With Possible Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Gmm Estimation And Uniform Subvector Inference With Possible Identification Failure, Donald W.K. Andrews, Xu Cheng
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper determines the properties of standard generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators, tests, and confidence sets (CS’s) in moment condition models in which some parameters are unidentified or weakly identified in part of the parameter space. The asymptotic distributions of GMM estimators are established under a full range of drifting sequences of true parameters and distributions. The asymptotic sizes (in a uniform sense) of standard GMM tests and CS’s are established. The paper also establishes the correct asymptotic sizes of “robust” GMM-based Wald, t; and quasi-likelihood ratio tests and CS’s whose critical values are designed to yield robustness to …
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption, investment in production, and replenishing/ refurbishing a depreciating public facility in a dynamic game with long-term investment opportunities. The public facility is financed either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or taxes. We find that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an intermediate level (far from zero or 100%), and the experimental economies sustain public goods at levels between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under VAC. Both the payoff …
Testing For Common Trends In Semiparametric Panel Data Models With Fixed Effects, Yonghui Zhang, Liangjun Su, Peter C.B. Phillips
Testing For Common Trends In Semiparametric Panel Data Models With Fixed Effects, Yonghui Zhang, Liangjun Su, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper proposes a nonparametric test for common trends in semiparametric panel data models with fixed effects based on a measure of nonparametric goodness-of-fit (R²). We first estimate the model under the null hypothesis of common trends by the method of profile least squares, and obtain the augmented residual which consistently estimates the sum of the fixed effect and the disturbance under the null. Then we run a local linear regression of the augmented residuals on a time trend and calculate the nonparametric R² for each cross section unit. The proposed test statistic is obtained by averaging all cross sectional …
Correlated Equilibrium In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Correlated Equilibrium In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Estimates Of The Social Cost Of Carbon: Background And Results From The Rice-2011 Model, William D. Nordhaus
Estimates Of The Social Cost Of Carbon: Background And Results From The Rice-2011 Model, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A new and important concept in global warming economics and policy is the social cost of carbon or SCC. This concept represents the economic cost caused by an additional ton of carbon-dioxide emissions or its equivalent. The present study describes the development of the concept as well as its analytical background. We estimate the SCC using an updated version of the RICE-2011 model. Additional concerns are uncertainty about different aspects of global warming as well as the treatment of different countries or generations. The most important results are: First, the estimated social cost of carbon for the current time (2015) …
Optimism And Pessimism With Expected Utility, David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen
Optimism And Pessimism With Expected Utility, David Dillenberger, Andrew Postlewaite, Kareen Rozen
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Savage (1954) provided a set of axioms on preferences over acts that were equivalent to the existence of an expected utility representation. We show that in addition to this representation, there is a continuum of other “expected utility” representations in which for any act, the probability distribution over states depends on the corresponding outcomes. We suggest that optimism and pessimism can be captured by the stake-dependent probabilities in these alternative representations; e.g., for a pessimist, the probability of every outcome except the worst is distorted down from the Savage probability. Extending the DM’s preferences to be defined on both subjective …
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Theory And Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Theory And Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public facility is financed either by anonymous voluntary contributions or by taxing agents on their income from private production. Agents start with an endowment of private goods and money, while the government starts with an endowment of public good and money. All private goods produced are tendered for sale in exchange for money in a sell-all market mechanism. Agents’ proceeds from sale are taxed, and they individually allocate their private goods between current consumption and investment in production for the following period. The optimal levels of supply …
Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption, investment in production and maintenance of a depreciating public facility. The public facility is financed either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or taxes. We find that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%, and the experimental economies sustain public goods at levels between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC). Both the payoff efficiency and production …
Career Concerns With Coarse Information, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner
Career Concerns With Coarse Information, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker’s skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are strategic substitutes. Equilibrium effort (and, if marginal cost is convex, wage) is single-peaked with seniority. The agent works too little, too late. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. If the firm commits to wages but faces competition, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages as well as severance pay.
Career Concerns And Market Structure, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner
Career Concerns And Market Structure, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts, effort and wages are single-peaked with seniority, due to the strategic substitutability of effort levels at different times. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set of Bayes Nash equilibria and the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior information of the analyst …
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Robust Predictions In Games With Incomplete Information, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information …