President/Executive Department Commons^™

The Unitary Executive And The Federal Reserve, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation — known as the unitary executive theory (UET) — would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the …

Presidential Power And Administrating Injustice In Removal Proceedings, Beth K. Zilberman

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Presidential regime changes often lead to notable shifts in federal policy and raise important questions about how the executive branch manages high-volume adjudication systems within the broader administrative state. While managing an enormous caseload, federal mass-adjudication systems make determinations concerning individuals’ disputes with the government across various subject areas that disproportionately affect disadvantaged populations. The outcomes of these adjudication systems have profound impacts on the lives of vulnerable individuals compelled to appear before these administrative tribunals. The scale and life-altering consequences of these adjudications highlight the need for a deeper examination of the procedural protections afforded by agencies to some …

The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay suggests that, given an ostensibly originalist Supreme Court, the future depends on getting the past right. The unitary executive theory is approaching its political and doctrinal zenith in 2025, at the very moment it is approaching an evidentiary crisis. This essay details that crisis: a subset of misuses and misrepresentations of sources in the unitary executive scholarship. This subset focuses on serious misrepresentations of the Ratifications debates.

The Ratification debates appropriately have become the primary source of evidence for original public meaning, the dominant theory of originalism. The Ratification debates have always been a significant problem for …

Perfecting Our Submission? Mann And Trump, Ruffin And Roberts, Joseph Scott Miller

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Presidential power is vast, both under law and in practice. Who holds presidents accountable, and by what means? Courts wrestle with these intertwined questions of power and accountability. The majority opinion in the 2024 presidential immunity case, Trump v. United States, is eerily resonant, rhetorically, with a notorious judgment enhancing one person’s power over others by shielding that power utterly from criminal-law accountability. That judgment, from 1829, is Judge Thomas Ruffin’s infamous slavery-law opinion for the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Mann. I juxtapose the two opinions, which share jarringly similar claims about the nature of power, rule, …

Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jodi L. Short, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

A contradiction about the role of the president has emerged between the Roberts Court’s Article II jurisprudence and its Major Questions Doctrine jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the president is the “most democratic and politically accountable official in Government” because the president is “directly accountable to the people through regular elections,” an audacious new interpretation of Article II; and it argues that tight presidential control of agency officials lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the “directly accountable president” and the “chain of dependence” as the foundation …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

The Place Of The Presidency In Historical Time, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay arises from a symposium based on Jack Balkin’s book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, which argues that America’s constitutional development is marked by patterns of decline and renewal. I contend that the presidency today has become endowed with outsized expectations borne of popular frustrations with a centuries-old document that is desperately in need of updating. As a result, Presidents enjoy imbalanced and dangerous power to initiate legal reform or stymie it. Going forward, three dynamics are worth watching. First, noisy signals coming from performative transformation can obscure the true source and scope of legal changes initiated by a …

Presidential Control Of Elections, Lisa M. Manheim

Vanderbilt Law Review

In recent decades, presidents of both political parties have asserted increasingly aggressive forms of influence over the administrative state. During this same period, Congress has expanded the role that the federal government plays in election administration. The convergence of these two trends leads to a troubling but underexamined phenomenon: presidential control of elections. Relying on their official powers, presidents have the ability to affect the rules that govern elections, including elections meant to check and legitimize presidential powers in the first place. This self-serving arrangement heightens the risk of harms from political entrenchment and subordination of expertise. These harms, in …

Structural Deregulation, Jody Freeman, Sharon Jacobs

Publications

Modern critics of the administrative state portray agencies as omnipotent behemoths, invested with vast delegated powers and largely unaccountable to the political branches of government. This picture, we argue, understates agency vulnerability to an increasingly powerful presidency. One source of presidential control over agencies in particular has been overlooked: the systematic undermining of an agency’s ability to execute its statutory mandate. This strategy, which we call “structural deregulation,” is a dangerous and underappreciated aspect of what then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan termed “presidential administration.”

Structural deregulation attacks the core capacities of the bureaucracy. The phenomenon encompasses such practices as leaving agencies …

The Executive Branch Anticanon, Deborah Pearlstein

Articles

Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential” effects. While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive branch conduct: judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive branch and the people themselves draw on past …

Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not …

Presidential Whim, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This article describes a new body of legal literature on the presidency. In contrast to older bodies of writing, which emphasize presidential independence, this body of writing emphasizes the dependence of the executive power, and a set of moral values associated with the office: faith, faithfulness, responsibility, honesty, due care, and professionalism, among others. The article considers prospects for enforcing this vision of the presidency in light of the particular problems posed by the Trump presidency. Many writers have complained of President Trump's leadership style, which is abrupt, reflexive, dissembling, and unilateral. I refer to this as the problem of …

The President And Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, And Process, Mary B. Derosa, Ashley Nicolas

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to update them.

Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson

Articles

Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. …

Presidential Factfinding, Shalev Roisman

Vanderbilt Law Review

The modern President possesses enormous power. She can use military force abroad without congressional authorization, impose economic sanctions on foreign powers, or enter into trade agreements with foreign states. She can do all this on her own, with little constraint. Or so it seems. In reality, these important powers, along with numerous more mundane ones, are all contingent on the President first making certain factual determinations. For example, to use force abroad, the President must first determine that the use of force is in the "national interest," perhaps that it will preserve "regional stability" or protect American lives. To impose …

Presidential Responses To Protest: Lessons Jefferson Davis Never Learned, Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner

Law Faculty Publications

In 1865, the Confederacy fell. This is not a secret. In April 1865, in the Virginia village of Appomattox Court House, Confederate General, Robert E. Lee, signed the terms of surrender, thus triggering the beginning of the end of the American Civil War. As writer and historian Fletcher Pratt describes the scene, after signing the terms of surrender, Lee “clasped hands with [Union General, Ulysses S. Grant], stepped to the door and rode out of history.” But neither Lee nor the Civil War has ridden out of history. Indeed, a deep fascination with the American Civil War persists. Well over …

Bureaucratic Resistance And The National Security State, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Modern accounts of the national security state tend toward one of two opposing views of bureaucratic tensions within it: At one extreme, the executive branch bureaucracy is a shadowy “deep state,” unaccountable to the public or even to the elected President. On this account, bureaucratic obstacles to the President’s agenda are inherently suspect, even dangerous. At the other end, bureaucratic resistance to the President represents a necessary benevolent constraint on an otherwise imperial executive, the modern incarnation of the separation of powers, as the traditional checks on the President of the courts and Congress have fallen down on the job. …

Presidential Exit, J.B. B. Ruhl, James Salzman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

"The biggest problem that we're facing right now has to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all, and that's what I intend to reverse when I'm president of the United States of America."

"Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that are major power grabs of authority?"

"President Trump signed the 30th executive order of his presidency on Friday, capping off a whirlwind period that produced more orders in his first 100 days than for any president since Harry Truman. The rash of executive orders …

Sanctuary Networks And Integrative Enforcement, Ming Hsu Chen

Publications

My intended focus is on the widespread response--in cities, churches, campuses, and corporations that together comprise "sanctuary networks"--to the Trump Administration's Executive Order 13768 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States as an instance of the changing relationship between federal, local, and private organizations in the regulation of immigration. After briefly covering the legal background of the Trump Interior E.O., the focus of the Article shifts to the institutional dynamics arising in communities. These institutional dynamics exemplify the beginnings of a reimagined immigration enforcement policy with a more integrative flavor.

Presidents And War Powers, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution vests the president with “executive power” and provides that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” while it endows Congress with the power “To declare War.” These provisions have given rise to two major questions about presidential war powers: first, what should be the president’s role in taking the country to war, and, second, what are the president’s powers to direct its conduct. Historian Michael Beschloss’s new book, “Presidents of War,” examines how presidents have responded to each of these questions across two hundred years of U.S. history.

The major argument of …

Lincoln, The Constitution Of Necessity, And The Necessity Of Constitutions: A Reply To Professor Paulsen, Michael Kent Curtis

Maine Law Review

The George W. Bush administration responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11th with far-reaching assertions of a vast commander-in-chief power that it has often insisted is substantially free of effective judicial or legislative checks. As Scott Shane wrote in the December 17, 2005 edition of the New York Times, "[f]rom the Government's detention of [American citizens with no or severely limited access to courts, and none to attorneys, families, or friends] as [alleged] 'enemy combatants' to the just disclosed eavesdropping in the United States without court warrants, the administration has relied on an unusually expansive interpretation of the president's …

The New Era Of Presidential Immigration Law, Michael Kagan

Scholarly Works

At the dawn of the Obama Administration, Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez wrote: “[T]he inauguration of a new President can bring with it remarkable changes in immigration policy.” At the time they wrote that, this proposition was in some ways more a matter of advocacy than a description of reality. As we approach the election of a new president in 2016, we finally live in the world that Professors Cox and Rodríguez advocated. The election of a new President will likely carry significant immediate consequences for immigration policy. My goal in this short space will be to focus on …

The President And The Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety.... The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.... With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.

Long Wars And The Constitution, Stephen M. Griffin

Schmooze 'tickets'

No abstract provided.

The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …

Stochastic Constraint, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay reviews Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 by Jack Goldsmith (2012).

With The Terror Presidency, Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote, hands down, the very best analysis of the national security issues surrounding President George W. Bush's tenure. In Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, Goldsmith returns to the same set of problems, but adopts a different tack. He argues that the modern wartime Executive is constrained in new ways beyond the traditional system of checks and balances, and that these new constraints combine to create an effective system that checks executive power. Though …

Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last 90 days of presidential administrations. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “Midnight Regulation” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Report, prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, looks closely at one species of Midnight Regulation, namely Midnight Rules, promulgated in the last 90 days of an administration. The Report examines the phenomenon and concludes with recommendations adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States at its …

A Skeptical View Of A Skeptical View Of Presidential Term Limits, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Dean Jeremy Paul is concerned that the presidency has been weakened and that the Twenty-Second Amendment’s limitation on presidential service is at least partly to blame. Dean Paul is clearly correct that once a President reaches the point beyond which re-election is not constitutionally possible, the President is effectively a lame duck. Dean Paul further points out that since 1951 when the amendment limiting Presidents to two terms went into effect, there have been several instances of very poor results in the President’s second term. He attributes the second term problems of some recent Presidents at least partly to term …

Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The President As Scientist-In-Chief, Michele E. Gilman

All Faculty Scholarship

During the Bush Administration, many scientists, both inside and outside of government, asserted that the President was distorting scientific knowledge to achieve political ends. In controlling the scientific output of government agencies, President Bush acted consistently with unitary executive theory. Under this theory, the President can direct the output and discretion of government agencies. This article examines the tension between a unitary executive and government agencies engaged in scientific research and policy making. In particular, the article assesses the legality of two high profile instances in which President Bush allegedly distorted scientific data to achieve his policy objectives: global climate …