President/Executive Department Commons^™

Some Realism About Constitutional Remedies, Thomas P. Schmidt, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has wavered between two approaches to questions of executive power, which are often labeled institutional formalism and realism. Formalism treats an institution like the presidency as a “black box” to which the Constitution assigns certain powers. In Trump v. Hawaii,  for example, the Supreme Court upheld President Trump’s infamous travel ban by focusing not on the “particular President” and his past call for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” but rather on “the authority of the Presidency itself.” That is the language of institutional formalism.

Realism, on the other hand, peers into the “black …

The Unitary Executive And The Federal Reserve, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation — known as the unitary executive theory (UET) — would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the …

Levers Of Default: Can The President Unilaterally Alter The Terms Of The National Debt?, Lev E. Breydo, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

The inviolability of America’s $30 trillion debt is a cornerstone of global markets and the U.S. economy. This Essay identifies a critical loophole: the President’s underappreciated power to dramatically change its legal structure—and argues that Congress should act to prevent a potential catastrophe.

The Essay details, for the first time in the literature, the arcane legal architecture underpinning America’s sovereign borrowings. Our analysis finds that although the President lacks authority to change the terms of outstanding debt retroactively, the President can accomplish similar goals by issuing new debt instruments that embed unprecedented powers. In surprisingly short order, a determined Executive …

The Executive's Takeover Of Independent Agencies: How Institutional Design Gave Way To Political Will, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

The anticipated demise of the independent agency is a saga that implicates Congress as much as it does the President or the Supreme Court. By capitulating to presidential initiatives and failing to defend their institutional prerogatives, Congress has facilitated presidential control of the administrative state. Indeed, irrespective of whether the Court formally repudiates Humphrey’s Executor, Congress has largely acquiesced to a regime whereby presidents essentially control independent agencies. By highlighting the competing incentives of Congress and the White House, this Essay explains the rise of presidential unilateralism vis-à-vis independent agencies. This Essay also casts light on a critically important but …

The Foreign Commerce Power, Kathleen Claussen, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is the first to scrutinize presidential trade authority under the Constitution. The Constitution grants the President no independent power to regulate foreign commerce. That conclusion, while apparent from a straightforward reading of Articles I and II, stands in stark contrast to executive conduct of U.S. trade policy in recent years. This Article traces the roots of this constitutional distortion to a confluence of doctrinal drift and academic oversight. Courts and commentators have increasingly relied on an expansive conception of executive power grounded in a perceived general foreign affairs authority. In doing so, they have blurred the line between …

Rethinking Judicial Power & Remedial Restraint, Caprice L. Roberts

Catholic University Law Review

This Article maintains that groundbreaking Supreme Court cases reshaping judicial power and restraint are frequently remedies centric. The much- anticipated ruling in Trump v. CASA illustrates this correlation. Interpreting traditional equity, the Supreme Court circumscribed federal judicial power to issue universal relief. The Court relied on Marbury v. Madison to bolster its reasoning on the limits of judicial power. Ironically, both cases denied any remedy while enhancing the potential for future judicial power. Whether via judicial review and supremacy power or the Court’s future ability to now be the only federal court able to issue universal remedies—the Court’s role in …

Removal: A Response To Professor Nelson, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

In an essay published earlier this fall, Professor Caleb Nelson argues that, as a matter of originalism, the President does not have a constitutional power to remove executive officers. Professor Nelson is a renowned scholar, whose arguments could well influence the Supreme Court in two upcoming removal cases: Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook. It’s therefore important to evaluate whether his historical claim about removal is correct.

Presidential Regulation, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article documents and analyzes the rise of a new mode of economic governance: presidential regulation. Today, the President regularly bypasses not only Congress but also the executive branch’s own administrative agencies and directly imposes sweeping new economic regulations. President Biden, for instance, created new regulatory regimes governing producers of artificial-intelligence technologies, companies that trade in or hold the personal information of U.S. citizens, and companies that can increase the production of energy-efficient equipment and technology. During his first term, President Trump regulated the kinds of technologies that U.S. telecommunications companies can buy and sell, placed restrictions on the electrical …

The Executive Branch: Powers Of The President & Inaugurations, Wolf Law Library, William & Mary Law School

Library Book Displays

On display in the Wolf Law Library January - July 2025.

War Powers Reform: A Skeptical View, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Debates about war powers focus too much on legal checks and on the President’s power to start wars. Congressional checks before and during crises work better than many reform-ists suppose, and there are ways to improve Congress’s political checking without substantial legal reform.

“Improve Your Privileges While They Stay”: A Guide To Improve The Privileges Of U.S. Citizenship For Everybody, Joshua J. Schroeder

Touro Law Review

In 1767, the young Phillis Wheatley wrote from her position of slavery in the Wheatley home of Boston to “ye sons of Science” at Harvard College, telling them to “improve your privileges while they stay.” She beheld the startling privileges of learning and discovery bestowed upon an elite group of young, rich white men in Boston and celebrated their privileges. Neither did she scorn those whose luck had placed a bounty of privilege upon their laps, for she likely planned to share in that bounty herself, one day. When she was only 13 or 14, Wheatley sublimely encouraged grown men …

The National Security Consequences Of The Major Questions Doctrine, Ganesh Sitaraman, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The rise of the major questions doctrine—the rule that says that in order to delegate to the executive branch the power to resolve a “question of ‘deep economic and political significance’ that is central to [a] statutory scheme,” Congress must do so expressly—threatens to unmake the modern executive’s authority over foreign affairs, especially in matters of national security and interstate conflict. In the twenty-first century, global conflicts increasingly involve economic warfare, rather than (or in addition to) the force of arms.

In the United States, the executive power to levy economic sanctions and engage in other forms of economic warfare …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

The National Security Consequences Of The Major Questions Doctrine, Timothy Meyer, Ganesh Sitaraman

Faculty Scholarship

The rise of the major questions doctrine—the rule that says that in order to delegate to the executive branch the power to resolve a “question of ‘deep economic and political significance’ that is central to [a] statutory scheme,” Congress must do so expressly—threatens to unmake the modern executive’s authority over foreign affairs, especially in matters of national security and interstate conflict. In the twenty-first century, global conflicts increasingly involve economic warfare, rather than (or in addition to) the force of arms.

In the United States, the executive power to levy economic sanctions and engage in other forms of economic warfare …

Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot

Notre Dame Law Review

The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …

The Executive Branch Anticanon, Deborah Pearlstein

Articles

Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential” effects. While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive branch conduct: judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive branch and the people themselves draw on past …

Distinguising Between Core And Peripheral Presential Powers, Harold J. Krent

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Future Of Progressive Regulatory Reform -- A Review And Critique Of Two Proposals, William Funk

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Administrative Truth: Comments On Cortez's Information Mischief, David Thaw

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comments On Executive Ruilemaking And Democratic Legitimacy: "Reform" In The United States And The United Kingdom's Brexit Bt Susan Rose-Ackerman, Nicholas Almendares

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authorty -- Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Civil Servant Resistance At The Epa -- A Response To Jennifer Nou, Joel A. Mintz

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Civil Servant Alarm, Bijal Shah

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Civil servants have long resisted presidential immigration policies. However, bureaucratic by superiors, retaliation against resistance is the norm under the current dministration, despite the fact that this resistance has resulted from principled “dissonance” between civil servants’ understanding of their core responsibilities and the priorities emphasized by new political directives. Rather than condemnation, however, frequent incidents of resistance from divergent factions of the immigration bureaucracy, particularly if met with a harsh response from the President, should be characterized as a “fire alarm” imploring a congressional response.

First, We'll Neuter All The Judges, A. Benjamin Spencer

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Presidential Whim, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This article describes a new body of legal literature on the presidency. In contrast to older bodies of writing, which emphasize presidential independence, this body of writing emphasizes the dependence of the executive power, and a set of moral values associated with the office: faith, faithfulness, responsibility, honesty, due care, and professionalism, among others. The article considers prospects for enforcing this vision of the presidency in light of the particular problems posed by the Trump presidency. Many writers have complained of President Trump's leadership style, which is abrupt, reflexive, dissembling, and unilateral. I refer to this as the problem of …

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …

Executive Underreach, In Pandemics And Otherwise, David E. Pozen, Kim Lane Scheppele

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

When Protest Is The Disaster: Constitutional Implications Of State And Local Emergency Power, Karen Pita Loor

Faculty Scholarship

The President’s use of emergency authority has recently ignited concern among civil rights groups over national executive emergency power. However, state and local emergency authority can also be dangerous and deserves similar attention. This article demonstrates that, just as we watch over the national executive, we must be wary of and check on state and local executives — and their emergency management law enforcement actors — when they react in crisis mode. This paper exposes and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and emergency management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political activity and suggests avenues to counter that abuse. I …

Article Ii Vests Executive Power, Not The Royal Prerogative, Julian Davis Mortenson

Articles

Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presidential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional originalists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. …

Prosecutors At The Periphery, Peter M. Shane

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Contrary to so-called unitary executive theory, Article II does not guarantee presidents the power to control federal criminal prosecution, a supervisory role Congress has placed by statute with the Attorney General. Nor is Congress without authority to protect federal prosecutors from policy-based dismissals. Rule-of-law values embodied in our system of checks and balances could alone justify these conclusions. But the same conclusions follow also from close attention to the entirety of the relevant constitutional text and from an understanding of how the Founding generation would have understood the relationship between executive power and criminal prosecution. In contemplating the newly proposed …