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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Testimony Before The House Committee On National Security And The House Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, George H. Baker Iii
Testimony Before The House Committee On National Security And The House Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
The Commission to Assess the threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse, on which I served as principal staff, made a compelling case for protecting critical infrastructure against the nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) caused by severe solar storms. Their 2008 Critical Infrastructure Report explains EMP effects, consequences, and protection means for critical infrastructure sectors. EMP and GMD are particularly challenging in that they interfere with electrical power and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all critical infrastructures. The affected geography may be continental in scale. EMP and GMD events thus represent …
National Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (Emp) And Solar Storm Geomagnetic Disturbance Catastrophes, George H. Baker Iii
National Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (Emp) And Solar Storm Geomagnetic Disturbance Catastrophes, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack has provided a compelling case for protecting civilian infrastructure against the effects of EMP and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) caused by severe solar storms. Similar to protecting critical infrastructure against any hazard, it will be important to take a risk-based priority approach for these two electromagnetic threats, recognizing that it will be fiscally impracticable to protect everything. In this regard, EMP and GMD are particularly challenging in that they interfere with electrical and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all critical infrastructures, simultaneously, …
Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii
Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
EMP and solar storm wide geographic coverage and ubiquitous system effects beg the question of “Where to begin?” with protection efforts. Thus, in addressing these “wide area electromagnetic (EM) effects,” we must be clever in deciding where to invest limited resources. Based on simple risk analysis, the electric power and communication infrastructures emerge as the highest priority for EM protection. Programs focused on these highest risk infrastructures will go a long way in lessoning societal impact. Given the national scope of the effects, such programs must be coordinated at the national level but implemented at local level. Because wide-area EM …
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
Two electromagnetic phenomena have the potential to create continental-scale disasters. The first, nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), results from a nuclear detonation high above the tropopause. The second, a major solar storm, or "solar tsunami" occurs naturally when an intense wave of charged particles from the sun perturbs the earth's magnetic field. Both phenomena can debilitate electrical and electronic systems necessary for the operation of infrastructure systems and services. One reason why a U.S. protection program has yet to be initiated is that policy makers continue to wrestle with the question of where to begin, given the Department of Homeland Security’s …
Emp: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
Emp: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
A nuclear detonation at altitudes from about 30 to 500 kilometers generates a strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that propagates to points on the ground within the line-of-sight of the burst. For bursts above 100 kilometers, electronics can be affected over continental scale areas. The EMP induces large voltages and currents in antennas and cables of electronic systems that will upset operation or damage circuit components if protection measures are not present. The article provides a brief tutorial on EMP environments, effects and protection.
High Power Electromagnetic Weapons: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
High Power Electromagnetic Weapons: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
High power electromagnetic weapons, also referred to as high power radiofrequency (HPRF) weapons, are a type of directed energy weapons. The system effects of high power electromagnetic environments are well recognized by world scientific and military communities. Former CIA Director John Deutch has said that, "the electron is the ultimate precision-guided weapon." In the course of the investigation ofnuclear EMP effects on electronics during the Cold War period, it became evident that garden variety, unprotected electronics would malfunction, in some cases burn out, in the presence of electromagnetic fields in the hundreds to thousands of volts per meter. The EMP …
Proceedings Of The 2009 Nrc Federal Facilities Council/James Madison University Symposium On Protecting Large Facility Complexes;, George H. Baker, Cheryl E. Wilkins
Proceedings Of The 2009 Nrc Federal Facilities Council/James Madison University Symposium On Protecting Large Facility Complexes;, George H. Baker, Cheryl E. Wilkins
George H Baker
Large, complex facilities pose unique protection challenges involving multidisciplinary expertise and collaboration among government, academia, and the private sector. The symposium served as a forum for sharing experiences in dealing with large facility catastrophic events and risk management. The symposium was organized based on the value of interaction among different people representing diverse disciplines. In many instances, such interactions lead to solutions that would not have been developed within disciplinary stovepipes. The venue was divided into three panels addressing physical security, cyber security, and real facility case studies. We were also privileged to have three keynote speakers including Dr. Charles …
Homeland Security: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
Homeland Security: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
George H Baker
Recent U.S. high consequence events have clarified the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefit of such collaboration was one of the most important lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. At our 2007 Symposium, General Russel Honoré, who led the National Guard response to Katrina stated, “We need the partnering between local, state, and …
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
George H Baker
Because the operation and control of most critical infrastructures are highly dependent on electronics, it is important to understand the vulnerability of those electronics to intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI). The possibility of interference using readily available consumer devices is a particular concern. We investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of using compact stun guns to intentionally interfere with electronic systems. Test articles included individual computers and computers networked through a central hub. 60KV and 600KV devices were used in the experiments. Results indicate that stun guns are effective in disabling digital electronic systems.
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
George H Baker
The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures (“critical national infrastructures”) whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these frastructures to threats — deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature — is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. This report presents the results of the Commission’s …
Summary Of 2008 Homeland Security Symposium At The National Academies: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
Summary Of 2008 Homeland Security Symposium At The National Academies: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
George H Baker
Recent U.S. high consequence events have made clear the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefits of such collaboration were clearly seen as a lesson from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. General Russel Honoré who led the National Guard response to Katrina has said, “We need the partnering between local, state, and federal governments; but the …
Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
George H Baker
No critical infrastructure is self-sufficient. The complexity inherent in the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems complicates planning and preparedness for system failures. Recent wide-scale disruption of infrastructure on the Gulf Coast due to weather, and in the Northeast due to electric power network failures, dramatically illustrate the problems associated with mitigating cascading effects and responding to cascading infrastructure failures once they have occurred.
The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry …
Electric Power: Cyber And Electromagnetic Security Issues, George H. Baker
Electric Power: Cyber And Electromagnetic Security Issues, George H. Baker
George H Baker
Electric power is essential to the functioning of U.S. society. The electric power system increasingly operates at or near its reliability limits. The geographic scale of the tightly coupled networks involved makes the system susceptible to large-scale outages. More frequent natural and accidental failures portend possible catastrophes from intentional disruption. Deregulation has been a major factor to the lack of investment in system upgrades. Techniques to prevent attacks and reduce vulnerabilities are available and affordable.
Homeland Security: Engaging The Frontlines - Symposium Proceedings, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
Homeland Security: Engaging The Frontlines - Symposium Proceedings, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott
George H Baker
The rise of the American homeland security endeavor under the leadership of the new Department of Homeland Security has been heralded by several major national strategy documents. These documents have served to organize efforts at top levels within the government and industry. However, the national strategy guidance is not getting to many organizations and people at the grass-roots level who can make the most difference in preventing attacks, protecting systems, and recovering from catastrophic events, viz. the general citizenry, private infrastructure owners, and local governments. To better understand grass-roots issues and solutions, James Madison University, in cooperation with the Federal …
Network Security Risk Assessment Modeling Tools For Critical Infrastructure Assessment, George H. Baker, Samuel Redwine, Joseph Blandino
Network Security Risk Assessment Modeling Tools For Critical Infrastructure Assessment, George H. Baker, Samuel Redwine, Joseph Blandino
George H Baker
The James Madison University (JMU) CIPP research team is developing Network Security Risk Assessment Modeling (NSRAM) tools that will enable the assessment of both cyber and physical infrastructure security risks. The effort is driven by the need to predict and compute the probability of adverse effects stemming from system attacks and malfunctions, to understand their consequences, and to improve existing systems to minimize these consequences.
The tools are targeted at systems supporting critical infrastructures varying from individual systems to organization-wide systems, to systems covering entire geographical regions. Early work emphasizes computing systems, but systems sharing the network nature of computing …
Applications Of Underground Structures For The Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker, Richard G. Little, Don A. Linger
Applications Of Underground Structures For The Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker, Richard G. Little, Don A. Linger
George H Baker
The U.S. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), convened in the wake of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, concluded that the nation’s physical security and economic security depend on our critical energy, communications, and computer infrastructures. While a primary motivating event for the establishment of the commission was the catastrophic physical attack of the Murrah Building, it is ironic that the commission focused its attention primarily on cyber threats. Their rationale was that cyber vulnerabilities posed a new, unaddressed challenge to infrastructure security. This approach was further questioned by the events of September 11, …
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (Scada) Systems, George H. Baker, Allan Berg
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (Scada) Systems, George H. Baker, Allan Berg
George H Baker
Our critical national infrastructure systems have become almost universally dependent upon computer-based control systems technically referred to as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems evolved from the telemetry and event-alarm systems developed in the early days of utilities. With the widespread use of SCADA systems, computers have become the "basis element" for much of our critical infrastructure. Thus, the disruption of controlling computer terminals and networks due to natural disasters, electric power failure, accidents or malicious activity can have catastrophic consequences.
Time Domain Probabilistic Risk Assessment:, George H. Baker, Charles T. C. Mo
Time Domain Probabilistic Risk Assessment:, George H. Baker, Charles T. C. Mo
George H Baker
For critical facilities, survivability and reconstitution in stressful environments generated by electromagnetic transients, sabotage, terrorist activity, military conflict, or Murphy’s laws are issues of concern. Critical fixed facilities are likely to be functionally complex and their system-wide failure probabilities, modes, and consequences are often not obvious. To analyze and quantify survivability, existing probabilistic risk assessment tools usually provide a “snapshot” of failure modes at a single point of time for certain initiating conditions. Likewise, elaborate physics models developed to treat weapons effects on structures and individual functional components compute effects at a single time point.
We have developed a tool …
Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems
Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems
George H Baker
This standard establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of transportable1 ground-based systems that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. Systems required to fully comply with the provisions of the standard will be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Military Department Headquarters, or a Major Command.
The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP threat environments. The standard also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection measures …
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
George H Baker
The presentation recommends an approach for unifying electronic system protection designs for a wide spectrum of electromagnetic environments. A general electromagnetic topological construct is developed as the basis for a consistent shielding and terminal protection methodology. Spectral characteristics of multiple interfering electromagnetic sources, both internal and external, are described. Effects addressed include EMI/EMC, lightning, nuclear EMP, and RF weapons. Protection practices for individual effects are discussed and means for integrating these into a single protection topology.
Nuclear Emp Hardening Approach As The Basis For Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker Iii
Nuclear Emp Hardening Approach As The Basis For Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker Iii
George H Baker
Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the clear military advantage that was provided by our sophisticated electronic C4I and weapons systems. High tech means so dominate the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. However, the electromagnetic threat landscape is highly complex. The already formidable list of environments (EMI, lighting, ESD, EMP, HERO, TEMPEST, EW, etc.) is lengthened by emerging threats from high power microwave (HPM) and ultra-wide band (UWB) electromagnetic weapons. Many of these environments overlap in the frequency and amplitude of the electrical stresses they create.
The large number of …
Progress In The Development Of Hemp Protection Standards For C3i Facilities, George H. Baker, Clinton R. Gordon
Progress In The Development Of Hemp Protection Standards For C3i Facilities, George H. Baker, Clinton R. Gordon
George H Baker
DoD is involved in EMP standards development efforts which culminate 25 years of research. This paper previews an EMP protection standard for fixed, ground-based communication facilities. The standard uses a low-risk hardening approach which depends on an electromagnetic barrier comprised of a conducting shield to prevent harmful transients from reaching communication electronics. The standard is the first of its kind and is being instituted as MIL-STD-188-125.
Electro-Optics Applications For Alleviating Emi/Emc/Emp Problems, George H. Baker, Walter H. Hardwick
Electro-Optics Applications For Alleviating Emi/Emc/Emp Problems, George H. Baker, Walter H. Hardwick
George H Baker
No abstract provided.