Privacy Law Commons^™

Gag With Malice, Shaakirrah R. Sanders

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Article brings agriculture privacy and other commercial gagging laws into the ongoing debate on the First Amendment actual malice rule announced in New York Times v. Sullivan. Despite a resurgence in contemporary jurisprudence, Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch have recently questioned the wisdom and viability of Sullivan, which originally applied actual malice to state law defamation claims brought by public officials. The Court later extended the actual malice rule to public figures, to claims for infliction of emotional distress, and—as discussed in this Article—to claims for invasion of privacy and to issues of public importance or concern.

United …

Automation In Moderation, Hannah Bloch-Wehba

Faculty Scholarship

This Article assesses recent efforts to encourage online platforms to use automated means to prevent the dissemination of unlawful online content before it is ever seen or distributed. As lawmakers in Europe and around the world closely scrutinize platforms’ “content moderation” practices, automation and artificial intelligence appear increasingly attractive options for ridding the Internet of many kinds of harmful online content, including defamation, copyright infringement, and terrorist speech. Proponents of these initiatives suggest that requiring platforms to screen user content using automation will promote healthier online discourse and will aid efforts to limit Big Tech’s power.

In fact, however, the …

Law School News: Logan To Serve As Adviser On Restatement Third Of Torts 11-07-2019, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Facebook V. Sullivan: Public Figures And Newsworthiness In Online Speech, Thomas E. Kadri, Kate Klonick

Faculty Publications

In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free expression—particularly the entangled concepts …

Rwu First Amendment Blog: David Logan's Blog: Discovering Trump 06-22-2018, David A. Logan

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Defamation And Privacy In The Social Media Age: What Would Justice Brennan Think?, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act: The True Culprit Of Internet Defamation, Heather Saint

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review

This Note highlights the growing concern of Internet defamation and the lack of viable legal remedies available to its victims. Internet defamation is internet speech with the purpose to disparage another’s reputation. At common law, a victim of alleged defamation has the right to file suit against not only the original speaker of the defamatory statements, but the person or entity to give that statement further publication as well. In certain cases even the distributor, such as a newspaper stand, can be held liable for a defamation claim. However, liability due to defamatory speech on the Internet is quite different. …

Unwanted Publicity, The News Media, And The Constitution: Where Privacy Rights Compete With The First Amendment, Ernest D. Giglio

Akron Law Review

It is ironic that while recent legal history records the emergence of a constitutional right to privacy, the Supreme Court, in a line of cases from New York Times to Firestone, has restricted the common law tort of privacy. The legal issues are particularly complex and admittedly difficult to reconcile when the public disclosure tort comes in conflict with first amendment privileges. Expansion of the privacy tort need not necessarily impose an unreasonable burden on the news media, provided the Supreme Court distinguishes between defamation and privacy invasion and establishes and applies to the latter wrong its own legal principles.

Cohen V. Google, Inc., Eirik Cheverud

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

In The Matter Of Ottinger V. Non-Party The Journal News, Daniel Haier

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Introduction, Russell L. Weaver, David F. Partlett

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking The Identity Of Anonymous Employee Internet Posters, Margo E. K. Reder, Christine Neylon O'Brien

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Communications systems are now wide open and fully accessible, with no limits in range, scope or geography. Targeted audiences are accessible with pinpoint accuracy. Messages reach millions of readers with one click. There is a chat room for everyone. Most importantly, there is no limit on content. Therefore, employees can register their dissatisfaction by posting a message in a chat room. Moreover, the identity of the posting employee is not easily discoverable due to anonymous and pseudonymous communications capabilities. The nature of these online messages is qualitatively different from real-world communications. By way of example, newspapers have a responsibility regarding …

Silencing John Doe: Defamation And Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Lidsky

Faculty Publications

John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought for symbolic reasons — some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However, these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law doctrines are not responsive to the threat …