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Full-Text Articles in Privacy Law

Platforms, Encryption, And The Cfaa: The Case Of Whatsapp V Nso Group, Jonathon Penney, Bruce Schneier Jan 2022

Platforms, Encryption, And The Cfaa: The Case Of Whatsapp V Nso Group, Jonathon Penney, Bruce Schneier

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

End-to-end encryption technology has gone mainstream. But this wider use has led hackers, cybercriminals, foreign governments, and other threat actors to employ creative and novel attacks to compromise or workaround these protections, raising important questions as to how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the primary federal anti-hacking statute, is best applied to these new encryption implementations. Now, after the Supreme Court recently narrowed the CFAA’s scope in Van Buren and suggested it favors a code-based approach to liability under the statute, understanding how best to theorize sophisticated code-based access barriers like end-to-end encryption, and their circumvention, is now …


Eu Privacy Law And U.S. Surveillance: Solving The Problem Of Transatlantic Data Transfers, Peter Margulies Mar 2021

Eu Privacy Law And U.S. Surveillance: Solving The Problem Of Transatlantic Data Transfers, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Regulating Personal Data Usage In Covid-19 Control Conditions, Mark Findlay, Nydia Remolina May 2020

Regulating Personal Data Usage In Covid-19 Control Conditions, Mark Findlay, Nydia Remolina

Centre for AI & Data Governance

As the COVID-19 health pandemic ebbs and flows world-wide, governments and private companies across the globe are utilising AI-assisted surveillance, reporting, mapping and tracing technologies with the intention of slowing the spread of the virus. These technologies have capacity to amass and share personal data for community control and citizen safety motivations that empower state agencies and inveigle citizen co-operation which could only be imagined outside times of real and present personal danger. While not cavilling with the short-term necessity for these technologies and the data they control, process and share in the health regulation mission (provided that the technology …


Internet Of Things For Sustainability: Perspectives In Privacy, Cybersecurity, And Future Trends, Abdul Salam Jan 2020

Internet Of Things For Sustainability: Perspectives In Privacy, Cybersecurity, And Future Trends, Abdul Salam

Faculty Publications

In the sustainability IoT, the cybersecurity risks to things, sensors, and monitoring systems are distinct from the conventional networking systems in many aspects. The interaction of sustainability IoT with the physical world phenomena (e.g., weather, climate, water, and oceans) is mostly not found in the modern information technology systems. Accordingly, actuation, the ability of these devices to make changes in real world based on sensing and monitoring, requires special consideration in terms of privacy and security. Moreover, the energy efficiency, safety, power, performance requirements of these device distinguish them from conventional computers systems. In this chapter, the cybersecurity approaches towards …


Risk And Anxiety: A Theory Of Data Breach Harms, Danielle K. Citron, Daniel Solove Mar 2018

Risk And Anxiety: A Theory Of Data Breach Harms, Danielle K. Citron, Daniel Solove

Faculty Scholarship

In lawsuits about data breaches, the issue of harm has confounded courts. Harm is central to whether plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court and whether their claims are viable. Plaintiffs have argued that data breaches create a risk of future injury from identity theft or fraud and that breaches cause them to experience anxiety about this risk. Courts have been reaching wildly inconsistent conclusions on the issue of harm, with most courts dismissing data breach lawsuits for failure to allege harm. A sound and principled approach to harm has yet to emerge, resulting in a lack of consensus …


Data Collection And The Regulatory State, Ahmed Ghappour Sep 2017

Data Collection And The Regulatory State, Ahmed Ghappour

Faculty Scholarship

The following remarks were given on January 27, 2017 during the Connecticut Law Review’s symposium, “Privacy, Security & Power: The State of Digital Surveillance.” Hillary Greene, the Zephaniah Swift Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law, offered introductory remarks and moderated the panel. The panel included Dr. Cooper, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Economics & Privacy at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, Professor Ghappour, Visiting Assistant Professor at UC Hastings College of the Law, Attorney Lieber, Senior Privacy Policy Counsel at Google, and Dr. Wu, Professor of Law …


Cybersecurity Stovepiping, David Thaw Jan 2017

Cybersecurity Stovepiping, David Thaw

Articles

Most readers of this Article probably have encountered – and been frustrated by – password complexity requirements. Such requirements have become a mainstream part of contemporary culture: "the more complex your password is, the more secure you are, right?" So the cybersecurity experts tell us… and policymakers have accepted this "expertise" and even adopted such requirements into law and regulation.

This Article asks two questions. First, do complex passwords actually achieve the goals many experts claim? Does using the password "Tr0ub4dor&3" or the passphrase "correcthorsebatterystaple" actually protect your account? Second, if not, then why did such requirements become so widespread? …


Standing After Snowden: Lessons On Privacy Harm From National Security Surveillance Litigation, Margot E. Kaminski Jan 2017

Standing After Snowden: Lessons On Privacy Harm From National Security Surveillance Litigation, Margot E. Kaminski

Publications

Article III standing is difficult to achieve in the context of data security and data privacy claims. Injury in fact must be "concrete," "particularized," and "actual or imminent"--all characteristics that are challenging to meet with information harms. This Article suggests looking to an unusual source for clarification on privacy and standing: recent national security surveillance litigation. There we can find significant discussions of what rises to the level of Article III injury in fact. The answers may be surprising: the interception of sensitive information; the seizure of less sensitive information and housing of it in a database for analysis; and …