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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts
Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each component is insured. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within extended family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks.
Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts
Insurance In Extended Family Networks, Orazio P. Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Corina Mommaerts
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic components, allowing us to measure the extent to which each is insured, having accounted for public insurance programs. We apply our framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergenerational structure of the PSID. We find that over 60% of shocks to household income are potentially insurable within family networks. However, we find little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks.
Radical Financial Innovation, Robert J. Shiller
Radical Financial Innovation, Robert J. Shiller
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Radical financial innovation is the development of new institutions and methods that permit risk management to be extended far beyond its former realm, covering important new classes of risks. This paper compares past such innovation with potential future innovation, looking at the process that produced past success and the possibilities for future financial innovation.
Monetary Equilibrium With Missing Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Monetary Equilibrium With Missing Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider a two-period model with missing assets and missing market links, in which money plays a central role and is linked to every instrument in the economy. If there are enough missing market links relative to the ratio of outside to inside money, then monetary equilibrium (ME) exists and money has positive value. The nonexistence of GEI (of the underlying economy) shows up as a liquidity trap in terms of the ME. In sharp contrast to GEI, the ME are generally determinate not only in terms of real, but also financial, variables.
If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You Rich?Belief Selection In Complete And Incomplete Markets, Larry Blume, David Easley
If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You Rich?Belief Selection In Complete And Incomplete Markets, Larry Blume, David Easley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper provides an analysis of the asymptotic properties of consumption allocations in a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers. In particular we investigate the market selection hypothesis, that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. We show that in any Pareto optimal allocation whether each consumer vanishes or survives is determined entirely by discount factors and beliefs. Since equilibrium allocations in economies with complete markets are Pareto optimal, our results characterize the limit behavior of these economies. We show that, all else equal, the market selects for consumers who use Bayesian learning with the truth in the support …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …
Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By specializing the default penalties and imposing an exclusivity constraint on asset sales, we obtain a perfectly competitive version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance. In our model their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it doesn’t.
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) and some moral hazard problems in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it increases the dimension of …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. In contrast to game-theoretic models of adverse selection, our perfectly competitive framework eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. The …
Default In A General Equilibrium Model With Incomplete Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default In A General Equilibrium Model With Incomplete Markets, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) to allow for default. The equilibrating variables include aggregate default levels, as well as prices of assets and commodities. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill-fortune. It can be caused by events directly affecting the borrower, or indirectly as part of a chain reaction in which a borrower cannot repay because he himself has not been repaid. Each asset is defined by its promises A , the penalties lambda for default, and the limitations Q on its sale. The model is thus named GE ( A …
An Introduction To General Equilibrium With Incomplete Asset Markets, John Geanakoplos
An Introduction To General Equilibrium With Incomplete Asset Markets, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
I survey the major results in the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets. I also introduce the papers in this volume and offer a few suggestions for further work.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model As A General Equilibrium With Incomplete Markets, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
The Capital Asset Pricing Model As A General Equilibrium With Incomplete Markets, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We recast the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the broader context of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI). In this setting we give proofs of three properties of CAPM equilibria: they are efficient, asset prices lie on a “security market line,” and all agents hold the same two mutual funds. The first property requires a riskless asset, the latter two do not. We show that across all GEI only one of these three properties of equilibrium is generally valid: asset prices depend on covariances, not variances. We extend CAPM to many consumption goods in such a way that all …
Liquidity And Bankruptcy With Incomplete Markets: Pure Exchange, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Liquidity And Bankruptcy With Incomplete Markets: Pure Exchange, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We enlarge the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete market (GEI), to incorporate liquidity constraints as well as the possibility of bankruptcy and default. A new equilibrium results, which we abbreviate GELBI (general equilibrium with liquidity, bankruptcy and incomplete markets). When the supply of bank money and bankruptcy/default penalties are taken sufficiently high (the high regime), GEI occur as GELBI. But outside the high regime many new phenomena appear: money is (almost) never neutral, it has positive value and its optimum quantity is often finite; bankruptcy and default not only occur in equilibrium but can have welfare improving consequences …