Public Law and Legal Theory Commons^™

The Federalism Canons As Ordinary Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Northwestern University Law Review

Scholars remain generally skeptical of substantive canons of statutory interpretation even as courts continue to employ such canons in important cases. Unlike semantic canons, which help judges discern the best meaning of statutory text in context, substantive canons provide tiebreakers when the text is unclear or require special clarity in order for the text to perform certain functions. Among the substantive canons, the so-called “federalism canons” have been singled out for special scrutiny. The federalism canons are a family of canons that require courts to avoid interpreting an act of Congress to divest states of certain sovereign rights or powers—including …

Self-Determination Through Children's Rights: Resisting The Paradoxical Pretext Of Parents' Rights Legislation, Jeremiah Chin

Washington Law Review

Washington state law balances the interests of parents and the state in education, healthcare, and the general wellbeing of children. Despite the fact that children are at the center of emerging controversies, children’s rights are rarely discussed in state legislation debating the obligations and relationships between the state of Washington and parents. In education, for example, RCW 28A.605.005 finds “[p]arents are the primary stakeholders in their children’s upbringing.” While this may be true relative to the state, it overlooks the fact that children are the primary actors, agents, and rights bearers in their own personhood. This Article therefore considers ongoing …

Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith

Northwestern University Law Review

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permit the state to destroy property without compensation whenever it declares an emergency? The long-standing doctrine of necessity empowers the state to do exactly that.

Courts dating back to common law England have permitted governments to claim a privilege of necessity to avoid paying for private property they destroy in times of crisis. The privilege rests on the principle that the public good sometimes outweighs the harm the individual suffers. Today’s courts and academics stretch this principle to its limits, arguing necessity should be used as a vehicle for combating all manner of social …

Something Concrete: How Labor Advocates Can Best Respond To The Ambiguity Of Glacier Northwest, Ateş Serifsoy

Seattle University Law Review

The Supreme Court’s much-anticipated decision in Glacier North-west, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 174 (Glacier) marked a critical moment for workers’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the longstanding practice of Garmon preemption. Yet, initial fears of a significant rollback of workers’ rights, driven by sensational headlines, were met with an unexpectedly narrow Court opinion. This Comment examines Glacier’s implications for Gar-mon preemption and the right to strike. It offers the historical background of the doctrine of labor law preemption before Glacier; presents a detailed analysis of Glacier itself, including its …

Rethinking The History Of The Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation Of An Ancient Statute, Mark Cheung

Maine Law Review

In 1648, the Massachusetts colonial government ordered into print The Book of the General Laws and Libertyes that included an ordinance, commonly known as the Colonial Ordinance. The Ordinance extended private seashore property rights to the low water mark but to no more than one hundred rods beyond the high-water mark. The 1648 Ordinance replaced an earlier version enacted in the Body of Liberties of 1641. While both versions of the Ordinance enumerated public rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation in the foreshore, the 1648 Ordinance provided the critical language extending the private boundary to the low water mark. Prior …

Expanding Public Access By Codifying The Public Trust Doctrine: The Massachusetts Experience, William L. Lahey, Lauren Sandler Zurier, Kenneth W. Salinger

Maine Law Review

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is dramatically expanding public access to the coast through statutory and regulatory codification of the public trust doctrine. Is this legislative and administrative experiment relevant to other states, particularly to Maine? The initial answer to this question may depend on the meaning of the Bell v. Town of Wells decision. For better or for worse, Massachusetts jurisprudence set the course followed by the majority of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Bell. To some, including several of the authors in this symposium, the bearing of the Massachusetts courts leads to a civic wasteland where the public's …

Intellectual Indifference—Intellectual Dishonesty: The Colonial Ordinance, The Equal Footing Doctrine, And The Maine Law Court, Orlando E. Delogu

Maine Law Review

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the recent Bell decision was the fact that it was 4-3, that significant public interests were lost because a bare majority refused to examine, in the detail necessary, the Colonial Ordinance, old and new United States Supreme Court cases, Maine law, or the reasoning of their own colleagues who filed a compelling dissenting opinion in the case. A mere recitation of the dissenting opinion would serve no useful purpose—it is a part of the public record; its rationale speaks for itself. Had the rationale of the dissent been adopted by the majority it would …

Public Trust, Public Use, And Just Compensation, Alison Rieser

Maine Law Review

In its recent decision, Bell v. Town of Wells, the Maine Law Court declined to grapple with one of the major legal conceptual problems presented by the case. The court failed entirely to reckon with the intersection of two competing, dynamic principles of American property law; these principles are increasingly significant in an era of growing conflict between public and private interests in land and natural resources. The first principle protects particular expectations of private owners of property through application of the just compensation (or "takings") clause of the fifth amendment. The second principle recognizes that certain property is held …

The Penal Judgment Exception To Full Faith And Credit: How To Bind The Bounty Laws, Walker Mckusick

Washington Law Review

In the current moment of interstate friction over abortion, the penal judgment exception poses a barrier against interstate enforcement of bounty laws. A doctor who prescribes a medicated abortion to a Texas patient may be exposed to civil liability—even in faraway Washington State. A Washington court asked to enforce a Texas judgment against the doctor is subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution mandates that each state give full faith and credit to judgments rendered in sister states. Under Texas Senate Bill 8 (S.B. 8), any member of the public …

An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Constitutional Equality And Executive Action: A Comparative Perspective To The Comparator Problem, Kenny Chng

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

A general right to equality is a common feature of written constitutions around the world. Interesting questions arise when one seeks to apply such rights to discrete executive acts. The subject of such acts has necessarily been singled out from a multitude of possibilities for the purposes of the act. To determine whether a differentiation has occurred such that like cases have not been treated alike, to what or whom should this subject be compared? The question of how one selects the proper comparator becomes especially significant when one notes that whether the equal protection guarantee is triggered at all …

Common Good Gun Rights, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Defining “Substantial Burdens” On Religion And Other Liberties, Sherif Girgis

Journal Articles

The U.S. Supreme Court seems poised to restore free exercise exemptions from neutral laws that burden religion. But pivotal Justices have asked how to narrow religious exemptions. This Article proposes answers with wide-ranging implications for the future—and limits—of free exercise, and for the doctrine on other liberties.

To date, courts applying exemptions from “substantial burdens” on religion have tended to narrow protections to the detriment of religious minorities. But many fear that expanding exemptions would over-protect Christians in culture-war cases.

Striking a balance will require a sound definition of “substantial burdens.” But the current, strongly pro-religion Court will not impose …

Reframing Article I, Section 8, Richard Primus

Articles

Constitutional lawyers usually think of the Constitution's enumeration of congressional powers as a device for limiting the federal government's legislative jurisdiction. And there's something to that. But considered from the point of view of the Constitution's drafters, it makes more sense to think of the enumeration of congressional powers as primarily a device for empowering Congress, not limiting it. The Framers wanted both to empower and to limit the general government, and the Constitution's enumeration of congressional powers makes more sense as a means of empowerment than as a means of limitation. The major exception--that is, the one significant way …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents and Special Thanks.

Second Amendment Equilibria, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

Equilibrium-adjustment theory, first articulated by Professor Orin Kerr for Fourth Amendment cases, holds promise for rationalizing Second Amendment doctrine going forward. Like the Fourth Amendment, the Second Amendment suggests an initial equilibrium—or actually, multiple equilibria—between government power to possess, use, and control the implements of violence and private power to do the same. And, like Fourth Amendment doctrine, Second Amendment doctrine must contend with both technological and societal change. These changes—e.g., more deadly and accurate weapons, more public acceptance of concealed carry—can upset whatever initial balance of gun rights and regulation there may have been in the initial state. Although …

Legal Constraint In Emergencies: Reflections On Carl Schmitt, The Covid-19 Pandemic And Singapore | Symposium On Covid-19 & Public Law, Wei Yao, Kenny Chng

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The controversial legal theorist Carl Schmitt’s challenge to the possibility of meaningful legal constraint on executive power in emergencies could not be more relevant in a world struggling to deal with Covid-19. Scrambling against time, governments around the world have declared states of emergency and exercised a swathe of broad executive powers in an effort to manage this highly infectious disease. In times like these, if Schmitt is indeed right that emergencies cannot be governed by law, we are on the cusp of (or perhaps have already entered) a post-law world – where the business of government is characterised by …

The Opioid Litigation: The Fda Is Mia, Catherine M. Sharkey

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

It is readily agreed that federal preemption of state tort law alters the balance between federal and state power. Federal preemption is a high-profile defense in almost all modern products liability cases. It is thus surprising to see how little attention has been given to federal preemption by courts and commentators in the opioid litigation. Opioid litigation provides a lens through which I explore the role of state and federal courts and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in striking the right balance of power. My purpose here is not to resolve the divide among the few courts that have …

Double Jeopardy’S Dual Sovereignty: A Tragic (And Implausible) Lack Of Humility, Stephen E. Henderson, Dean Strang

Faculty Articles

The core proposition of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is as intuitive as it is straightforward. After all, if a state could prosecute someone despite her previous conviction or acquittal, then the scope of punishment would be unlimited and its threat unending—the sort of proposition only a tyrant could love. Yet, in Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court once again blessed a dual sovereignty exception that permits just such duplicative prosecutions. We hardly are the first to question this rule, but we submit the Court’s most recent primary mistakes were two. First, the Court began from a …

The Shrinking Constitution Of Settlement, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Sanford Levinson has famously distinguished between the "Constitution of Settlement" and the "Constitution of Conversation." The former comprises those aspects of the Constitution that are clear, well established, and resistant to creative interpretation. The latter comprises those aspects that are subject to ongoing litigation and debate. Although Americans tend to fixate on the Constitution of Conversation, Levinson argues that much of what ails our republic is attributable, at least in part, to the grossly undemocratic and "decidedly nonadaptive" Constitution of Settlement.

This Article, prepared for a symposium on Levinson's coauthored book Democracy and Dysfunction, explains that the Constitution of …

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …

Constitutional War Powers In World War I: Charles Evans Hughes And The Power To Wage War Successfully, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

On September 5, 1917, at the height of American participation in the Great War, Charles Evans Hughes famously argued that “the power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully.” This moment and those words were a collision between the onset of “total war,” Lochner-era jurisprudence, and cautious Progressive-era administrative development. This article tells the story of Hughes’s statement – including what he meant at the time and how he wrestled with some difficult questions that flowed from it. The article then concludes with some reasons why the story remains important today.

Constitutional Law And The Presidential Nomination Process, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has had little direct role in the evolution of that process from congressional caucuses to party national conventions to our current primary-dominated system of selecting convention delegates. Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the principal actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future changes.

The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two axes: government-party, and state-national. The government-party dimension focuses on the tension between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and administering the …

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Queens County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.