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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- California (1)
- Collateral Consequences (1)
- Criminal Law (1)
- Fictional Pleas (1)
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Learning From Land Use Reforms: Housing Outcomes And Regulatory Change, Noah Kazis
Learning From Land Use Reforms: Housing Outcomes And Regulatory Change, Noah Kazis
Law & Economics Working Papers
This essay serves as the introduction for an edited, interdisciplinary symposium of articles studying recent land use reforms at the state and local level. These papers provide important descriptive analyses of a range of policy interventions, using quantitative and qualitative methods to provide new empirical insights into zoning reform strategies.
After situating and summarizing the collected articles, the Introduction draws out shared themes. For example, these essays demonstrate the efficacy of recent reforms, not only at facilitating housing production but at doing so in especially difficult contexts (like when producing affordable housing and redeveloping single-family neighborhoods). They point to the …
Collusive Prosecution, Ben A. Mcjunkin, J.J. Prescott
Collusive Prosecution, Ben A. Mcjunkin, J.J. Prescott
Law & Economics Working Papers
In this Article, we argue that increasingly harsh collateral consequences have surfaced an underappreciated and undertheorized dynamic of criminal plea bargaining. Collateral consequences that mostly or entirely benefit third parties (such as other communities or other states) create an interest asymmetry that prosecutors and defendants can exploit in plea negotiations. In particular, if a prosecutor and a defendant can control the offense of conviction (often through what some term a “fictional plea”), they can work together to evade otherwise applicable collateral consequences, such as deportation or sex-offender registration and notification. Both parties arguably benefit: Prosecutors can leverage collateral consequences to …