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Full-Text Articles in Organisms

Telling Stories Without Words, Kristin Andrews Apr 2015

Telling Stories Without Words, Kristin Andrews

Kristin Andrews, PhD

I will argue here that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One reason for thinking that language must be implicated in FP explanations arises from the history of theorizing about the nature of scientific explanation. I will show that there are other models of explanation that are free from the metaphysical linguistic …


It's In Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology, Kristin Andrews Apr 2015

It's In Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology, Kristin Andrews

Kristin Andrews, PhD

I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and …


A Role For Folk Psychology In Animal Cognition Research, Kristin Andrews Apr 2015

A Role For Folk Psychology In Animal Cognition Research, Kristin Andrews

Kristin Andrews, PhD

If we consider that the field of animal cognition research began with Darwin’s stories about clever animals, we can see that over the 150 years of work done in this field, there has been a slow swing back and forth between two extreme positions. One extreme is the view that other animals are very much like us, that we can use introspection in order to understand why other animals act as they do, and that no huge interpretive leap is required to understand animal minds. On the other extreme we have the view that other animals are utterly different from …