President/Executive Department Commons^™

Mapping Minority Investigative Powers In Congress, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“Shut down the Senate . . .” “Roll over and play dead . . .” In the first hundred days of President Donald Trump’s second term, these were the rallying cries of two far ends of a debate among Democrats about how to respond to the administration’s unprecedented actions. This debate, which rages on today, has been marked by a lack of specificity about the various oversight tools available to members of the minority party in Congress, particularly when they investigate whether the Executive Branch is faithfully executing the laws Congress passes. Scholarship too has focused little on the full …

Legal Academia And Permanent Democracy: The Fault In Our Law Schools, Sara Dillon

DePaul Journal for Social Justice

It is widely recognized that the American Constitution is failing as the foundational document of a modern democracy. Although many basic principles of constitutionalism have faded into irrelevance, with rising authoritarianism eclipsing such core ideals as judicial independence, separation of powers and restraints on arbitrary use of power, America’s nearly 200 institutions of legal teaching and scholarship have provided little in the way of proposals for urgently needed law reform. It is striking that even with so many high-powered academic institutions, so few meaningful proposals for constitutional change have been presented to the public as a way out of our …

A Rendezvous With Destiny: The President's Ftc Removals And The Rule Of Law, George Sakkopoulos

Cleveland State Law Review

In March 2025, the President removed two commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The removed commissioners called the removals unlawful and challenged them in court, citing the FTC Act’s for-cause removal protection and the Supreme Court’s decision in Humphrey’s. After President Roosevelt removed an FTC commissioner, the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s in 1935 upheld the constitutionality of the FTC Act’s removal limitation based on the FTC being expert, nonpartisan/independent, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative. The Court in Seila in 2020 held that the President has “unrestricted removal power” as to the executive branch unless the Humphrey’s exception for “multimember expert …

Keynote Address: Community Over Constitution, Riddhi Mukhopadhyay

Seattle University Law Review

In this keynote address, Riddhi Mukhopadhyay challenges the veneration of the U.S. Constitution by highlighting its origins in exclusion and its continued failure to protect marginalized communities. Drawing from her experience in civil legal aid and gender justice, she argues that the Constitution was drafted to consolidate power among white, wealthy men and continues to reflect that legacy through racial, gender, and class-based inequities. While acknowledging the significance of constitutional amendments and landmark cases, Mukhopadhyay emphasizes that meaningful change has always come from community-led action, not top-down reform. Additionally, Mukhopadhyay calls on lawyers and legal advocates to center community, practice …

Constitutional Futurism As Pedagogy, Jeremiah Chin

Seattle University Law Review

Constitutional Law has transformed from a course on history to a discussion of current events. Cases like Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo reveal that the study of constitutional law is not a static, or even linear, discussion of constitutional text and history. Law is a shifting, changing enterprise that reflects social constructions of power, authority, and identity. How do we teach, learn, and understand constitutional law that is so laden with history, riddled with theories of consistency and adherence to precedent, but ultimately subject …

What Are “Wartime Authorities” And When Can The President Use Them? An Expert Q&A, Tess Bridgeman, Rebecca Ingber, Scott Roehm

Online Publications

The first several months of President Donald Trump’s second administration have been marred by the chaotic and often unlawful use, or threatened use, of wartime and terrorism-related authorities for what are essentially domestic immigration or criminal law enforcement purposes. This is not the first time a president has sought to push the boundaries of his wartime powers, or outright claimed those he did not have, but it may well be the most extreme. Indeed, Trump’s reliance on wartime authorities in contexts entirely divorced from armed conflict, or even the threat of force against the United States, puts the country on …

Legislative Reforms To End Lawfare By State And Local Prosecutors, Elizabeth Beske

Legislative Testimony & Comments

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and Limited Government will hold a hearing on Tuesday, March 4, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. ET. The hearing, "Legislative Reforms to End Lawfare by State and Local Prosecutors," will examine the use of lawfare tactics by the Biden-Harris Administration to weaponize the rule of law against political opponents. It will further highlight legislative reforms to end politically motivated state and local prosecutions.

The Excluded: Where Did Our Rights Come From, Who Paid The Price Trying To Establish Them, And Who Is Trying To Take Them Away? The Centuries-Long Struggle For Inclusion, Jim Brosnahan

University of San Francisco Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Sword, The Purse, And The Pen: The Constitutional Conundrum Of Impoundment, William N. Chance

CMC Senior Theses

This Thesis explores the constitutional conundrum of executive impoundment, the practice by which the President of the United States withholds or delays the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress. Although impoundment has deep historical roots dating back to the Constitution’s Framers, its modern use raises profound questions regarding our separation of powers. This Thesis establishes a functional framework that distinguishes between “routine” impoundments, which promote administrative efficiency, and “policy” impoundments, which may undermine congressional intent. Furthermore, after tracing the development of impoundment from the early Republic through the Nixon Administration and the passage of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, …

Forgive And Forget: Honoring Full And Unconditional Pardons, Philip P. Houle

Maine Law Review

With few words, the Great Bard summarized the popular understanding of full and unconditional pardons as unrestrained acts of mercy which approximate, as best as humans can, the divine ability to forgive and forget. Perhaps in light of that sentiment, the common law held that a royal pardon blotted out any guilt or infamy resulting from commission of a crime, as well as the legal existence of the conviction itself. Following much discussion of the issue, the Supreme Court adopted the forgive-and-forget rule in a series of decisions following the Civil War. Yet, despite clear common law and Supreme Court …

“Improve Your Privileges While They Stay”: A Guide To Improve The Privileges Of U.S. Citizenship For Everybody, Joshua J. Schroeder

Touro Law Review

In 1767, the young Phillis Wheatley wrote from her position of slavery in the Wheatley home of Boston to “ye sons of Science” at Harvard College, telling them to “improve your privileges while they stay.” She beheld the startling privileges of learning and discovery bestowed upon an elite group of young, rich white men in Boston and celebrated their privileges. Neither did she scorn those whose luck had placed a bounty of privilege upon their laps, for she likely planned to share in that bounty herself, one day. When she was only 13 or 14, Wheatley sublimely encouraged grown men …

Narrow But Deep: The Mcculloch Principle, Collective-Action Theory, And Section Three Enforcement, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

In Trump v. Anderson, 144 S. Ct. 662 (2024), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Colorado Supreme Court erred in excluding President Donald J. Trump from the Republican Party's primary ballot in the state.  The Court reasoned that the Constitution makes Congress, not the states, solely responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Scholars of Section 3 have demonstrated that Section 3 is self-executing, so the Court's rationale lacks a sound basis in the original or contemporary meaning of the text of the Civil War Amendments, the original intent of their drafters, or …

The First Amendment To The Constitution, Associational Freedom, And The Future Of The Country: Alabama’S Direct Attack On The Existence Of The Naacp, Helen J. Knowles-Gardner

Seattle University Law Review

Sixty years ago, on Wednesday, April 8, 1964, Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., gave the second of three lectures at The Ohio State University College of Law Forum. These lectures were published two years later in a book entitled The Negro & the 1st Amendment. In the second lecture, Kalven distinguished between direct and indirect threats to the associational freedom of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Kalven categorized the 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson as an indirect effort to control the NAACP.

With the benefit of material obtained from numerous archival sources, …

Command And Control: Operationalizing The Unitary Executive, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still …

Taking Care With Text: "The Laws" Of The Take Care Clause Do Not Include The Constitution, And There Is No Autonomous Presidential Power Of Constitutional Interpretation, George Mader

Law Faculty Scholarship

“Departmentalism” posits that each branch of the federal government has an independent power of constitutional interpretation—all branches share the power and need not defer to one another in the exercise of their interpretive powers. As regards the Executive Branch, the textual basis for this interpretive autonomy is that the Take Care Clause requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and the Supremacy Clause includes the Constitution in “the supreme Law of the Land.” Therefore, the President is to execute the Constitution as a law. Or so the common argument goes. The presidential oath to “execute …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

The Place Of The Presidency In Historical Time, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay arises from a symposium based on Jack Balkin’s book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, which argues that America’s constitutional development is marked by patterns of decline and renewal. I contend that the presidency today has become endowed with outsized expectations borne of popular frustrations with a centuries-old document that is desperately in need of updating. As a result, Presidents enjoy imbalanced and dangerous power to initiate legal reform or stymie it. Going forward, three dynamics are worth watching. First, noisy signals coming from performative transformation can obscure the true source and scope of legal changes initiated by a …

2nd Annual Women In Law Leadership Lecture: A Fireside Chat With Debra Katz, Esq. 03-03-2021, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Can President Trump Be Impeached As Mr. Trump? Exploring The Temporal Dimension Of Impeachments, Harold J. Krent

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Impeachment As A ‘Madisonian Device’ Reconsidered, Amanda Hollis-Brusky

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Senate, The Trump Impeachment Trial And Constitutional Morality, Joel K. Goldstein

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Like “Nobody Has Ever Seen Before”: Precedent And Privilege In The Trump Era, Heidi Kitrosser

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Misguided On-Off Theory Of Congressional Authority, Steven D. Schwinn

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …

Restoring Trust In The Judiciary: A Critical, High Priority Project For The Biden Administration, Richard C. Cahn

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Presidents And The U.S. Constitution: The Executive’S Role In Interpreting The Supreme Law Of The Land, Mitchell Scacchi

Honors Theses and Capstones

In 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued a veto message claiming the same duty as the Supreme Court to interpret the U.S. Constitution. Do modern presidents exercise the principal role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution that President Jackson claimed was their duty, and, if so, in what ways do they choose to articulate their interpretations? The hypothesis is that modern presidents have exercised a principal role in interpreting the U.S. Constitution similar to the interpretative duty expressed by President Jackson, and they perform this duty, in part, through the issuance of veto messages and signing statements. After a content analysis of …

Power Transitions In A Troubled Democracy, Peter L. Strauss, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Written as our contribution to a festschrift for the noted Italian administrative law scholar Marco D’Alberti, this essay addresses transition between Presidents Trump and Biden, in the context of political power transitions in the United States more generally. Although the Trump-Biden transition was marked by extraordinary behaviors and events, we thought even the transition’s mundane elements might prove interesting to those for whom transitions occur in a parliamentary context. There, succession can happen quickly once an election’s results are known, and happens with the new political government immediately formed and in office. The layer of a new administration’s political leadership …

Rethinking The Federal Courts: Why Now Is Time For Congress To Revisit The Number Of Judges That Sit On Federal Appellate Panels, Mitchell W. Bild

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Permissibility Of Acting Officials: May The President Work Around Senate Confirmation?, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Recent presidential reliance on acting agency officials, including an acting Attorney General, acting Secretaries of Defense, and an acting Secretary of Homeland Security, as well as numerous below-Cabinet officials, has drawn significant criticism from scholars, the media, and members of Congress. They worry that the President may be pursuing illegitimate goals and seeking to bypass the critical Senate role under the Appointments Clause. But Congress has authorized—and Presidents have called upon—such individuals from the early years of the Republic to the present. Meanwhile, neither formalist approaches to the constitutional issue, which seem to permit no flexibility, nor current Supreme Court …